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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF BIOSAFETY CLIMATE SCALE AND
SURVEY-BASED ANALYSES OF SAFETY PERCEPTIONS IN BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH AND TEACHING LABORATORIES AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES IN
THE USA
Sivarchana Mareedu
June 28, 2021

Biosafety plays a key role in ensuring safety of researchers’ as well as the public from
unintentional exposures to infectious agents. However, the occurrence of lab acquired infections,
exposures, and safety lapses in biological laboratories underscores challenges in biosafety
program management. The raise in emerging and reemerging infectious diseases and the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic reiterates the need for biosafety and research community to work together.
Literature recommends the application of safety climate in measuring safety culture. The goal of
this dissertation is to quantify biosafety climate and examine associated factors to understand the
gaps between research and biosafety professionals in ensuring safety in biological laboratories.
Multiple studies were conducted to collect primary data through surveys, interviews, and program
evaluation on perceptions of biosafety climate, practices, and measures in place at public
universities in the US. A biosafety climate scale specific to biological laboratories was developed
utilizing exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. The impact of COVID-19
pandemic and biosafety program management on biosafety climate perceptions of research
vii

professionals was examined. A national survey was administered to research and biosafety
professionals to collect data on biosafety climate perceptions at public universities in the US.
Analyses were conducted utilizing appropriate statistical tests such as Chi square, T-test,
Wilcoxon methods, logistic regression, linear modeling, and ordinal regression.
Chapter one provides an outline of the studies undertaken. Chapter two describes biosafety
climate scale development process. Chapter three explores the relationship between COVID-19
pandemic and biosafety climate. Chapter four examines relationship between biosafety climate
perceptions of research and biosafety professionals. Chapter five investigates the relationship
between biosafety program management and biosafety climate. Chapter six presents a discussion
on biosafety program management in the era of COVID-19 and beyond. The seventh and final
chapter summarizes the key findings of this dissertation.
Biosafety climate scale has applications as risk assessment tool as well as a key performance
indicator of biosafety program management. This dissertation makes significant contribution to
biosafety climate literature as the insights gained from it could assist in developing biosafety
programs that facilitate collaboration between research and biosafety professionals leading to
biosafety advancement.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In the recent years, biological laboratory safety or biosafety has received increased awareness in
the field of occupational safety. Biosafety is the discipline that addresses practices, procedures,
and use of equipment for safe handling and containment of infectious microorganisms and
hazardous biological materials.1 Safe handling of hazardous biological materials is essential for
safeguarding the health of not only those who work in biological laboratories but also the public
and the environment.1-8 Exposures to infectious agents and infectious outbreaks at research and
teaching laboratories emphasizes the risk involved in biological research.4-10 Incidents of potential
exposures3 leading to lab acquired infections to Salmonella typhimurium,9-10 and deaths due to lab
acquired infections such as Yersinia pestis,3 and Neisseria meningitidis6 have occurred in the
recent times, underscoring the challenges in biosafety. The risk posed by accidents in biological
laboratories is not just limited to personnel working with these agents but also the public and the
environment.1-3 A need to address the challenges in ensuring safety and compliance in research
and teaching laboratories is reflected by current literature8-7 as well as existing evidence of
occurrence of incidents.3,10-11 The need for a stronger safety culture in biological laboratories has
been suggested in literature.12-14 Occurrence of infectious disease outbreaks, lab acquired
infections, exposures, and accidents in biological research laboratories in US universities reflects
the persistent challenges in risk mitigation and safety compliance, that needs to be addressed.
Literature recommends use of concepts such as safety culture utilized in high reliability
organizations to mitigate risks to hazardous organism in research laboratories.13-14 Examining the
drivers of biosafety program can also assist in advancement of the biosafety profession.15-16
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However, there are limited studies that provide insights into biosafety programs at research and
teaching biological laboratories leading to gaps in comprehending the drivers of biosafety. Safety
climate provides a snapshot of culture and is considered a measurable aspect of safety culture.17-22
It can be used as a leading (prospective) indicator of safety23-24 and has wide applications in
occupational safety. Few studies explored the application of safety climate in academic
laboratories25-28 but nothing specific to biological laboratories. Therefore, the overall goal of this
dissertation is to evaluate safety climate and its associated factors to gain insights on safety
perceptions of research and biosafety professionals at biological laboratories at public universities
in the US. To accomplish this objective, the following specific aims were addressed in chapters 2
to 6 of this dissertation:
Specific Aim 1: Development and validation of biosafety climate scale for biological and
biomedical science laboratories in the United States. To develop a biosafety climate scale that is
specific to biological laboratories based on existing safety climate literature.
Specific Aim 2: Impact of COVID-19 pandemic on biosafety climate at University of Louisville.
To determine the associations of biosafety climate perceptions and COVID-19 pandemic.
Specific Aim 3: Assessment of biosafety climate in biological and biomedical laboratories at
public universities in the US. To evaluate biosafety climate perceptions of research and biosafety
professionals and its associations with biosafety practices and biosafety perceptions.
Specific Aim 4: Impact of biosafety program management on biosafety climate at University of
Louisville. To determine the associations of biosafety climate perceptions and biosafety program
management.
Specific Aim 5: Biosafety program management in the era of COVID-19 and beyond. To
examine the perspectives of researchers and biosafety professionals in improving biosafety
program management.
2

Chapter 2 presents a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Applied Biosafety
journal. It provides a background on the need and application of safety climate as a leading
indicator of safety. This chapter details the study taken up to develop and validate a biosafety
climate scale specific to biological and biomedical research laboratories using psychometric scale
development process.
Chapter 3 provides results from test-retest analysis to test the reliability of the biosafety climate
scale and confirmatory factor analysis to confirm the biosafety climate scale construct. It
investigates the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on biosafety climate at University of Louisville
by comparing biosafety climate, biosafety practices, and perceptions of researchers before and
during the pandemic.
Chapter 4 comprises of a national survey of research and biosafety professionals conducting
biological and biomedical research activities at public universities in the US. The results from
confirmatory factor analysis to confirm the biosafety climate scale construct using the national
biosafety climate data are presented.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of biosafety program management on biosafety climate at
University of Louisville. It evaluates the changes made to biosafety program over the period of
2011 to 2021 and its impact on biosafety climate. This chapter presents the perspectives of
researchers on biosafety program management in biological laboratories at University of
Louisville.
Chapter 6 summarizes the perspectives of biosafety subject matter experts on biosafety program
management in biological laboratories. Drawing upon the conclusions of the previous chapters,
the important aspects of biosafety program management in the era of COVID-19 and beyond
were further explored, taking into account the perspectives of research and biosafety
professionals.

3

Chapter 7 summarizes the overall findings, strengths, limitations, significance, and future
recommendations of this dissertation.
The findings of this dissertation will add significant knowledge to safety climate and occupational
safety literature specific to biological laboratory safety. An important outcome of this study
would be the development of a biosafety climate scale that has a multitude of applications as a
tool to quantify safety climate in biological laboratories. The results of this study will aid in
understanding the status of biosafety climate in US public universities and provide insights on
biosafety program management from the perspectives of researchers and biosafety professionals.
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF BIOSAFETY CLIMATE
SCALE FOR BIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE LABORATORIES IN
THE UNITED STATES

Introduction
Biological laboratory safety or biosafety is the discipline addressing practices, procedures, and

1

use of equipment for safe handling and containment of pathogenic microorganisms and hazardous
biological materials in laboratories utilizing principles of risk assessment and containment.1
Ensuring safe handling of hazardous biological materials is crucial for protecting not only those
who work in biological laboratories but also the public and the environment.1,2,3 Infectious
exposures and/or outbreaks at research4-8 and teaching9-10 institutions underscore the risk involved
in biological research. Lab acquired infections and accidental exposures in biological laboratories
could be minimized by improving biosafety programs as reported by Byers and Wooley.11
Experts recognized the need for a stronger safety culture in biological laboratories to address
deficiencies.12 Interest in application of safety culture concepts in biosafety has been expressed by
the biosafety professional community during symposiums, webinars, professional discussions,
and in published literature.13-14 There is a need for identifying key performance indicators, client
satisfaction, and program drivers in biosafety programs.15 Emery et al., highlighted the need to
benchmark performance indicators that track biosafety program outcomes to advance the

This chapter presents the manuscript62 that has been published in Applied Biosafety Journal and is being
shared in this dissertation after receiving the copyright permission from Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers,
Appendix A.
1
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biosafety profession.15-16 Trevan argued that lessons can be learned from other fields that also
focus on prevention and safety culture to improve biosafety.13

The UK nuclear safety panel first defined safety culture as “the product of individual and group
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that can determine
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety management
system”.17 Safety climate is considered to be a measurable aspect of safety culture as it provides a
“snapshot” of culture at a given time.18-19 Zohar defined safety climate as the perceptions of
employees on policies, procedures, and practices about safety within the organization.20 Safety
status is reflected by safety climate, a multi-dimensional construct that evaluates management and
workers’ attitudes and safety commitment.20-22 Over the years, safety climate has been recognized
to evaluate the link between an organization’s characteristics and safety at work.22

Often, lagging (retrospective) indicators23 of safety such as data on exposures, incidents and lab
acquired infections (LAIs) are not readily available making it difficult to assess the safety status
of biological laboratories. Safety climate can be used as a leading (prospective) indicator of safety
without the need for analyzing negative safety outcomes.23-24 This highlights the potential of
safety climate as a useful tool to evaluate safety status in biological laboratories. There are few
studies on safety climate in chemical laboratories25 and higher education institutions26-28 but
nothing specific to biological laboratories. However, the ability of safety climate to predict safety
behavior and safety outcomes has long been established in various fields such as vineyards,
manufacturing, construction, transport, rail, and other industries. 19,22,29-30 Therefore, safety
climate literature from other fields can also inform biosafety. In 2012, a Danish study on how
work environments influence health concluded that higher number of safety climate problems
were associated with increased odds for experiencing accidents in the general working population
of Denmark.22 In a study of residential roofers, safety promotion increased safety behavior
6

indicated by both an increase in use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and decrease in
injuries, indicating positive association of safety climate with better workplace safety.31
Research instruments like measurement scales are utilized to measure theoretical constructs.32 De
Vellis defined scales as “collections of items combined into a composite score intended to reveal
levels of theoretical variables not readily observable by direct means”.33 Scales can be
unidimensional with a single underlying dimension or multidimensional with two or more
underlying dimensions (factors).33 The number of dimensions in a construct might increase with
the abstractness of the construct.33 A multidimensional scale is made up of subscales that
represent one composite score of the construct. 33 A construct can thus be quantified via a scale
with items (questions) that can measure a set of factors (dimensions).19,34

Literature on existing safety climate scales have identified different factors important to improve
safety outcomes. Bronkhorst et al., utilized a safety climate scale to collect and analyze data from
health care workers to study the effectiveness of a multifaceted intervention on safety climate
perceptions and safety behavior.21 They identified three factors in improving safety climate and
safety behaviors. These include leadership priority for safety, supervisor commitment and
co(workers) norms in relation to safety. 21A safety climate scale developed for utility industry
identified that organizational and managerial aspects can be a strong indicator of safe behavior
and safety outcomes.18 Safety climate perceptions among laboratory users was found to be
important in improving safety conditions in college chemical laboratories.25 To identify novel and
context dependent indicators of safety climate perceptions within respective industries, safety
climate scales that are industry specific rather than universal are encouraged.18,34-35 This study
aims to develop a safety climate scale to measure factors affecting workplace environment,
behaviors, and perceptions specific to biological laboratories. It specifically focuses on research
and teaching laboratories at public universities in the United States, as they function under similar
guidelines and regulations set at federal, state, and institutional levels.
7

Rationale & Purpose of the Study
This study’s objective is to develop an industry specific Biosafety Climate (BSCL) scale to
measure perceptions of safety in biological and biomedical science laboratories at public
universities in the USA and validate it using qualitative and quantitative methods. Research
professionals (RPs) and biosafety professionals (BPs) represent two groups with distinct roles.
RPs directly work with potentially infectious microorganisms and hazardous biological materials
utilizing biosafety practices in laboratories. In contrast, BPs facilitate implementation of biosafety
practices and policies in the laboratories by providing on-site policy compliance, guidance, and
administrative support. Although RPs and BPs have distinct roles, they share a common goal of
ensuring safety in biological laboratories. Hence, this study proposes to develop and validate a
BSCL scale that is unique to each group.

Methods
Literature on scale development recommends theoretical and empirical assessments for a
thorough and satisfactory validation of a scale,32-33 which were employed in this study. The
methods consisted of literature review, item identification, feedback from experts, survey
administration and data analysis. The study design and protocols have been approved by the
Institutional Review Board of University of Louisville (UofL), Appendix B. The study
participants did not receive any form of compensation and their identity was kept anonymous.
The development and validation process has been outlined in Appendix C.

A literature review on instrumentation process, scale development, validation methods27,33-34,36-40
and existing safety climate scales across various fields such as utility18, vineyard19, chemical
laboratory25, manufacturing41, rail30 was conducted. The factors (dimensions) and items
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(questions) important to biosafety climate construct were identified. The five factors identified
were: 1) senior management priority, 2) supervisor commitment, 3) communication, 4) safety
participation and 5) group norms. Senior management (or university administration) priority is
considered a main influencer of safety climate for its role in establishing organizational priorities
and resource allocation.21,42-43

Supervisor commitment is regarded as the building blocks of safety climate given the daily
interaction between management and employee.21 Communication is considered an important
factor for its link to safety promotion and motivation.21,44 Safety participation plays an important
role as it contributes to an environment that supports safety.21 Group norms are considered
important due to the influence of coworkers on safety behavior.21,38 Items important to measure
the factors were identified by reviewing safety climate scales developed for Australian
workplaces and Italian manufacturing companies.21,37-38 First, items were examined for face
validity and those that were not appropriate for biological laboratories were removed. Second, the
original items were modified to make them specific to biological laboratories. Example:
employee health and safety were changed to safety; workplace to laboratory. A 15 item Biosafety
Climate (BSCL-15) scale consisting of five factors with three items each was developed.

The Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level (FKGL), a readability test which determines the comprehension
difficulty of written material45-46 was performed using an online tool47 to assess the readability of
the scale. A FKGL indicates the US academic grade level required to comprehend the written
material. Example: a score 10 reflects a grade level appropriate for someone who completed tenth
grade education. A readability rating of 8 is recommended, whereas a rating of 12 is considered
difficult.46
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Assessment of psychometric properties (reliability and validity) ensure that the scale measures a)
the intended construct and b) the construct’s consistency and precision. Cronbach’s coefficient
alpha is commonly used for reliability analysis to measure internal consistency of a scale.48-49
Content validity measure assess if the objectives of the study match with the contents of the items
in the scale.32,50 All statistical analysis performed in the current study utilized IBM SPSS version
27.

Methods Study 1: Development of BSCL Scale
Participant Sampling and Subject Recruitment
The study participants consisted of RPs and BPs. RPs engaged in biological research activities at
UofL were identified with the assistance of biosafety team at UofL. The RPs consisted of
students, principal investigators, and institutional biosafety committee (IBC) members. BPs
participating in biosafety matters at public universities in the USA, who attended the Midwest
Area Biosafety Network’s (MABioN) annual biosafety symposium in 2018 were contacted to
participate in the study.

Survey Administration
A biosafety climate questionnaire was administered to RPs and BPs through SurveyMonkey® in
September 2019. The questionnaire consisted of BSCL-15 scale as well as questions on
background information such as age, gender, educational level, trainings, type of work conducted,
and work environment. All the items were positive, optional to respond and measured on a fivepoint Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
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Data Management and Analysis
The survey data collected was exported into Microsoft Excel for data cleaning and management.
Surveys with at least 85% or more completed responses on the 15 items were included in the
analysis. Any surveys completed by participants who identified their roles as other or both RP
and BP were excluded from the analysis. Readability analysis of the scale was conducted using
FKGL test. Descriptive statistics was employed to describe the individual characteristics of the
survey participants. The items were assessed for internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha.
Content validity was validated through feedback from the study participants on issues of clarity,
ambiguity, general syntax, semantics, and relevance of the item to the BSCL scale.

Results
Sample Size and Participant Characteristics
The biosafety climate questionnaire was sent out to 30 RPs and 13 BPs who agreed to participate.
After three weeks of data collection in September 2019, 9 RPs, 7 BPs and 1 respondent who
identified as both RPs & BPs completed the survey. Sample size requirements were met as a
sample of greater than 5 to 100 is acceptable for pretest.33 The response rate was 30% for RPs and
53.8 % for BPs. The average time to respond to the questionnaire was 13.5 minutes. Only 2 item
responses were missing which was addressed by substituting the missing value with 3 (neither
agree nor disagree) to enable quantitative analysis. Table 1 reports the characteristics of the study
participants. Most respondents of RP survey were male; had a role as principal investigator; had
doctoral level of education and worked in biosafety laboratory level (BSL) 2 settings that utilize
risk group (RG) 2 and 3 agents. The gender for respondents of BP survey was uniformly
distributed between male and female. Most respondents of BP survey had a role as assistant
biosafety officers; had master’s level of education and worked in universities with mostly BSL-3
or lower settings utilizing RG-3 or lower agents.
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Scale Reliability and Validity
The readability of the BSCL-15 scale had a FKGL score of 12.3 for RPs and 12.5 for BPs. The
feedback received from the study participants was organized in Microsoft Excel and reviewed by
Sivarchana Mareedu and Torsten Hopp. Feedback was received on the questionnaire such as
having the need for an introduction page, definitions, revise phrases for clarity and the need for
additional questions to evaluate research professional’s participation and group behavior in the
laboratory. The Cronbach’s alpha scores range from 0 to 1, where: 0.7 and above - good; 0.80 and
above - better; and 0.90 and above - best.48-49 The overall scale alpha score was 0.928, implying
the scale is highly reliable in measuring safety climate. The alpha values for factors on university
administration priority, supervisor commitment and communication were acceptable ranging
from 0.7 to 0.98. However, factors on participation and group norms had alpha values <0.7
indicating the items were not consistent. Low alpha score indicates poor correlation between
items51, underlining the need to revise the items. Cronbach alpha scores are presented in Table 2.

Based on the results of reliability and content validity analysis, the 15 items were revised by
adding one additional item each to participation and group norms factors, resulting in a revised 17
item Biosafety Climate (BSCL-17) scale for both RPs and BPs. Changes were made to items, for
example: senior management was changed to university. The items 4, 14, 15, 16 and 17 in BSCL17 for RPs are based on perceptions at the laboratory level whereas in BSCL-17 for BPs they are
based on perceptions at the university level. The proposed BSCL-17 scale for both RPs and BPs
are reported in Table 3. The proposed BSCL-17 scale was assessed for reliability to verify if
alpha score improved. The average means of participation and group norm factors was substituted
as the average mean of the two newly added items respectively, to conduct reliability analysis.
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The revised BSCL scale showed alpha values greater than 0.7 for participation and group norms
indicating improved reliability of the items, as shown in Table 2.

Methods Study 2: Validation of BSCL Scale
Participant Sampling and Subject Recruitment
The study participants consisted of RPs and BPs. RPs included principal investigators, IBC
members, research associates, students, graduate research assistants, lab personnel and equivalent
positions at UofL. BPs consisted of biosafety officers, training specialists, responsible officials, or
equivalent positions with responsibilities in biosafety administration and management at public
universities in the USA. The biosafety administration at UofL provided a list of individuals
engaged in biological research activities at UofL in 2019. A list of individuals involved in
biosafety matters was compiled by reviewing the Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity
(ABSA International) directory available online in 2019.52

Survey Administration
The biosafety climate questionnaire was shared with RPs and BPs through REDCapTM from
November 19, 2019, to March 17, 2020. The survey consisted of BSCL-17 scale and questions on
background information such as age, gender, educational level, training, type of work conducted,
and work environment. To complete the survey, answers to the 17 items was mandatory whereas
other questions were optional. All the items were positive and measured on a 5-point Likert scale,
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Data Management and Analysis
The data collected through REDCapTM was exported into Microsoft Excel for data cleaning and
management. Surveys completed by RPs and BPs were included in the analysis. Any surveys
13

completed by participants who identified their role as both BP and RP, or other role was excluded
from the analysis. The BSCL-17 scale’s readability was assessed using the FKGL readability test.
Internal consistency test was performed using Cronbach’s alpha analysis.

Statistical Analysis
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is routinely employed for developing and validating a new
scale.36 EFA procedures identify correlations among the variables, common variance between
variables, number of factors and pattern of factor loadings in a scale.32-33,53-55 To evaluate the
suitability of EFA in a study, sample size requirements,33,56 correlations53, communalities33,
Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity33,36,57
are examined prior to conducting EFA. Correlation coefficients between items are used to
estimate communalities and factor loading.53 Communality is the total proportion of variance of
an item accounted for by the extracted factors.33 Maximum likelihood (ML) is recommended as a
data extraction method, wherein a certain number of components are initially formed by putting
the variables together based on their mutual correlations and then combined.33-48 To improve the
interpretability of the extraction procedure, rotations are utilized along with extraction
procedure,36 such as promax when factors are correlated with each other.58-59 The correlation
between the original item and factors extracted in EFA are interpreted by means of factor
loadings.36 Higher values of factor loadings are desirable to show that the item measures the
factor, with 0.32 factor loading considered minimum.36

EFA was used to assess the validity of the proposed biosafety climate construct and assess if the
proposed underlying five factor structure was validated in the BSCL-17 scale for RPs and BPs.
Prior to conducting EFA, the suitability of using EFA in this study was evaluated by examining
correlations, KMO and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. EFA analysis was conducted using maximum
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likelihood extraction with promax rotation. The number of factors to extract was determined by
examining the eigenvalues and scree plots.33,60

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is routinely employed for developing and validating a new
scale.36 EFA procedures identify correlations among the variables, common variance between
variables, number of factors and pattern of factor loadings in a scale.32-33,53-55 To evaluate the
suitability of EFA in a study, sample size requirements,33,56 correlations53, communalities33,
Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity33,36,57
are examined prior to conducting EFA. Correlation coefficients between items are used to
estimate communalities and factor loading.53 Communality is the total proportion of variance of
an item accounted for by the extracted factors.33 Maximum likelihood (ML) is recommended as a
data extraction method, wherein a certain number of components are initially formed by putting
the variables together based on their mutual correlations and then combined.33-48 To improve the
interpretability of the extraction procedure, rotations are utilized along with extraction
procedure,36 such as promax when factors are correlated with each other.58-59 The correlation
between the original item and factors extracted in EFA are interpreted by means of factor
loadings.36 Higher values of factor loadings are desirable to show that the item measures the
factor, with 0.32 factor loading considered minimum.36

EFA was used to assess the validity of the proposed biosafety climate construct and assess if the
proposed underlying five factor structure was validated in the BSCL-17 scale for RPs and BPs.
Prior to conducting EFA, the suitability of using EFA in this study was evaluated by examining
correlations, KMO and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. EFA analysis was conducted using maximum
likelihood extraction with promax rotation. The number of factors to extract was determined by
examining the eigenvalues and scree plots.33,60
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Results
Sample Size and Participant Characteristics
The biosafety climate questionnaire with BSCL-17 scale was shared with 1055 RPs and 410s BP.
A total of 377 responses were received. Of these 377 responses, 229 (91 RPs, 88 BPs, 4 RP &
BP, 46 other role) were completed responses and 148 were incomplete. Only the completed
responses i.e., 91 RPs and 88 BPs were included in data analysis. Sample size requirements were
met. In a scale, a 5:1 ratio of participants to number of variables in a scale is acceptable33,56The
characteristics of study participants is presented in Table 1. Most respondents of RP survey were
male; had a role as principal investigator or professor; had doctoral level of education and worked
in BSCL-1 & 2 settings that utilize RG 1 & 2 agents. The gender for respondents of BP survey
were uniformly distributed between male and female. Most respondents of BP survey had a role
as biosafety officers; had either masters or doctoral level of education and worked in universities
with mostly BSCL-2 or BSCL-2+ or lower settings that utilize RG-1 and 2 agents.

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
The readability of the BSCL-17 scale had a FKGL of 12.6 for RPs and 12.5 for BPs. Correlation
coefficients for both RPs and BPs datasets were found to be >0.30 within the acceptable range of
0.30 to 0.70. 33,36,53 Communalities for both RPs and BPs datasets ranged from 0.52 to 0.93 which
were acceptable. Communalities can range from 0 to 1, with 0.40 to 0.70 considered acceptable in
social sciences.33,36,53 KMO measure of sampling adequacy was 0.898 for RPs dataset and 0.896
for BPs dataset. The KMO values can range from 0.6 or higher to be accepted, with values >0.9
considered to be marvelous.33,37,57 The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p <0.001) for
both BPs and RPs datasets, which was within the acceptable range of <0.05.33,37,57 All the
assumptions of EFA were met, implying EFA is suitable on the datasets of study 2. Table 4
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shows EFA results for both RPs and BPs BSCL scales. EFA was performed with ML extraction,
promax rotation and factor loading cut off set at 0.32 for both RPs and BPs BSCL-17 scales. For
RPs, it resulted in three factors: management priority, communication & participation (RP-F1)
consisting of items 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13; group norms (RP-F2) consisting of items
14,15,16 & 17; and supervisor commitment (RP-F3) consisting of items 4, 5 & 6. The three
factors RP-F1, RP-F2 and RP-F3 explained 60.08%, 13.30% and 5.79% of variance respectively
with a total variance of 79.17%. For BPs, it yielded three factors: management priority &
communication (BP-F1) consisting of items 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 & 12; group norms & participation
(BP-F2) consisting of items 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17; and supervisor commitment (BP-F3)
consisting of items 4, 5 & 6. The three factors BP-F1, BP-F2 and BP-F3 explained 50.38%,
9.71% and 8.93% of variance respectively with a total variance of 69.03%. In social sciences,
60% of the total variance is considered as the minimum threshold for such analysis.61 Clearly, the
extracted variances met the criterion.

In RP BSCL-17 scale, the first extracted factor (RP-F1) combined the three proposed factors of
university administration priority, communication, and participation which can be explained as
items that reflect initiatives taken at the university level. The second factor (RP-F2) and third
factor (RP-F3) consisted of proposed group norms, and supervisor commitment respectively,
corresponding to the factors envisioned by Bronkhorst et al.22,38,44 RP-F2 can be explained as
items that indicate initiatives taken at the laboratory level. RP-F3 are reflective of initiatives taken
at department or laboratory level.

In BP BSCL-17 scale, the first factor (BP-F1) combined the 2 proposed factors of university
administration priority and communication along with item-12 from the participation factor. BPF1 like RP-F1, can be explained as items that reflect initiatives taken at the university level. The
second factor (BP-F2) combined proposed items of group norms as well as items 10, 11 & 13 of
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participation which can be interpreted as activities that influence safety at laboratory level. The
third factor (BP-F3) consisted of proposed supervisor commitment like the factor envisioned by
Bronkhorst et al,22,38,44 which are indicative of activities taken at department level. The validated
17 items of BSCL-17 scale and its underlying structure for both RPs and BPs are reported in
Figure 1a and 1b respectively. The alpha values were used to assess the reliability of the BSCL17 scale and underlying three factors; it was acceptable at 0.88 or higher as shown in Table 5.

Discussion
The objective to develop and validate a scale for measuring safety perceptions at academic
biological and biomedical science laboratories in the USA was accomplished. During scale
development, it is recommended that research should include at least a) literature review b)
qualitative research c) feedback from experts and d) pre-test of the scale factors and items,33
which were all done in the current study along with e) analysis of reliability and validity of
underlying factors and items.

BSCL-15 scale with 15 items and five factors for RPs and BPs was proposed based on existing
safety climate scales. The number of items and perceptions measured in BSCL-15 scale is similar
for both RPs and BPs except for item 4. Item 4 in BSCL-15 for RPs measured perceptions at
laboratory level whereas in BSCL-15 for BPs it measured at institution level.

BSCL-15 scale was pretested on a small sample of RPs and BPs. Feedback from the experts,
analysis of preliminary data, reliability, and validity analysis pointed out concerns with
participation and group norm factors. To address this, items were revised that resulted in a BSCL17 scale with 17 items. The number of items and perceptions measured in BSCL scale is similar
for both RPs and BPs. The items 4, 14, 15, 16 and 17 in BSCL-17 scale measured perceptions at
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laboratory level for RPs whereas for BPs it measured at university level to imply their respective
work settings, as shown in Table 3.
To validate the BSCL-17 scale and identify the underlying structure, EFA was conducted for both
RPs and BPs datasets, Table 4. Factors were extracted based on evaluation of scree plots and
eigenvalues. For RP BSCL-17 scale, EFA identified a three-factor structure that explained
79.18% of variance with factor loadings greater than 0.53 on all the 17 items. For BP BSCL-17
scale, EFA identified a three-factor structure, that explained 69.03% of variance with factor
loadings greater than 0.33 on all the 17 items. The themes identified in BSCL for RPs and BPs in
BSCL scale has been presented in Figure 2a and 2b respectively. The three factors in BSCL-17
scale for RPs can be interpreted as 1) management priority, communication and participation that
indicate safety perceptions at university level, 2) supervisor commitment that indicate safety
perceptions at department or laboratory level and 3) group norms that indicate safety perceptions
of (co)workers at laboratory level. The three factors in BSCL-17 scale for BPs can be interpreted
as 1) management priority and communication that indicate safety perceptions at university level,
2) supervisor commitment that indicate safety perceptions at department level and 3) group norms
& participation that indicate safety perceptions of (co) workers and participation by researchers at
laboratory level. Three items (10, 11 and 13) of the four items initially proposed to assess the
participation factor, load along with the items in the group norms factor for BPs whereas they
load in the management and communication factor for RPs. This could be explained as the items
10 to 13 of BP BSCL-17 scale measures participation of researchers which directly effects the
safety perceptions at the laboratory level. It should be noted that items 9 for RPs and 10 & 11 for
BPs cross loaded with a loading of <0.32 on more than one factor. Taking theoretical and
practical aspects into consideration, these items were loaded into the factor in which they had the
greatest loading score, Table 4. The FKGL was around 12 for the BSCL scales for both RPs and
BPs, which implies that the scale is targeted towards those who have at least high school
education.
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This study identified all the 17 items as appropriate and an underlying three factor structure to
evaluate biosafety climate. The item groupings identified through EFA are indicative of the three
underlying factors in the BSCL-17 scale for both RPs and BPs. The themes of management
priority, group norms and supervisor commitment that were identified as important to biosafety
climate in this study are consistent with the finding of previous studies22,48. Given the preliminary
nature of the current study, more studies are recommended to confirm the underlying factor
structure before considering factor scoring. However, the 17 items in the BSCL scale have been
validated and can be used to quantify safety climate with scores ranging from 17 to 85, higher
scores indicating better safety climate. Preliminary findings at UofL have shown positive
association of leading indicator (biosafety climate) and negative association of lagging indicator
(incidence risk), with safety status in biological laboratories. However, additional correlations
studies are encouraged to examine the relationship between biosafety climate and safety status in
biological laboratories.

There are a few limitations to this study. As a study based on self-reported survey data it is prone
to implicit bias in responses. Researchers from only one public university were included in the
survey warranting caution when generalizing the study findings to other public, private, research
and diagnostic laboratories across the country or countries. However, there are considerable
strengths of the study as well. A process to develop an instrument to measure occupational safety
perceptions specific to biological laboratories affiliated with public universities has been
established. This study adds on to the literature of safety climate scale targeted for university
laboratories. The gap in lack of safety climate scales specific to biological laboratories has been
addressed by this study.
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There are several theoretical and practical implications of this study. The scale is simple with
only 17 items and consequently does not require a lot of time from the respondents and survey
administrators. There are numerous applications of a BSCL scale. These include prospective
indicator of safety, risk assessment tool, quantify current safety status at a specific laboratory or
university, identify areas that can be improved, develop targeted interventions, measure change in
safety status pre- and post-intervention, use as a standardized scale across different universities,
and compare perceptions of RPs and BPs. BSCL-17 scale can be used to quantify safety culture
within a biological laboratory. By evaluating biosafety climate and safety culture within an
organization, shortcomings in safety programs can be addressed proactively. The results from
BSCL scale can be used as part of process improvement in biological safety programs. The BSCL
scale can be utilized before and after the implementation of any new biological safety programs
to study its impact on safety outcomes.

Further studies to cross validate the BSCL-17 scale and underlying factor structure across
universities in USA and other countries can be taken up. The BSCL-17 scale can be re-tested at a
later point at UofL to verify reliability. Additional studies on associations between biosafety
climate and safety related outcomes i.e., decreased exposure to biological hazards, fewer lab
acquired infections or near misses, increased participation, resource awareness and university
administrations’ priority are recommended. Further research to determine variables that might
contribute to safety climate such as lab settings, type of agents, experience, mode of training and
inspections are encouraged.

Conclusion
The study was conducted to address the lack of in-depth literature on safety climate measures
specifically designed for the field of biological laboratory safety. A thorough discussion on the
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steps to develop and validate a scale has been provided to aid interested scholars in understanding
and utilizing scale development concepts. The BSCL-17 scale can be a beneficial risk assessment
tool to personnel involved in research activities, biosafety management, university administration,
and occupational safety matters. It can be used as a key performance indicator of biosafety
programs and aid in developing targeted interventions to improve safety climate. BSCL-17 scale
developed in this study could serve as a benchmark for evaluating biosafety climate status across
institutions conducting biological research.
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Study 1
Variable
Gender
Female
Male
Prefer Not to Answer
Role
Principal Investigator
Professor
Lab Manager
Research Assistant
GRA/TA*
Student
Other-Research Role
Biosafety Officer
Assistant Biosafety Officer
Research Training Professional
Research Safety Professional
Other-Biosafety Role
No Answer
Educational Background
High School
Bachelors
Masters
PhD
BSL Level
BSL-1
BSL-2
BSL-2+
BSL-3
BSL-3+
RG Level
RG-1
RG-2
RG-3
RG-4

RPsa

Study 2

BPsb

(n=9)

(n=7)

(n=91)

BPsb
(n=88)

1
6
2

3
4

38
48
5

41
43
4

7

RPsa

36
33
15
19
7
7
2
4

55
8
7
15
25

1
2

1
8

1
4
1

5
2
2

2
5

1
5
4

1
6

3
12
16
57

23
34
31

40
69
13
8
0

82
88
64
53
3

53
45
9
0

86
88
60
4

Table 1: Characteristics of study 1 and study 2 participants
Note: a) Study 1 & 2 research professionals (RPs) at UNIV-1 b) Study 1 & 2, biosafety
professionals (BPs) at public universities in the USA. *Graduate research assistants
(GRA), teaching assistants (TA).
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Cronbach's Alpha
Biosafety Climate Scale
& Proposed Factors

F1: University
Administration Priority
F2: Supervisor
Commitment
F3: Communication
F4: Participation
F5: Group Norms
Biosafety Climate Scale

Cronbach's Alpha

Number
of items
BSCL-15

Study
1
RPs
(n=9)

Study
1 BPs
(n=7)

Number
of items
Proposed
BSCL-17

Study
1 RPs
(n=9)

Study
1 BPs
(n=7)

3

0.730

0.930

3

0.730

0.930

3

0.980

0.960

3

0.980

0.960

3

0.730

0.840

3

0.730

0.840

3

0.510

0.690

3(+1)

0.760

0.840

3

0.620

0.930

3 (+1)

0.810

0.970

15

0.928

0.950

15(+2)

0.935

0.956

Table 2: Cronbach's alpha coefficients of proposed and revised BSCL scale and factors in
Study 1
Note: Factors 1 to 5 are represented as F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5 respectively. Study 1 proposed
BSCL scale consisted of 15 items and 5 factors for research professionals (RP) and biosafety
professionals (BP). Revised BSCL-17 scale consisted of revised 15 items from BSCL-15 and
one additional item in each of factor 4 and 5.

24

Biosafety Climate Scale (BSCL-17)
Items in the Scale
1. The safety of research professionals’ is a priority for my institution.
2. University administration considers research professionals' safety to be as important as
productivity.
3. University administration shows support for prevention of biological hazards and incidents
through involvement and commitment.
4. In the laboratory (At my institution), my supervisor acts quickly to correct problems/issues that
affect research professionals’ safety.
5. My supervisor clearly considers the safety of research professionals’ to be of great importance.
6. My supervisor acts decisively when a concern of a research professionals’ safety practices is
raised.
7. There is good communication at my institution about biosafety issues which affect me.
8. Information about proper biosafety practices is always brought to my attention in my institution.
9. My contributions to resolving biosafety concerns in the institution are listened to.
10. Research professionals participate in developing best biosafety practices in my institution.
11. Research professionals are encouraged to become involved in biosafety matters.
12. At my institution, the promotion of best biosafety practices involves all levels of the
organization.
13. Consultation in developing best biosafety practices involves researchers and biosafety
professionals.
14. In the laboratory (At my institution), we discuss research professionals’ safety, biological
hazards, and incident prevention.
15. In the laboratory (At my institution), we care about each other’s safety awareness.
16. In the laboratory (At my institution), we remind each other of the regulations and guidelines
regarding research professionals’ safety.
17. In the laboratory (At my institution), we care about each other’s safety compliance.
Table 3: Biosafety Climate Scale
17 item Biosafety climate (BSCL-17) scale to measure safety perceptions at biological science
laboratories. For Items 4 and 14 to 17, the phrase 'In the laboratory' is used in the scale for research
professionals whereas for biosafety professionals the phrase, ‘At my institution' is used to imply
their respective work settings. BSCL-17 is a 5-point Likert scale with score ranging from 17 to 85.
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BSCL-17 Scale
Item 1

Items

Factor

RPs (n=91) a
F1
0.836

F2

Item 2

0.881

-0.124

Item 3

0.940

-0.196

Item 4

0.106

Item 5

F3

BPs (n=88) b
F1

-0.213

F2
0.728

F3
0.129

0.881

-0.131

0.984

0.856
0.108

Item 6

1.003

0.875

0.156

0.892

-0.155

0.212

0.817
0.814

0.128

0.542

0.201

0.300

0.316

0.137

0.351

0.354

0.149

0.643

0.316

-0.374

Item 7

0.872

Item 8

0.755

Item 9

0.737

Item 10

0.554

Item 11

0.653

0.365

0.826

-0.152

Item 12

0.891

-0.157

0.258

0.507

Item 13

0.509

0.141

0.639

0.237

0.753

0.773

0.137

0.966

0.630

0.239

Item 16

0.883

0.763

0.102

Item 17

0.940

0.684

0.173

Item 14
Item 15

Eigenvalues
Percentage variance
Cumulative variance

-0.133

10.214
60.080
60.080

0.219
0.389

2.262
13.305
73.385

-0.209

0.985
5.793
79.178

8.565
50.381
50.381

1.652
9.717
60.098

-0.168

1.519
8.933
69.031

Table 4: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) Results for Study 2
Note: Extraction and Rotation Method used: Maximum Likelihood and Promax with Kaiser
Normalization. Higher values of factor loadings are desirable to show that the item measures the factor,
with 0.32 factor loading considered minimum. Bolded values indicate highest factor loading appropriate
for each factor. For RP BSCL-17 scale, EFA identified a three-factor structure that explained 79.18% of
variance with factor loadings greater than 0.53 on all the 17 items. For BP BSCL-17 scale, EFA
identified a three-factor structure, that explained 69.03% of variance with factor loadings greater than
0.33 on all the 17 items. The 3 factors for BSCL for RPs are represented as Management Priority,
Communication & Participation (F1), Group Norms (F2) and Supervisor Commitment (F3). b) The 3
factors for BSCL for BPs are represented as Management Priority, Communication & Participation
(F1), Group Norms & Participation (F2) and Supervisor Commitment (F3).
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Cronbach's Alpha
RP Biosafety
Climate Scale
& Validated
Factors

Number
of items

Study 2
RPs
(n=91)

Cronbach's Alpha
BP Biosafety
Climate Scale
& Validated
Factors

Number
of items

a

RP-F1:
Management
Priority,
Communication
& Participation

10

0.947

RP-F2: Group
Norms

4

0.935

3

0.972

17

0.957

RP-F3:
Supervisor
Commitment
Biosafety
Climate Scale

Study 2
BPs
(n=88)
b

BP-F1:
Management
Priority &
Communication
BP-F2: Group
Norms &
Researchers'
participation
BP-F3:
Supervisor
Commitment
Biosafety
Climate Scale

7

0.895

7

0.889

3

0.914

17

0.936

Table 5: Cronbach's alpha coefficients of validated BSCL-17 scale and factors in Study 2
Note: a) The validated biosafety climate scale for research professionals (RP) in study 2
consisted of 3 factors: RP-F1 with items 1,2,3,7,8,9,10,11,12 & 13, RP-F2 with items
14,15,16 & 17 and RP-F3 with items 4,5 & 6. b) The validated biosafety climate scale for
biosafety professionals (BP) in study 2 consisted of 3 factors: BP-F1 with items 1,2,3,7,8,9
& 12, BP-F2 with items 10,11,13,14,15,16 & 17 and BP-F3 with items 4,5 & 6.
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Item 1
Item 2
Item 3

F1. University
Administration
Priority

Item 7
Item 8

F3. Communication

Item 9

Item 1
Item 2
RP-F1
Management
Priority,
Communication
and Participation

Item 3
Item 7
Item 8

Item 12

Item 12

RP
Biosafety Climate
Scale (BSCL-17)

Item 14
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Item 16

BP-F1
Management
Priority and
Communication

F4. Participation

F4. Participation

Item 13

Item 15

F3. Communication

Item 9

Item 10
Item 11

F1. University
Administration
Priority

F5. Group Norms

RP-F2
Group Norms

Item 17

Item 10
Item 11

F4. Participation

Item 13
Item 14
Item 15
Item 16

BP
Biosafety Climate
Scale (BSCL-17)

F5. Group Norms

BP-F2
Group Norms
and Participation

Item 17
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6

F2: Supervisor
Commitment

RP-F3
Supervisor
Commitment

Item 4
Item 5
Item 6

Proposed items and factors of
BSCL-17 from study 1

Validated items and factors of BSCL-17 from
study 2

Figure 1a: Structure of proposed and validated BSCL-17 scale for research
professionals
Note: Proposed factors are represented as F1 to F5 and validated factors are denoted as RP-F1
to RP-F3.

F2: Supervisor
Commitment

Proposed items and factors of
BSCL-17 from study 1

BP-F3
Supervisor
Commitment
Validated items and factors of BSCL-17 from
study 2

Figure 1b: Structure of proposed and validated BSCL-17 scale for biosafety
professionals
Note: Proposed factors are represented as F1 to F5 and validated factors are denoted as BP-F1
to BP-F3.
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CHAPTER 3: IMPACT OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON BIOSAFETY CLIMATE AT
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

Introduction
In the earlier chapter, an industry specific Biosafety Climate (BSCL) scale to measure perceptions
of safety in biological and biomedical science laboratories at public universities in the USA was
developed and validated.62 This chapter focuses on validating the BSCL scale construct for
researchers at biological and biomedical science laboratories at public universities in the USA
and determining the factors that influence biosafety climate.

This study attempts to confirm the construct structure of BSCL scale specific to biological and
biomedical science laboratories that measure biosafety climate among researchers at biological
and biomedical laboratories. A combination of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) are commonly utilized in scale development.48,63-68 The
underlying psychometric properties of an unknown scale can be evaluated utilizing EFA whereas
CFA utilizes a pre-determined factor structure to verify the underlying psychometric structure of
a known scale.69 Literature on development of scales recommends development of a scale
utilizing one sample followed by a longitudinal study on a different sample to give credibility to
the reliability of the scale.70 Test-retest method ensures the stability of a research instrument over
time by measuring the participants responses to a survey twice across time.32,71-72 The precision of
a construct over time can be assessed by measuring the stability of scores over time.73 In scale
development, EFA is routinely employed for developing and validating a new scale.33 The
proposed structure of a scale based on the results of EFA is then confirmed by CFA in scale
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development utilizing a separate sample.25,36,41 Hence, this study utilized test-retest method to
examine the reliability and CFA to confirm the construct of the BSCL scale for research
professionals (RPs) in biological and biomedical science laboratories at a public university in the
USA.

In December 2019, a new human coronavirus, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was discovered.74-76 By March
2020, COVID-19 outbreak was officially declared as a global pandemic.77-78 To mitigate the
spread of COVID-19 at work, Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) in USA
provided guidance on implementing a workplace COVID-19 prevention program.79 This program
provided measures to limit spread of COVID-19 in the workplace, such as: eliminate the hazard
by isolating infection employees at their homes, implement physical distancing, enable remote or
telework, install barriers when physical distancing not feasible, personal protective equipment,
face coverings, ventilation, resources to maintain good hygiene practices and routine cleaning and
disinfection at a workplace.79 Various guidelines by Centers for Disease Control (CDC), World
Health Organization, (WHO), state and federal governments were provided to mitigate risk of
exposure to COVID-19 not only in public settings but also occupational settings.78-83 Due to the
pandemic of COVID-19, measures to mitigate risk of COVID-19 exposure were put in place in
workplace settings, including academic research laboratories.82 Previous literature on safety
climate identified factors such as leadership priority for safety, supervisor commitment and
co(workers) norms in relation to safety in improving safety climate and safety behaviors.22 The
COVID-19 pandemic resulted in changes to biosafety program management and safety measures
in research laboratories that could have impacted leadership priority to safety, supervisor
commitment and group norms. I could not find any studies that explored the impact of COVID-19
pandemic on research professionals’ perceptions of safety in biological research laboratories.
Hence, this study proposes to investigate the impact of changes to laboratory safety measures due
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to COVID-19 pandemic on biosafety climate and biosafety perceptions in biological and
biomedical research laboratories.

This study utilized the test-retest reliability method to assess whether the BSCL scores remain the
same by conducting a longitudinal study over a one-year interval. CFA was also conducted to
confirm the biosafety climate scale structure proposed by EFA in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
The hypothesis being tested in this study was whether COVID-19 pandemic is associated with
changes in biosafety climate perceptions. The null hypothesis being tested is that COVID-19
pandemic is not associated with biosafety climate. To test this hypothesis, biosafety climate
perceptions prior to COVID-19 pandemic (2019) and during COVID-19 pandemic (2020) and its
impact on biosafety climate and safety perceptions of researchers at University of Louisville
(UofL) biological and biomedical research laboratories were examined.

Rationale & Purpose of the Study
To test the reliability of the BSCL scale, this study proposes to assess stability of the BSCL scale
items by using test-retest methods. To confirm the construct validity of the BSCL scale, CFA will
be conducted utilizing a sample different from the one used in EFA in Chapter-2. This study also
seeks to discover if COVID-19 pandemic impacted safety perceptions and biosafety climate in
biological laboratories. By investigating the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on safety perceptions
in biological laboratories, we can determine the factors that influence biosafety climate.

The University of Louisville Institutional Review Board reviewed the study design and protocols
were approved to proceed (IRB 18.1220, Appendix C). All institutional policies and guidelines on
participant privacy were followed.
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Methods
Participant Sampling and Subject Recruitment
The study participants consisted of researcher professionals (RPs) who engaged in biological
research activities at UofL. An email list of UofL researchers who were involved in past or
current chemical, animal, clinical and biological research activities was provided by the biosafety
administration at UofL. RPs included principal investigators, Institutional Biosafety Committee
(IBC) members, research associates, students, graduate research assistants, lab personnel and
equivalent positions at UofL. The subject recruitment email sent to the potential participants is
shown in Appendix D. The inclusion criteria for the participants were: a) involved in biological
research as researcher or biosafety administration, b) must be working with biological agents
belonging to risk group (RG) 1, 2 or 3 agents at biosafety level (BSL) 1, 2 or 3 laboratories, and
c) should be 18 years or older.

Survey Administration
The biosafety climate questionnaire was distributed to RPs at UofL through REDCapTM during
two periods: a) RP1 study -prior to COVID-19 pandemic that is between November 19, 2019, to
December 04, 2019, and b) RP2 study -during COVID-19 pandemic that is between November
02, 2020 to February 09, 2021. The survey consisted of BSCL-17 scale, questions on background
information such as age, gender, education level, training, type of work conducted, and work
environment. Responses to the 17 items in the BSCL scale was mandatory whereas other
questions were optional. All items were positive and measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The study participants were not provided with
any form of compensation and their identity was kept anonymous. The survey that was utilized in
both RP1 and RP2 studies were similar, except additional questions on lab design and research
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perceptions during COVID-19 pandemic were added to the survey during RP2 study. The survey
has been presented in Appendix E.

Data Management and Analysis
The data collected through REDCapTM was exported into Microsoft Excel for data cleaning and
management. Surveys completed by RPs in RP1 and RP2 study were included in the analysis.
Surveys completed by participants who identified their role as biosafety professional (BP), both
BP and RP, or other role was excluded from the analysis. IBM-SPSS (version 27), IBM SPSSAMOS (version 27) and R (R Core Team, 2021) were utilized for data analysis.

Statistical Analysis
CFA was used to assess the construct validity of the biosafety climate scale. A three factor underlying construct model was hypothesized through EFA in a previous study.62 Structural
equations model was developed using IBM SPSS-AMOS Version 27 software to confirm
biosafety climate dimensions derived from EFA. CFA was used to test for model fit and construct
reliability. This study estimated model goodness of fit utilizing several fit indices as literature
suggested there is no specific index to estimate model goodness of fit.25,41,67 This study utilized
Absolute Fit (Root Mean Square of Error Approximation- RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index
(CFI), Incremental Fit (NFI, IFI) Tukcker-Lewis Index (TLI), and Parsimonious Fit (Chisquare/Degrees of Freedom - ChiSq/df) to test the level of model fitness. RMSEA values between
0.05 and 0.08 (ideally) or between 0.05 to 0.1, CFI >0.90, NFI >0.90, IFI >0.90, TLI >0.95, and
ChiSq/df <5.0 are recommended as indicators of good fitting models.25,41,84-91
The Pearson’s product-moment correlation71 was computed using IBM-SPSS to quantify the
degree of consistency among measurements in the RP1 and RP2 studies. Internal consistency was
tested using Cronbach’s alpha analysis using SPSS.38-39,62 For continuous variables, independent
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samples t-tests (for normal distribution), Wilcoxon methods (for non-normal distribution) and
Fishers Exact Test for categorical variables was utilized to compare RPs responses during the two
periods in the study. Differences in RPs perceptions prior to and during the pandemic was
examined using the Wilcoxon rank sum test using R.

Results
Sample Size and Participant Characteristics
The biosafety climate questionnaire was shared with RPs prior to the pandemic in 2019 (RP1
survey) and during the pandemic in 2020 (RP2 survey). Two email reminders were sent to
potential respondents requesting them to complete the survey. RP1 survey resulted in 228
responses. Of these 108 were incomplete and 120 were completed that consisted of 91 RPs, 4
both RP and BP, and 25 other role). RP2 survey resulted in 433 responses. Of these 209 were
incomplete and 223 were completed that consisted of 120 RPs, 1 both RP and BP, 102 other). 91
RPs from RP1 study and 120 RPs from RP2 study were included in the data analysis. The
characteristics of the participants in RP1 and RP2 surveys are shown in Table 6. The sample
population in RP1 study was majorly male (n=48, 54.5%), aged (46.00 +14.28), had post
doctorate (n=57, 64.8%), in the role of principal investigator (n=36, 39.6%) followed by
professor (n=33, 36.3%), conducted research (n=89, 97.8%), worked at BSL-2 setting (n=69,
75.8%), worked with RG-1 agents (n=53, 58.2%) followed by RG-2 (n=45, 49.5%), with
government funding (n=72, 79.1%), had an average team size of 6.25 and 11.68 years of
experience in current role. The sample population in RP2 study was majorly male (n=61, 51.3%),
aged (43.44 +14.97), had post doctorate (n=57, 47.5%), in the role of principal investigator
(n=33, 27.5%) followed by research assistant (n=27, 22.5%), conducted research (n=116, 96.7%),
worked at BSL-2 setting (n=81, 67.5%), worked with RG-1 agents (n=67, 55.8%) followed by
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RG-2 (n=58, 48.3%), in open/shared laboratory space (n=63, 57.3%), with government funding
(n=90, 75.0%), had an average team size of 7.11 and 8.71 years of experience in current role.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Table 7 shows the fit indices values obtained from CFA of RP2 dataset. The initial model tested
the underlying three factor structure consisting of 1) management priority, communication, and
participation, 2) group norms, and 3) supervisor commitment that was hypothesized using the
RP1 dataset from a previous study.62 Though χ2/df was acceptable, the values obtained for fit
indices: χ2/df=2.652, NFI=0.82, IFI=0.885, TLI=0.864, and CFI=0.884 were not within the
recommended range. Hence, it was concluded that fitting the model obtained at this stage does
not indicate a good fit. Literature on CFA recommends researchers to carry out post-hoc fitting.90
So, the model was corrected for a better fitting by including five underlying factors 1)
management priority, 2) communication, 3) participation, 4) group norms, and 5) supervisor
commitment based on theory.62 These modifications resulted in the modified model and the
results of the fit indices improved, are shown in Table 7. The modified model showed χ2/df as
acceptable as well as the values obtained for fit indices: χ2/df=2.155, NFI=0.869, IFI=0.925,
TLI=0.905, and CFI=0.924. The values of NFI =0.869 and TLI =0.905 showed an improvement
but were slightly below the recommended value of >.90 and >.95 respectively. The RMSEA
value improved from 0.118 in initial model to 0.099 in the modified model, however both the
values were above the recommend value of 0.08, indicating that both the models were not a good
fit for the data tested. However, RMSEA value between 0.08 to 0.1 provides adequate fit per few
studies.91-92 suggesting the modified model in this study could indicate a model fit of value in
evaluating biosafety climate scale. The standardized and unstandardized factor loadings for the
modified model with five factor confirmatory model biosafety climate for RPs is presented in
Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha scores shown in Table 8 for BSCL
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scale was 0.957 for RP1 study62 and for RP2 study was 0.947 and for the underlying five factors it
was greater than 0.8 in both RP1 and RP2 studies, indicating internal consistency of the scale.

Test-Retest Correlation
To assess the stability of the items in BSCL scale, a test-retest procedure was used to establish the
stability of results from respondents who were asked to take the survey initially in 2019 and 12
months later in 2020. The Pearson’s product-moment correlation showed that there was a
significant positive correlation between the biosafety climate scores on the RP1 survey and those
on the RP2 survey (r=1, p=0.30), thereby indicating that the items in the BSCL scale were
effective in measuring biosafety climate over time.

Survey Analysis
Biosafety climate perceptions of RPs measured using BSCL scale,62 is presented in Table 9.
Wilcoxon rank sum test showed that there was no statistically significant change in biosafety
climate perceptions of RPs prior to and during COVID-19 pandemic, (p > 0.352). The mean
aggregate of BSCL score of RPs during 2020 (mean =72.080) slightly decreased compared to
BSCL score of RPs in 2019 (mean =72.630), however this was not found to be statistically
significant. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that COVID-19 pandemic is not associated
with biosafety climate. Study participants perceived 11 of 17 items on BSCL scale slightly less
positively during 2020 compared to 2019, though this difference was not found to be significant.
Of the five factors, perceptions on supervisor commitment to safety showed an increase during
2020 compared to 2019. However, this difference was not found to be significant (p>0.673).

Perceptions on biosafety practices was examined prior to and during COVID-19 pandemic using
Wilcoxon signed-rank test as shown in Table 10. The results did not indicate any significant
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differences in biosafety climate perceptions during the two periods. A slight increase in
following CDC, National Institute of Health (NIH) and OSHA guidelines during 2020 was
noticed. RPs perceived concepts based on regulations and safety culture to drive university
biosafety program during 2019 whereas concepts based on institutional policies and behaviorbased safety during 2020. Online trainings given during both periods remained comparable (mean
= 4.37 & 4.38), however a decrease in classroom and hands on training was observed.
Perceptions on biosafety resources awareness such ABSA, WHO, CDC, NIH, PSDA, OSHA,
Guidelines for biosafety laboratory competency and IBC guidelines decreased during 2020
compared to 2019. A decrease in biohazard exposure prevention awareness during 2020 was
noticed. The number of announced lab inspections decreased during 2020 compared to 2019.
Biosafety perceptions prior to and during COVID-19 pandemic of RPs at UofL was examined as
shown in Table 11. No significant differences were observed in RPs biosafety perceptions during
both the periods. Researchers rated biosafety practices at UofL as “can be improved” to “good”
during both 2019 and 2020. Perceptions on risk level of work conducted in the lab slightly
decreased during 2020 compared to 2019. A slight increase in perceptions on measures taken in
lab against hazards and university’s biosafety program in mitigating risks during 2020 compared
to 2019 was seen.

RPs perceived biological laboratory safety perceptions during COVID-19 pandemic positively as
presented in Table 12. RPs agreed that they felt safe working in labs (mean = 4.06), university
prioritized COVID-19 precautions in labs (mean = 4.05), supervisor prioritized COVID-19
precautions (mean = 4.29), and peers in lab complied with lab safety precautions (mean=4.06).
RPs agreed that there was good communication on changes in lab safety (mean = 3.98). However,
they agreed that there were challenges imposed by COVID-19 precautions (mean =3.71).
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Discussion
Based on a previous study on biosafety scale development,62 this study aimed to further test the
psychometric properties of a new instrument biosafety climate (BSCL) scale designed for
measuring biosafety climate among researchers in biological and biomedical laboratories. The
initial CFA model did not show a good fit; however, modified model improved the goodness of
fit indices, indicating a five factor instead of three factors in BSCL scale. Kenny et al,
recommended not to compute RMSEA for studies with small sample sizes as the results could
falsely indicate a poor fitting model.92 Hence, future studies with a larger sample size could be
taken up to confirm a factor structure that demonstrates a good fit. However, the findings from
CFA showed that a five-factor underlying structure might be more appropriate for BSCL scale, as
shown in Figure 5. These factors are management priority, supervisor commitment,
communication, participation, and group norms, which corresponds to factors envisaged in other
studies.22,38,44,62 The items in the BSCL scale seem to be a stable measure of biosafety climate
based on the results of test-retest procedure using Pearson’s product-moment correlation
statistics. The results conclude that biosafety climate remained the same prior to and during
COVID-19 pandemic at UofL biological research laboratories. Hence, we conclude that there is
not sufficient evidence to support that COVID-19 pandemic is associated with changes in
biosafety climate perceptions. This could imply that the measures taken during the pandemic
were successful in maintaining safety of researchers in biological laboratories. The other
explanation could be that since researchers represent a unique set of individuals who already
work with infectious agents, they might have been more receptive to safety measures put in place
due to the pandemic. However, further studies are advised to examine how biosafety climate
might have been impacted by the pandemic in research laboratories and cross-validate the results
with this study.
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A key strength of this study is that it was able to compare BSCL scores from two different time
periods in a similar sample to test the reliability of the scale. This study provides insights on
biosafety climate perceptions, biosafety perceptions, and biosafety practices in biological research
laboratories during COVID-19 pandemic. However, there are limitations to this study.
Researchers from only one public university were included in the study warranting caution when
generalizing the study findings to other public universities. The other limitation in using a
questionnaire is that participants might lack proper understanding about questions resulting in
inaccurate responses. Nevertheless, this study adds on to the literature of safety climate scale
specific to biological laboratories in the USA.

The comparison of biosafety climate before and during COVID-19 provides a unique opportunity
to assess the factors that affect biosafety climate. This study confirmed the structure of BSCL
scale and identified underlying five factors for researchers at an academic biological laboratory.
The five factors identified are in accordance with the five factors of biosafety climate identified in
other studies.21,42 Studies have demonstrated safety climate as a robust predicator of safety-related
outcomes.35,62 However, there are limited studies that explain how frequently safety climate
should be assessed.94 This study suggested that biosafety climate might be assessed periodically
to verify the impact of intentional or unintentional changes to biosafety program management at
an institution utilizing the BSCL scale.

Further studies could be taken up to assess the reliability of the BSCL scale in biological research
laboratories across different universities in the USA. Additional studies on associations between
biosafety climate and safety related outcomes are recommended. Studies on changes to biosafety
climate perceptions before and during COVID-19 pandemic in different occupational settings
such as manufacturing, healthcare or service industry in comparison to biosafety climate
perceptions in biological laboratory settings can be conducted.
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Conclusion
This study was conducted to validate the structure of BSCL scale and compare biosafety climate
perceptions before and during the pandemic. The results showed evidence of test-retest reliability
demonstrating the reliability of BSCL scale in evaluating biosafety climate in biological research
laboratories. It suggested the construct structure of BSCL scale as having five underlying factors:
university administration priority, supervisor commitment, communication, participation, and
group norms. Biosafety climate prior and during the COVID-19 pandemic in biological
laboratories was compared to assess the impact of changes made to research lab safety due to the
pandemic. This study concluded that there was no significant difference in biosafety climate prior
to and during COVID-19 pandemic in biological research laboratories.
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Characteristics
Gender
Female
Male
Other (Non-Binary)
IBC Membership
Current
Past
Never
Role
Principal Investigator
Professor
Lab Manager
Research Assistant
GRA/GA/TA
Student
Other-Research Role
Educational Background
High School
Bachelors
Masters
PhD
Type of Work
Research
Teaching
Diagnostics
Other
BSL Level
BSL-1
BSL-2
BSL-2+
BSL-3
RG Level
RG-1
RG-2
RG-3
Research Funding
Government
University
Private
Other
Lab Design
Open Lab
Closed Lab
Both
Continuous Variable= mean (SD)

UofL RP1
Prior to
COVID-19
Pandemic
(n=91)
N (%)

UofL RP2
During
COVID-19
Pandemic
(n=120)
N (%)

38(43.2)
48(54.5)
2(2.3)

61(51.3)
57(47.9)
1(0.8)

7(7.9)
3(3.4)
79(88.8)

8(6.7)
4(3.4)
107(89.9)

36(39.6)
33(36.3)
15(16.5)
19(20.9)
7(7.7)
7(7.7)
17(18.7)

33(27.5)
25(20.8)
24(20.0)
27(22.5)
18(15)
23(19.2)
16(13.3)

3(3.4)
12(13.6)
16(18.2)
57(64.8)

6(5)
31(25.8)
26(21.7)
57(47.5)

89(97.8)
26(28.6)
6(6.6)
1(1.1)

116(96.7)
36(30)
17(14.2)
2(1.7)

40(44.0)
69(75.8)
13(14.3)
8(8.8)

55(45.8)
81(67.5)
27(22.5)
12(10.0)

53(58.2)
45(49.5)
9(9.9)

67(55.8)
58(48.3)
14(11.7)

72(79.1)
38(41.8)
19(20.9)
3(3.3)

90(75.0)
54(45.0)
27(22.5)
4(3.3)

p-value1
0.408

0.938

0.371

0.069

0.229

0.756

0.917

0.628

Not collected
63(57.3)
Not collected
22(20.0)
Not collected
25(22.7)
UofL RP1
UofL RP2
Prior to
During
COVID-19
COVID-19
Pandemic
Pandemic
(n=91)
(n=120)
p-value1
Age (years, continuous)
46.99(14.28)
43.44(14.97)
0.102
Experience in current role(years)
11.68(11.50)
8.71(9.19)
0.053
Team Size
6.25(6.803)
7.11(10.78)
0.988
Table 6: Characteristics of Study Participants in the UofL Biosafety Climate Study (n=211)
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Models
Limit
Initial
Modified

χ2

DF

307.589
234.888

116.000
109.000

χ2/DF*
<2.0-5.0
2.652
2.155

NFI
>.90
0.828
0.869

IFI
>.90
0.885
0.925

Table 7: Goodness of fit indicators of the Biosafety Climate Scale for Research Professionals (n=120)

TLI
>.95
0.864
0.905

CFI
>.90
0.884
0.924

RMSEA
<.08
0.118
0.099
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Cronbach's Alpha
Biosafety Climate Scale & Proposed
Factors
F1: Management Priority
F2: Supervisor Commitment
F3: Communication
F4: Participation
F5: Group Norms
Biosafety Climate Scale

Number
of items
BSCL-17

UofL RP1
During COVID-19
Pandemic
(n-91)

UofL RP2
During COVID-19
Pandemic
(n-120)

3
3
3
4
4
17

0.903
0.972
0.906
0.886
0.935
0.957

0.823
0.927
0.877
0.873
0.895
0.947

Table 8: Cronbach's alpha coefficients of Biosafety Climate Scale and Factors
Note: The validated biosafety climate (BSCL) scale consisted of 17 items and 5 factors for research
professionals (RP). Factors 1, 2, 3 ,4 and 5 are represented as F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5 respectively. Factor 1
consisted of items 1, 2 and 3. Factor 2 consisted of items 4, 5 and 6. Factor 3 consisted of items 7, 8 and 9.
Factor 4 consisted of items 10, 11, 12 and 13. Factor 5 consisted of items 14, 15, 16 and 17.
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UofL RP1
Prior to COVID-19
Pandemic
(n=91)

UofL RP2
During COVID-19
Pandemic
(n-120)
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Biosafety Climate Scale: Items and Factors
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Biosafety Climate Score
72.630
11.534
72.080
1. The safety of research professionals is a priority for my institution.
4.418
0.716
4.408
2. University administration considers research professionals' safety to be as important as productivity.
4.198
0.909
4.142
3. University administration shows support for prevention of biological hazards and incidents through
involvement and commitment.
4.231
0.895
4.275
4. In the laboratory (institution), my supervisor acts quickly to correct problems/issues that affect research
professional’s safety.
4.451
0.847
4.475
5. My supervisor clearly considers the safety of research professionals to be of great importance.
4.538
0.779
4.508
6. My supervisor acts decisively when a concern of a research professional’s safety practices is raised.
4.462
0.821
4.508
7. There is good communication at my institution about biosafety issues which affect me.
4.187
0.953
4.225
8. Information about proper biosafety practices is always brought to my attention in my institution.
4.110
0.971
4.133
9. My contributions to resolving biosafety concerns in the institution are listened to.
4.066
0.929
3.975
10. Research professionals participate in developing best biosafety practices in my institution.
3.989
0.983
3.883
11. Research professionals are encouraged to become involved in biosafety matters.
4.110
0.960
3.942
12. At my institution, the promotion of best biosafety practices involves all levels of the organization.
3.857
1.101
3.975
13. Consultation in developing best biosafety practices involves researchers and biosafety professionals.
4.143
1.017
4.133
14. In the laboratory (institution), we discuss research professional’s safety, biological hazards and incident
prevention.
4.319
0.905
4.200
15. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety awareness.
4.571
0.652
4.517
16. In the laboratory (institution), we remind each other of the regulations and guidelines regarding research
professional’s safety.
4.418
0.776
4.292
17. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety compliance.
4.560
0.653
4.492
Factor 1: University Administration Priority
12.850
2.319
12.820
Factor 2: Supervisor Commitment
13.450
2.382
13.490
Factor 3: Communication
12.360
2.618
12.330
Factor 4: Participation
16.100
3.509
15.930
Factor 5: Group Norms
17.870
2.758
17.500
Table 9: Comparison of Biosafety Climate Prior to COVID-19 Pandemic versus During COVID-19 Pandemic in the UofL Biosafety Climate Study

Std.
Dev.
9.606
0.655
0.873

p-value1
0.352
0.713
0.486

0.686

0.781

0.744
0.698
0.767
0.727
0.777
0.864
0.832
0.910
0.874
0.798

0.784
0.462
0.840
0.663
0.702
0.334
0.251
0.128
0.735
0.416

0.826
0.580

0.131
0.324

0.738
0.594
1.917
2.066
2.128
2.910
2.415

0.128
0.269
0.588
0.673
0.577
0.525
0.113

Biosafety Practices at UofL
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Regulations and guidelines
Which of the following regulations and guidelines does the biosafety program
follow at your institution? (Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
CDC
NIH
OSHA BBP
Institutional Policies
Other (Formaldehyde safety, lab specific, biosafety manual, vendor waste
handling)
University biosafety practices
Select all that apply to your institution.
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Regulations and guidelines are strictly followed
Everyone is encouraged to know regulations and guidelines
Practical Training is given to first time researchers in lab before they begin work
Peer to Peer feedback on biosafety issues and safe practices is encouraged
Biosafety issues and safe practices are easily communicated
Senior management is involved in addressing biosafety issues and improve safe
practices
Concepts that drive university's biosafety program
Which of the following concepts drives the biosafety program at your institution?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Regulations (Federal & State such as OSHA, NIH, CDC, DOT and others)
Institutional Policies
Safety Culture
Behavior Based Safety

UofL RP1
Prior to COVID-19
Pandemic
(n=91)
Std.
N
Mean
Dev.

UofL RP2
During COVID-19 Pandemic
(n-120)
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

84
88
88
85

4.643
4.602
4.750
4.812

0.831
0.917
0.777
0.500

112
111
116
112

4.652
4.739
4.819
4.795

0.756
0.657
0.486
0.539

7

2.857

1.864

19

2.632

1.862

88
89
88
89
88

4.170
4.483
4.318
4.034
4.170

0.874
0.624
0.953
1.027
0.887

119
119
117
119
119

4.210
4.504
4.291
4.092
4.134

0.700
0.595
0.872
0.863
0.823

88

3.920

1.096

117

4.085

0.961

89
88
89
88

4.607
4.443
4.303
4.045

0.633
0.676
0.831
1.038

116
117
117
115

4.578
4.513
4.291
4.061

0.577
0.582
0.777
0.901

p-value1

0.626
0.541
0.742
0.658
0.826

0.870
0.869
0.549
0.997
0.585
0.387

0.476
0.604
0.753
0.801

Mode of training given
What mode of training is given at your institution?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
Online
Classroom
Hands on by Researchers
Hands on By Biosafety
Hands on by both researchers and Biosafety professionals
Other (animal care, biological hazards, chemical hazards)
Training taken with 1 year
Training taken with 3 year
Training taken with 5 year
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Biosafety resource awareness
Which of the following biosafety resources are you aware of? (Select all that apply)
(1-Not at all Aware,2- Slightly Aware,3-Moderately Aware,4-Very Aware,5Extremely Aware)
ABSA
WHO
CDC
NIH
PSDS
OSHA
Guidelines for Biosafety Laboratory Competency
IBC
Other (IIACUC committee)
Resources utilized for risk assessment
Which of the following do you utilize to assess the risk of your research and lab
activities in your lab? (Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
Risk group of agents
Consultation with a biosafety officer
CDC
NIH
PSDS

89
4.371
0.760
117
4.376
0.653
88
3.511
1.039
115
3.374
1.055
87
3.954
0.975
114
3.851
1.050
86
3.105
1.218
111
3.144
1.119
85
3.306
1.102
107
3.243
1.131
12
2.750
1.765
12
1.833
1.528
RP1: BBP (79(86.8%)), NIH (47(51.6%)), BS (68(74.7%))
PR2: BBP (100(83. %)), NIH (50(41.7%)), BS (89(74.2%))
RP1: BBP (63(69.2%)), NIH (52(57.1%)), BS (64(70.3%))
PR2: BBP (85(70.8%)), NIH (72(60%)), BS (92(76.7%))
RP1: BBP (59(65.8%)), NIH (48(52.7%)), BS (59(64.8%))
PR2: BBP (79(65.8%), NIH (65(54.2%)), BS (81(67.5%))

0.739
0.394
0.553
0.767
0.657
0.145

80
81
86
88
81
88
87
87
8

2.450
2.506
3.791
4.170
1.901
4.364
3.425
4.230
2.875

1.340
1.343
1.294
0.962
1.319
0.912
1.361
1.053
1.727

104
105
110
111
103
115
105
114
4

2.144
2.571
3.645
3.991
1.874
4.296
3.286
4.018
1.500

1.169
1.262
1.201
1.031
1.289
0.805
1.299
1.056
1.000

0.152
0.721
0.236
0.208
0.956
0.247
0.423
0.069

83
87
78
87
76

3.831
3.425
3.372
3.782
1.842

1.333
1.207
1.442
1.316
1.327

111
112
102
104
98

3.820
3.339
3.196
3.644
1.776

1.370
1.159
1.428
1.292
1.145

0.954
0.546
0.398
0.390
0.914

Peer research
OSHA
IBC
Other (General peer research)
Lab inspection conducted by biosafety program administration
The biosafety administration at your institution conducts __________type of
laboratory inspections/assessments.
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)

75
88
85
5

3.000
4.148
4.318
2.400

1.489
1.099
0.929
1.342

99
113
110
4

3.131
4.080
4.200
1.500
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1.475
1.127
1.107
1.000

0.563
0.660
0.690
0.338

Announced
80
3.713
1.160
93
3.591
1.144
Unannounced
67
2.299
1.030
83
2.349
1.131
Both
55
2.691
1.052
62
2.903
1.289
Other
7
2.857
1.215
6
2.333
1.033
Biohazard exposure prevention awareness
89
2.96
0.208
119
2.92
0.308
Are you aware of how to prevent exposure to a biological hazard if an incident
involving these hazards occurs in your lab? (3-Yes,2-Not Sure,1-No)
Incident reporting
If incidents involving biohazards occurs in your lab, whom are you required to
report to per incident reporting guidelines at your institution? (Select all that apply)
(1-if yes, 0-if no)
Principal investigator
91
0.890
0.314
120
0.817
0.389
Department chair
91
0.187
0.392
120
0.167
0.374
Biosafety officer
91
0.736
0.443
120
0.642
0.482
EHS
91
0.648
0.480
120
0.642
0.482
Government (NIH, CDC, FDA, DOD, OSHA, State)
91
0.055
0.229
120
0.042
0.201
Colleagues in the lab
91
0.319
0.469
120
0.358
0.482
I do not know
91
0.033
0.180
120
0.042
0.201
Other
91
0.011
0.105
120
0.025
0.157
Known biosafety incidents resulting in lab acquired infections
89
0.045
0.208
117
0.017
0.130
Are you aware of any biosafety incidents resulting in Lab Acquired Infections in
your lab during 2016 to 2020? (1-Yes,0-No)
Known biosafety incidents resulting in exposure to biohazards
89
0.067
0.252
116
0.017
0.131
Are you aware of any biosafety incidents resulting in exposure to biological hazards
in your lab during 2016 to 2020? (1-Yes,0- No)
Table 10: Biosafety Practices Prior to COVID-19 Pandemic versus During COVID-19 Pandemic in the UofL Biosafety Climate Study (n=211)

0.451
0.945
0.380
0.566

0.142
0.705
0.145
0.921
0.656
0.549
0.746
0.464
0.242
0.067

UofL RP1
Prior to COVID-19
Pandemic
(n=91)
Biosafety Perceptions of Researchers at UofL

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

UofL RP2
During COVID-19
Pandemic
(n-120)
N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

p-value
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Perception on university biosafety practices
How do you rate biosafety practices at your university?
(3-Good as is,2-Can be improved,1-Undergoing improvements)

90

2.72

0.498

118

2.75

0.43729

0.363

Perception on risk level of work conducted in the lab
What do you consider the risk level of work conducted in your lab?
(5-Very Low,4-Low,3-Moderate,2-High,1-Very High,0-I Don't Know)

89

3.73

0.986

118

3.91

1.062

0.144

Perception on measures taken in the lab against hazards
Do you believe your lab takes strong measures to protect you from the hazards of the
work conducted in your lab?
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Perception on university's Biosafety program in mitigating risks
Do you consider the biosafety program at your university to be effective in mitigating
risks in your lab?
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Perception on practices that improve adherence to safety practices & mitigate risk in lab
Which of the following do you believe would improve adherence to safety practices and
mitigating risks in your lab?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Regulations and guidelines are strictly followed
Everyone is encouraged to know regulations and guidelines
Practical Training is given to first time researchers in lab before they begin work
Peer to Peer feedback on biosafety issues and safe practices is encouraged
Biosafety issues and safe practices are easily communicated
Senior management is involved in addressing biosafety issues and improve safe
practices
Perception on lab inspections
Select the type of laboratory inspections/assessments you consider to be effective.

89

4.27

1.074

118

4.36

0.843

0.919

89

4.13

1.099

117

4.26

0.684

0.749

86
85
88
87
89
87

4.209
4.306
4.409
4.241
4.281
4.230

0.784
0.787
0.853
0.762
0.723
0.924

111
113
111
109
111
109

4.225
4.389
4.414
4.193
4.252
4.064

0.759
0.647
0.667
0.700
0.707
0.808

0.955
0.645
0.514
0.526
0.738
0.065

(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
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Announced
74
4.189
0.696
88
4.170
Unannounced
69
3.812
1.088
81
3.926
Both
66
4.121
0.832
91
4.110
Other
5
3.600
0.894
5
2.600
Perception on training format
Select the following training format that you believe could improve biosafety at your
institution.
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Online
84
4.012
0.898
105
4.010
Classroom
80
3.825
0.808
105
3.800
Hands on by Researchers
82
4.037
0.853
101
4.208
Hands on By Biosafety
82
4.085
0.804
103
4.087
Hands on by both researchers and Biosafety professionals
81
4.160
0.798
101
4.129
Other (animal care, biological hazards, chemical hazards)
10
3.800
0.789
11
2.545
Perception on lab design
Which lab design do you believe is safer:
(Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Open
80
3.013
Closed
99
4.000
Both
59
3.441
Perception on lab design type preferred
Which lab design do you prefer to work at:
(Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Open
76
3.39
Closed
89
3.89
Both
54
3.50
Table 11: Biosafety Perceptions Prior to COVID-19 Pandemic versus During COVID-19 Pandemic in the UofL Biosafety Climate Study (n=211)

0.834
1.010
0.849
1.140

0.792
0.551
0.997
0.219

0.915
0.892
0.828
0.853
0.845
1.293

0.975
0.884
0.151
0.887
0.857
0.021

1.153
0.892
0.815

1.223
1.133
0.694

UofL RP2
During COVID-19 Pandemic
(n=120)
Perceptions on Research Safety during COVID-19 Pandemic
In relation to Covid-19 and your activity in research labs, do you feel:
(Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

Feel safe working in labs
University prioritizes covid-19 precautions in labs
Supervisor prioritizes covid-19 precautions in labs
Good communication on changes in lab safety
In lab, peers are complying with lab safety and covid-19 precautions

Mean

Std.
Deviation

118

4.059

0.899

118

4.051

0.968

116

4.293

0.885

116

3.983

1.095

116

4.060

0.981

N

117
3.709 1.059
Covid-19 precautions are imposing additional challenges to lab safety
Table 12: Biological Laboratory Safety Perceptions During COVID-19 Pandemic in the UofL Biosafety
Climate Study (n=120)
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Figure 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Biosafety Climate Scale for Researchers at UofL (n=120), Unstandardized
Estimates of 5 Factors
Note: CFA results of unstandardized estimated of 5 factors are presented. 17 items are represented as bsclrp2_1 to
bsclrp2_17 for the 17 items of Research Professionals Biosafety Climate (BSCL-17) scale. The five factors are
presented as management priority (F1), communication (F2), participation (F3), group norms (F4), and supervisor
commitment (F5). The variance, that is the amount of change on dependent variable is 0.28, 0.48. 0.51, 0.31 and 0.30
for the five factors. The covariance that is the amount of change in single predictor variable ranged from 0.19 to 0.34.
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Figure 4: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Biosafety Climate Scale for Researchers at UofL (n=120), Standardized
Estimates of 5 Factors
Note: CFA results of standardized estimated of 5 factors are presented. 17 items are represented as bsclrp2_1 to
bsclrp2_17 for the 17 items of Research Professionals Biosafety Climate (BSCL-17) scale. The five factors are
presented as management priority (F1), communication (F2), participation (F3), group norms (F4), and supervisor
commitment (F5). The factor loading estimates (higher the better) ranged from 0.70 to 0.93 and were acceptable. The
correlations between the factors ranged from 0.50 to 0.87.
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Figure 5: Five underlying factors of Biosafety Climate Scale for Researchers in Biological Laboratories.
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CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF BIOSAFETY CLIMATE IN BIOLOGICAL AND
BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES IN THE USA

Introduction
The prior chapters focused on developing, validating a Biosafety Climate (BSCL) scale, and its
application in comparing biosafety climate perceptions before and during coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARSCoV-2) at University of Louisville (UofL). The current chapter examines the status of biosafety
climate and safety perceptions in research and teaching biological laboratories at public
universities in the Unites States.

As the previous chapters explained, there are few studies that investigated safety climate specific
to biological research laboratories. Industry specific safety climate scales rather than universal are
encouraged.18,34-35,62 Marin et al identified., a safety climate instrument specific to students
conducting chemical laboratory work that could be beneficial in identifying safety gaps that
inhibit proactive approaches to improve safety.25 In their study, they advocate use of safety
climate scales to understand perspectives of different groups, even those that are seldom
considered to identify gaps in college laboratory safety.25 The BSCL scale was developed and
validated in Chapter 2 utilizing research professionals (RPs) from University of Louisville (UofL)
and biosafety professionals (BPs) from different public universities in the US. As explained in
previous chapters, there are no studies that specifically assessed biosafety climate perceptions of
RPs and BPs who represent two groups with distinct roles who directly work with
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potentially infectious microorganisms and hazardous biological materials in laboratories.62 This
chapter focuses on assessing biosafety climate and biosafety perceptions in biological and
biomedical research laboratories at public universities in the US. In Chapter 3, confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) was utilized to confirm the BSCL scale construct using a dataset consisting
of responses to BSCL survey from RPs at UofL. The CFA analysis in Chapter 3, indicated that a
BSCL scale for RPs with underlying five factors might be more appropriate. Hence, this chapter
further analyzed the construct validity of BSCL scale using a larger sample size to address the
limitations in chapter 3.

Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) was declared a pandemic in March 2020.74-78 This resulted in guidelines from
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), World Health Organization (WHO), state and federal
governments on how to implement measures to mitigate risk of exposure to SARS-CoV-2 in
occupational settings including academic research laboratories.79-83 Chapter 2 explored the impact
of COVID-19 pandemic on biosafety climate perception at UofL. This chapter further explores
the perceptions of biosafety climate and research safety during COVID-19 pandemic in public
academic and teaching biological laboratories in the US.

The purpose of this study was to perform CFA on BSCL scale of RPs and BPs and examine
status of biosafety climate in biological and biomedical laboratories at public universities in the
US. This study investigated whether an individual’s biosafety climate perceptions depend on their
role as either a research or biosafety professional. The null hypothesis being tested is that
biosafety climate perceptions of research professionals and biosafety professionals are the same.
To test this hypothesis, biosafety climate perceptions of research and biosafety professionals at
public research and teaching laboratories in the United States were examined. This study also
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considered various factors such as biosafety practices and biosafety perceptions and their impact
on biosafety climate of either RPs or BPs. COVID-19 pandemic resulted in challenges to not only
public safety but also occupational safety during the year 2020 - 2021. Hence, this study explored
the effect of COVID-19 pandemic on perceptions of biological laboratory safety.

Rationale & Purpose of the Study
The study’s purpose was to identify biosafety climate of researchers and biosafety professionals
in biological and biomedical science laboratories at public universities in the USA. RPs and BPs
represent two groups with distinct roles.62 RPs directly work with potentially infectious
microorganisms and hazardous biological materials utilizing biosafety practices in laboratories. In
contrast, BPs facilitate implementation of biosafety practices and policies in the laboratories by
providing on-site policy compliance, guidance, and administrative support. Although RPs and
BPs have distinct roles, they share a common goal of ensuring safety in biological laboratories.
To my knowledge, there has never been a study conducted to examine the biosafety climate
perceptions of RPs and BPs. Hence, this study proposes to quantify biosafety climate perceptions
of these two key players of biosafety program management in public universities. This research
also proposed to investigate the impact of biosafety practices, biosafety perceptions, and COVID19 pandemic on biosafety climate. By doing this, the factors that influence biosafety climate of
researchers and biosafety professionals could be determined.

The study design and protocols were approved by University of Louisville Institutional Review
Board to proceed (IRB 18.1220, Appendix B). All institutional policies and guidelines on
participant privacy were followed.
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Methods
Participant Sampling and Subject Recruitment
The study participants consisted of RPs and BPs who engaged in biological research utilizing risk
group (RG)1, 2, and 3 agents at public research and teaching laboratories in the US. The inclusion
criteria for the participants were: a) involved in biological research as either researcher or
biosafety administrative personnel, b) must be working with biological agents belonging to RG 1,
2 or 3 agents at biosafety level (BSL) 1, 2 or 3 laboratories, and c) should be 18 years or older.
The exclusion criteria consisted of any researchers not involved in biological research activities at
private academic universities or commercial organizations. The RPs consisted of principal
investigators, Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) members, research associates, students,
graduate research assistants, lab personnel and equivalent positions. The BPs consisted of
biosafety officers, assistant biosafety officer, safety training specialists, biosafety administrative
personnel, and equivalent positions. Initially, the study planned to disseminate surveys to
biosafety officers and/or research safety admiration at public universities requesting them to share
the survey with researchers and/or biosafety administrative personnel at their respective
institutions. A subject recruitment email was sent to potential participants as shown in Appendix
F. However, due to a low response to survey invitations an alternative plan of directly contacting
population of interest was utilized. A list of public institutions offering a bachelors or advanced
(masters and doctoral) awards in biological and biomedical programs/majors was obtained from
National Center for Education Statistics website.95 The list obtained consisted of 584 universities.
Email addresses of potential participants was collected by reviewing the university’s website and
relevant department pages. Survey invitations were sent to approximately 35,000 potential
participants through email.
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Survey Administration
The biosafety climate questionnaire consisting of BSCL scale,62 background questions on age,
gender, education, training, type of work conducted, and work environment was shared through
REDCapTM with potential participants. The survey was administered from November 23, 2020, to
April 06, 2021. Three email reminders were sent to the participants who did not respond to the
survey invitation. All the questions in the survey were optional to respond except the BSCL scale
consisting of 17 items. These items were positive and measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). No form of compensation was provided to the
study participants whose identity was kept anonymous. The survey was similar to the one used in
the previous chapter, presented in Appendix E.

Data Management and Analysis
Survey data collected through REDCapTM was exported to Microsoft Excel for data cleaning and
management. Only the surveys that were completed by RPs and BPs were considered for data
analysis. Surveys completed by participants that identified their role as both BP and RP, or other
was excluded. IBM-SPSS (version 27), IBM SPSS-AMOS (version 27) and R (R Core Team,
2021) were utilized for data analysis.

Statistical Analysis
CFA was used to test for model fitness and construct relatability of BSCL scale for RPs and BPs.
A three factor-underlying construct was hypothesized62 through exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
in Chapter-2. However, CFA analysis on a different data set in the study presented in Chapter-3,
indicated a five factor-underlying structure for BSCL scale of RPs. Like Chapter-3, this study
also utilized Absolute Fit (Root Mean Square of Error Approximation- RMSEA), Comparative
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Fit Index (CFI), Incremental Fit (NFI, IFI) Tukcker-Lewis Index (TLI), and Parsimonious Fit
(Chi-square/Degrees of Freedom - ChiSq/df) to test the level of model fitness. RMSEA values
between 0.05 and 0.08 (ideally) or between 0.05 to 0.1, CFI >0.90, NFI >0.90, IFI >0.90, TLI
>0.95 and ChiSq/df < 5.0 are recommended as indicators of good fitting models.25,41,84-91
Maximum likelihood method was applied for model estimation. Internal consistency was tested
using Cronbach’s alpha analysis using SPSS38-39,62.

For continuous variables, independent samples t-tests (for normal distribution), Wilcoxon
methods (for non-normal distribution) and Fishers Exact Test for categorical variables was
utilized to compare RPs and BPs responses in the study. Differences in research professionals’
perceptions prior to COVID-19 pandemic and during the pandemic was examined. Logistic
regression is a poplar multivariate model.96-98 Logistic regression models,96-102 were used to
evaluate associations of biosafety climate score and items scores with the outcome of predicting
RPs or BPs. The estimates are the log odds ratios. The probability of falling into a biosafety
professional or a researcher profile is linked with the items scores through this logistic regression
model. Assumptions of logistic regression96-102 such as dependent variable measured on an ordinal
level, continuous independent variables, ordinal/categorical variables were met in this study.
Linear modelling was employed to examine associations of aggregate BSCL scores and
individual item scores of RPs and BPs with different variables such as biosafety practices,
biosafety perceptions, and lab safety perceptions during COVID-19 pandemic. Linear
regression103-105 was utilized to predict the aggregate BSCL scores of RPs and BPs based on
different variables such as biosafety practices, biosafety perceptions, and lab safety perceptions
during COVID-19 pandemic.
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Results
Sample Size and Participant Characteristics
The biosafety climate questionnaire was shared with RPs and BPs. Three email reminders were
sent to potential participants requesting them to complete the survey. The survey resulted in 2237
responses, out of which 1277 were incomplete and 960 were completed. Out of the 960
responses, 690 responses were from RPs, 157 responses from BPs, 36 both RP and BP and 80
others. 690 RPs and 157 RPs were included in the data analysis.

The characteristics of the participants RPs and BPs are shown in Table 13. The sample population
in USA-RPs study was majorly male (n=345, 50.4%), aged (44.29 + 13.12), had doctoral level of
education (n=492, 71.6%), in the role of principal investigator (n=359, 52%) followed by
professor (n=317, 45.9%), never an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) member (n=577
63.3%), conducted research (n=670, 97.1%), worked at BSL-2 setting (n=446, 64.6%), worked
with RG-1 agents (n=478, 69.3%) followed by RG-2 (n=320, 46.4%), primarily in open/shared
lab design (n=335, 53.1%), in labs with government funding (n=569, 82.5%), had an average
team size of (7.78 + 14.45) and (9.88 +9.68) years of experience in current role.

The sample population in USA-BPs study was majorly female (n=79, 52.7%), aged (47.6 +
11.11), had doctoral level of education (n=51, 32.7%), in the role of biosafety officer (n=90,
57.3%), current IBC member (n=109, 70.3%), conducted research (n=152, 96.8%), worked at
BSL-2 setting (n=148, 94.3%), worked with RG-1 agents (n=146, 93%) followed by RG-2
(n=145, 92.4%), primarily in both open/closed lab design (n=120, 87.6%), in institutions with
government funding (n=151, 96.2%), had an average team size of (3.80 + 3.01) and (7.64 +6.50)
years of experience in current role.
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis
The results of CFA showing the statistical fit indices of the measurement model are shown in
Table 14. Initial model tested the three-factor structure of RP-BSCL, consisting of 1)
management priority, communication, and participation, 2) group norms, and 3) supervisor
commitment that was hypothesized using the UofL RPs1 dataset in a previous study.62 For BPBSCL scale, the initial model tested the three-factor structure, consisting of 1) management
priority and communication 2) group norms and research professionals participation, and 3)
supervisor commitment that was hypothesized using the UofL RPs1 dataset in a previous study.62
The modified model for both RP and BP, BSCL scale tested the five-factor structure, consisting
of 1) management priority, 2) communication, 3) participation, 4) group norms, and 5) supervisor
commitment based on theory.62

As reported in Table 14, the initial factor model that emerged from EFA presented fit indices
which were below the recommended level for the measurement model for both BPs and RPs
BSCL scale. For the RP-BSCL construct, initial model had χ2/df =9.49, above the recommended
value of <5.0 and the values obtained for fit indices: NFI=0.898, IFI=0.908, TLI=0.892, and
CFI=0.908, and RMSEA =0.11 were not within the recommended range. However, the modified
model showed improvement in fit indices of RP-BSCL construct against the initial model. The
modified model had acceptable χ2/df =4.042, NFI=0.959, IFI=0.969, TLI=0.961, CFI=0.969, and
RMSEA=0.066 for the BSCL construct for researchers. The modified model for RP-BSCL
construct provided additional support for the goodness of the model based on theory.62 The
standardized and unstandardized factor loadings for the modified model with five factor
confirmatory model biosafety climate for RPs are presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively,
which are within the acceptable range.
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For the BPs BSCL construct, the initial model had acceptable χ2/df =3.27 and the values obtained
for fit indices: NFI=0.840, IFI=0.883, TLI=0.862, CFI=0.882 and RMSEA=0.12 which were not
within the recommended range. The modified model for the BP-BSCL construct showed slight
improvement with χ2/df =2.949, NFI=0.864, IFI=0.906, TLI=0.881, CFI=0.905, and
RMSEA=0.112 though still below the recommended values. The modified model for BPs-BSCL
construct failed to provide adequate support for goodness of the model. However, as discussed in
Chapter-3, Kenny et al, recommend not to compute RMSEA for studies with small sample sizes
as the results could indicate a poor fitting model.92 Hence, in this study we considered five factor
structure of BSCL construct for BPs to enable comparison of RPs and BPs.
The standardized and unstandardized factor loadings for the modified model with five factor
confirmatory model biosafety climate for BPs are presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively,
which are within the acceptable range.

The aggregate Cronbach’s alpha scores for BSCL scale were 0.953 and 0.955 for RPs and BPs
respectively, as shown in Table 15. The alpha scores for the five factors were greater than 0.8 in
both USA-RPs and USA-BPs studies, indicating internal consistency of the scale.

Survey Analysis
The biosafety climate perceptions of RPs and BPs measured using the BSCL scale,62 is shown in
Table 16. The aggregate biosafety climate score of RPs ranged from 17 to 85, with a mean score
of 69.94 (+ 12.51) and for BPs it ranged from 17 to 85, with a mean score of 68.90 (+ 11.80).
Figure 10 compares the five factor scores of RPs and BPs. Three factors of the biosafety climate
construct: management priority, communication and group norms are slightly greater for RPs
compared to BPs. However, supervisor commitment and participation are slightly greater for BPs
compared to RPs. Perceptions on biosafety practices of RPs and BPs was examined, as shown in
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Table 17. Differences in biosafety practices between RPs and BPs has been observed. RPs
responded that they are most aware of NIH guidelines and least aware of Pathogen safety data
sheets. BPs were most aware of CDC guidelines and least aware of WHO’s guidelines for
biosafety laboratory competency. Biosafety perceptions of RPs and BPs was examined, as shown
Table 18. Biosafety practices were rated higher by RPs (mean =2.64) compared to BPs
(mean=1.90), where 3 = good as is, 2= can be improved and 1=undergoing improvements). RPs
perceived the risk of work conducted in their labs as “low” whereas BPs considered the risk of
work conducted at their institutions as “moderate”. RPs and BPs perceived biological laboratory
safety perceptions during COVID-19 pandemic positively as shown in Table 19. Both RPs and
BPs agreed that: they felt safe working in labs (mean = 4.22 & 4.18); university prioritized
COVID-19 precautions in labs (mean = 4.30 & 4.43); supervisor prioritized COVID-19
precautions (mean = 4.48 & 4.47); there was good communication on changes in lab safety (mean
= 4.22 & 4.26); peers in lab complied with lab safety precautions (mean=4.28 & 4.17). RPs and
BPs agreed that those precautions imposed by COVID-19 caused additional challenges to lab
safety (mean=3.84 & 4.01).

Logistic regression
Preliminary data exploration was conducted for exploratory purposes using Wilcoxon methods on
some of the items for individual regressions. We found significant differences in some of the
variables and found that logistic regression is appropriate for this data set. Logistic regression is a
robust test that accounts for confounders and hence would be appropriate in this study. Logistic
regression was performed on the 17 items as well as the aggregate climate score of the BSCL
scale using USA-RPs and USA-BPs data sets.
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Logistic regression shows how different items discriminate the two groups: RPs and BPs. The
results of logistic regression are presented in Table 20. Logistic regression of BSCL score could
not discriminate RPs and BPs (p > 0.34). However, results of logistic regression on 17 items
showed some significant differences in perceptions of RPs and BPs. Significant differences were
found for items 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 17. The results from the model indicate that
respondents who reported greater scores on items 3, 8, 10, 12, 15 and 17 were associated with
RPs. The respondents who reported greater scores on items 9, 11, and 13 were associated with
BPs.

Linear Modeling
Linear modeling was performed to examine the relationship between BSCL score and variables
such as age, gender, education background, biosafety practices, biosafety perceptions, and
biological laboratory safety perceptions during the pandemic on RPs and BPs. The results of
linear regression of BSCL score of RPs and BPs are presented in Table 21. The BSCL score of
RPs was positively correlated with age of RPs, significant at p < 0.006. However, the BSCL score
of BPs did not correlate with age of BPs (p > 0.77). A positive correlation between the variable
on biosafety practices based on safety culture -communication (Biosafety issues and safe
practices are easily communicated) and BSCL score of RPs was found to be significant at p
<0.001. A positive correlation between the variable on biosafety practices based on safety culture
-management commitment (Senior management is involved in addressing biosafety issues and
improve safe practices) and BSCL score of RPs was found to be significant at p < 0.001.
Perceptions on university's Biosafety program in mitigating risks was found to positively
correlated with BSCL scores of RPs as well as BPs which found to be significant p < 0.001. A
positive correlation between BSCL scores of RPs and their perception on COVID-19 pandemic
measures (Supervisor prioritizes COVID-19 precautions in labs) was found to be significant at p
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< 0.001. A positive correlation between BSCL scores of BPs and their perception on COVID-19
pandemic measures (Research labs are safe during COVID-19 pandemic) was found to be
significant at p < 0.001.

Ordinal Regression
Ordinal regression was performed to examine the relationship between individual BSCL item
scores and variables such as age, gender, education background, biosafety practices, biosafety
perceptions, and biological laboratory safety perceptions during the pandemic on RPs and BPs.
The results are presented in Table 22. Significant associations between variables and item scores
of RPs and BPs were observed. A positive correlation between the variables of age and biosafety
practices based on behavior-based safety (peer to peer feedback on biosafety issues and safe
practices is encouraged) and item 1 (The safety of research professionals is a priority for my
institution) for RPs was noticed. Item 5 (My supervisor clearly considers the safety of research
professionals to be of great importance) positively correlated with COVID-19 precautions which
emphasized on supervisor priority (p = 0). IBC membership negatively correlated with the item 9
(My contributions to resolving biosafety concerns in the institution are listened to) for BPs.

Discussion
The current study collected survey data from RPs and BPs at public universities in USA who
were involved with biological and biomedical research activities. Initially, survey invitations
were sent out to biosafety officers and equivalent officials at various public universities in the US.
The assumption was that they would be able to distribute the survey to RPs and biosafety
administrate personnel within their institutions. However, due to low response rate, we had to
come up with alternative approaches. When designing a survey, different elements such as
invitation mode, subject line, location, URL link, length of test, and survey time need to be
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carefully selected.106 Literature suggests use of different strategies to improve web survey
efficiency through use of reminders.106-108 Based on feedback from initial survey invitations and
review of exiting literature on survey design, modifications were made to the survey invitation
and survey design to increase response rate. Changes such as: subject line, details in the
invitation, font size, font color, three reminders to complete the survey, survey invite sent directly
by the research investigators to potential participants emails and so on were made, which aided in
increased response.

To further understand the biosafety climate construct, this study performed CFA to test the
goodness of the factor pattern previously hypothesized62 with EFA in Chapter-2, and cross
validated the model indicated through CFA in Chapter-3. The results of CFA showed a good fit
for the modified model with five underlying factors of BSCL scale for RPs. These factors are
management priority, supervisor commitment, communication, participation, and group norms,
which corresponds to factors envisaged in other studies.22,38,62 The underlying factors of the
biosafety climate construct can also be assessed using BSCL scale for RPs. However, this study
could not confirm the underlying factor structure for BP-BSCL scale and additional studies are
recommended to assess the underlying factors of BSCL scale for BPs. Nevertheless, the BSCL
construct with five underlying factors showed to be a better fit than three underlying factors
initially hypothesized for BP-BSCL. The BSCL scale can be used to assess safety climate
perceptions of RPs and BPs.

Logistic regression was conducted to analyze the data. The aggregate BSCL score was unable to
distinguish RPs and BPs. However, some of the individual item scores were able to discriminate
RPs and BPs. The differences in item perceptions of RPs and BPs can be justified. As explained
in a previous study, RPs and BPs represent two groups with distinct roles with a shared goal of
ensuring safety in biological laboratories.62 BPs ensure administrative support and
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implementation of biosafety practices to ensure safety of RPs who directly work with potentially
infectious agents.62 Consequently, differences in their perceptions of safety climate are expected.

RPs have higher perceptions than BPs for items 3, 8, 10, 12, 15 and 17. Higher perceptions on
item 3 (University administration shows support for prevention of biological hazards and
incidents through involvement and commitment) and item 8 (Information about proper biosafety
practices is always brought to my attention in my institution) signifies that researchers recognize
university administration’s support in preventing hazards and communicating safety issues.
However, BPs consider the university’s support and communication to be lower than RPs. RPs
and BPs have different responsibilities due to which their expectations on support from university
administration might be different. Item 10 (Research professionals participate in developing best
biosafety practices in my institution) and item 12 (At my institution, the promotion of best
biosafety practices involves all levels of the organization) corresponds to participation of
researchers in biosafety matters, which researchers perceive to be greater than BPs. Item 15 (In
the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety awareness) and item 17 (In the
laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety compliance) are also perceived more
positively by RPs compared to BPs. The safety climate perceptions of RPs might be more
influenced by the culture within their laboratories followed by their departments and university.
Whereas for BPs perceptions might be influenced by the overall culture at the university level.

RPs have lower perceptions than BPs for the items of 9, 11 and 13. Lower perceptions for RPs
compared to BPs was found to be significant on item 9 (my contributions to resolving biosafety
concerns in the institution are listened to); item 11 (research professionals are encouraged to
become involved in biosafety matters); and 13 (Consultation in developing best biosafety
practices involves researchers and biosafety professionals). Due to the nature of their work, BPs
generally interact with multiple research labs and researchers within their institution. Whereas not
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all RPs in a university are involved in biosafety affairs due to various reasons such as: students or
junior research associates unaware of biosafety opportunities, principial investigators who are not
interested in biosafety affairs, or RPs not actively working with infectious agents and therefore
might not be aware of biosafety opportunities. Hence, BPs might feel that RPs have ample
opportunities to participate whereas not all RPs might agree they had an opportunity to be
involved in biosafety matters.
One of the important goals of occupational safety and health (OSH) is assessing and evaluating
risks, as misjudging the risks posed may lead to incidents.109-111 Risk perception consists of
cognitive and emotional dimensions.112 Cognitive dimension related to being knowledgeable and
understanding of the risks involved whereas as emotional dimension related to how one feels
about them.112 Ivenksy, stated that for OSH program to be effective, a shared vision of hazards
and required controls is essential.109 Risk perceptions are subjective as it depends on a multitude
of factors such as conceptions of knowledge, experience, and personalities. Response to hazards
depends on risk perceptions of the hazard posed.109,112-114 Risk in OSH is defined as, “the
likelihood that a person may be harmed or suffers adverse health effects if exposed to a hazard.”
Risk can be further explained as actual risk (actual hazards/actual control) and perceived risk
(perceived hazards/perceived control) which is influenced by individuals’ perceptions and is
prone to be subjective.109-111 Studies showed that safety programs are supported when an
occupational hazard is matched by a control.109 Whereas annoyance, low support, fear, outrage
with lack of safety support is reported when safety programs don’t match the hazards (or
perceived hazards).109 Studies on biosafety laboratory risk assessment emphasized use of relevant
knowledge and methods to identify and describe risk which is a systemic, comprehensive, and
continuous process.113-115
This study highlighted that BPs were more aware of biosafety resources and often utilized various
resources during risk assessment compared to RPs as shown in Table 17. It was observed that
RPs primarily utilized IBC and risk group of agent’s risk assessment whereas BPs utilized various
69

resources such as risk group of agents, CDC, IBC, peer research and NIH guidelines for risk
assessment. Also, it was observed that the awareness on incidents leading to exposure to
biohazards and lab acquired infections is greater for BPs than RPs, Table 17. This suggests that
the information being applied to assess risk might be different for RPs and BPs leading to
differences in risk perceptions. RPs considered the risk level of work conducted in their labs to be
“low” risk whereas BPs considered the risk level to “moderate”, Table 18. RPs positively rated
biosafety practices compared to BPs, demonstrating differences in perceptions on practices in
place to ensure biological laboratory safety, Table 18. This indicates that BPs considered the risk
to be greater than RPs in biological laboratories because of which they might have perceived the
biosafety practices in place less positively than RPs.

The results of linear regression in this study suggested that age positively correlated with BSCL
scores of RPs. Holden et al.,116 in their study on patient safety climate found significant
differences on total safety scores based on age. The association of age and BSCL perceptions of
RPs needs to be further evaluated so that the needs of specific age group can be met through
specific training or information sharing. Communication and management commitment are key
aspects of safety culture.117-118 A positive correlation of total BSCL scores for both RPs and BPs
with biosafety practices based on communication and management commitment aspects of safety
culture was found. This suggests that a biosafety program that utilizes concepts of safety culture
is associated with higher BSCL perceptions. Studies suggest that individuals’ perceptions vary
based on group-level safety climate(supervisor) and organizational level safety climate (top
management).119 Positive correlation of supervisor priority on COVID-19 precautions on BSCL
scores of RPs might indicate that RPS perceptions are driven by supervisor commitment to safety.
The negative association of IBC membership on BPs perceptions on item 9, might suggest that
there are challenges in communication between RPs and BPs. Since, IBCs are usually composed
of members from both biosafety administration and research community.
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This study validated BSCL scale utilizing national data collected from public universities with
biological and biomedical laboratories in the US. Per my knowledge, this is the first national
survey that evaluated BSCL perceptions of two key players of biosafety: researchers and
biosafety administrative personnel. Logistic regression was applied to avoid confounding
effects101 by analyzing the association of different item variables together to measure the
relationship between item variables and BSCL perceptions of RPs and BPs. However, this study
has few limitations. Only biological and biomedical laboratories at public universities in the US
were represented in this study, warranting caution when generalizing the finding of this study
across public, private, diagnostic, or clinical laboratories across the US or other countries. The
data in this study was collected through web-based survey which has its limitations71 such as not
being able to reach the population of interest. This study directly invited only the participants
whose emails were publicly available in university websites. This study relied on principal
investigators or biosafety officers to share the survey with students or other research personnel in
their laboratories whose emails might not be available in university websites. Another limitation
of this study is the lack of quantitative data on practices, risk perceptions and hazards that could
have been valuable in examining BSCL perceptions.

There are various theoretical and practical implications based on the findings of this study. The
BSCL scale for RPs was not only validated but the underlying five factor structure of the BSCL
scale construct was confirmed. BSCL scale can be used as a tool to assess BSCL perceptions of
RPs and BPs. Safety climate literature recommends examining the perspectives of all parties
involved in understanding safety gaps.25 This study was successful in identifying gaps in safety
perceptions by evaluating perceptions of researchers. This study quantified BSCL perceptions,
biosafety practices, biosafety perceptions, and research safety during COVID-19 pandemic in
public research and teaching biological laboratories of RPs and BPs in the US. RPs and BPs
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mostly had positive perceptions on COVID-19 precautions taken to ensure lab safety during
COVID-19 pandemic. Insights on the differences in perceptions of BSCL scale items of RPs and
BPs was also presented through this study. As previous studies noted,62 issues in biosafety
programs can be addressed proactively by evaluating biosafety climate and safety culture within
biological laboratories. The findings from this study contribute to the existing literature on safety
climate specific to academic laboratories. The insights gained from this study will be greatly
beneficial when developing biosafety management programs or improving existing programs.
Individual institutions can utilize the BSCL scale to measure biosafety climate within their
institutions and compare with national biosafety climate perceptions. The BSCL scale can be
employed before and after an intervention, periodic BSCL assessments and to understand
research professionals’ perceptions for biosafety program improvement.

Additional studies could be taken up to compare BSCL perceptions in US with other developed
and developing countries as well as with nonacademic biological research laboratories. The
knowledge gained from the development, validation and BSCL scale administration process can
be utilized to develop specific safety climate scale for chemical and radiation laboratories at
public universities. Studies on association of biosafety climate perceptions and related safety
outcomes such as decreased exposure to biological hazards, fewer lab acquired infections,
increased safety participation and increased resources are advised.

Conclusion
This study was conducted to confirm the underlying structure of BSCL scale for RPs and BPs and
compare their biosafety climate perceptions in biological and biomedical laboratories at public
universities in the USA. The results confirmed a BSCL construct for RPs with five underlying
factors: management priority, supervisor commitment, communication, participation, and group
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norms. However, for BSCL construct for BPs, the scale could not confirm the underlying factor
structure warranting additional studies. The overall BSCL perceptions of RPs and BPs were
comparable, however some of the item scores were found to be significantly different. This study
showed that there are gaps in perceptions of risk, resources awareness, resource utilization of RPs
compared to BPs. This might explain the motivation behind RPs and BPs in perceiving some of
items on university support, communication, participation, and group norms differently. For an
effective OSH program, a shared vision of hazards and required controls is considered
necessary.109 Additional studies to comprehend the differences in perceptions of risk, practices
(controls) in place, resource awareness, resource utilization of RPs and BPs should be considered.
Effective biosafety programs can be developed when RPs and BPs work together with a shared
vision of implementing appropriate practices (controls) based on actual risk in biological and
biomedical research. The results of this study will inform the biosafety community on biosafety
climate scale and its application in quantifying safety climate at biological laboratories.
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Characteristics

Gender
Female
Male
Other
IBC Membership
Current
Past
Never
Role
Principal Investigator
Professor
Lab Manager
Research Assistant
GRA/GA/TA
Student
Other-Research Role
Biosafety Officer
Assistant Biosafety Officer
Research Training Professional
Research Safety Professional
Other-Biosafety Administration role
Educational Background
High School
Bachelors
Masters
PhD
Type of Work
Research
Teaching
Diagnostics
Other
BSL Level
BSL-1
BSL-2
BSL-2+
BSL-3
BSL-4
RG Level
RG-1
RG-2
RG-3
RG-4
Research Funding
Government
University
Private
Other
Lab Design
Open Lab
Closed Lab
Both
Continuous Variable= mean (SD)

USA-RP
n=690
N (%)

USA-BP
n=157
N (%)

335(48.9)
345(50.4)
5(0.7)

79(52.7)
70(46.7)
1(0.7)

70(10.2)
40(5.8)
577(63.3)

109(70.3)
8(5.2)
38(24.5)

359(52)
317(45.9)
110(15.9)
92(13.3)
104(15.1)
78(11.3)
74(10.7)

90(57.3)
18(11.5)
9(5.7)
28(17.8)
44(28.0)

4(0.6)
120(17.5)
71(10.3)
492(71.6)

0
38(24.4)
67(42.9)
51(32.7)

670(97.1)
318(46.1)
45(6.5)
6(0.9)

152(96.8)
145(92.4)
90(57.3)
9(5.7)

396(57.4)
446(64.6)
93(13.5)
32(4.6)

147(93.6)
148(94.3)
116(73.9)
91(58.0)
2(1.3)

478(69.3)
320(46.4)
48(7.0)
3(0.4)

146(93.0)
145(92.4)
104(66.2)
3(1.9)

569(82.5)
410(59.4)
175(25.4)
12(1.7)

151(96.2)
147(93.6)
122(77.7)
3(0.3)

p-value1
0.680

<0.001

NA

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

335(53.1)
8(5.8)
<0.001
159(25.2)
9(6.6)
137(21.7)
120(87.6)
USA-RP
USA-BP
n=690
n=156
p-value1
Age (years, continuous)
44.29 (14.12)
47.6 (11.11)
0.005
Experience in current role(years)
9.88 (9.68)
7.644 (6.50)
0.202
Team Size
7.78 (14.45)
3.80 (3.01)
<0.001
Table 13: Characteristics of Study Participants in the USA Biosafety Climate Study (n=847)

74

Models

χ2

DF

χ2/DF*

NFI

IFI

χ2/DF*
9.495

NFI
0.898

IFI

116
109

4.042

0.959

χ2/DF*
3.268

NFI
0.840

2.949

0.864

<2.0-5.0

Limit

>.90

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

0.908

TLI
0.892

CFI
0.908

RMSEA
0.111

0.969

0.961

0.969

0.066

0.883

TLI
0.862

CFI
0.882

RMSEA
0.121

0.906

0.881

0.905

0.112

>.90

>.95

>.90

<.08

Biosafety Climate Scale for Researchers (n=690)
Models
Initial

χ2
1101.449
440.594

Modified

DF

Biosafety Climate Scale for Biosafety Professionals (n=157)
Models

χ2

Initial

379.099

Modified

321.401

DF
116.000
109

Table 14: Goodness of fit indicators of the Biosafety Climate Scale (n=847)

IFI
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Cronbach's Alpha
Biosafety Climate Scale & Proposed
Factors
F1: Management Priority
F2: Supervisor Commitment
F3: Communication
F4: Participation
F5: Group Norms
Biosafety Climate Scale

Number of
items
BSCL-17

USA-RP
n=690

USA-BP
n=157

3
3
3
4
4
17

0.892
0.935
0.886
0.908
0.923
0.953

0.872
0.927
0.848
0.908
0.923
0.955

Table 15: Cronbach's Alpha Coefficients of Biosafety Climate Scale and Factors (n=847)
Note: The validated biosafety climate (BSCL) scale consisted of 17 items and 5 factors for
research professionals (RP) and biosafety professionals (BP). Factors 1, 2, 3 ,4 and 5 are
represented as F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5 respectively. Factor 1 consisted of items 1, 2 and 3.
Factor 2 consisted of items 4, 5 and 6. Factor 3 consisted of items 7, 8 and 9. Factor 4
consisted of items 10, 11, 12 and 13. Factor 5 consisted of items 14, 15, 16 and 17.
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USA-RPs
n=690
Biosafety Climate Scale: Items and Factors
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

USA-BPs
n=157

69.942

Std.
Dev.
12.513

68.904

Std.
Dev.
11.809

4.359

0.842

4.248

0.829

2. University administration considers research professionals' safety to be as important as productivity.

4.028

1.014

3.898

0.955

3. University administration shows support for prevention of biological hazards and incidents through involvement and
commitment.
4. In the laboratory (institution), my supervisor acts quickly to correct problems/issues that affect research professional’s
safety.
5. My supervisor clearly considers the safety of research professionals to be of great importance.

4.136

0.937

3.866

0.975

4.345

0.887

4.363

0.848

4.455

0.818

4.478

0.773

6. My supervisor acts decisively when a concern of a research professional’s safety practices is raised.

4.388

0.895

4.401

0.807

7. There is good communication at my institution about biosafety issues which affect me.

3.986

1.081

3.854

0.999

8. Information about proper biosafety practices is always brought to my attention in my institution.

3.951

1.076

3.669

1.028

9. My contributions to resolving biosafety concerns in the institution are listened to.

3.961

1.024

4.076

0.971

10. Research professionals participate in developing best biosafety practices in my institution.

3.743

1.100

3.707

0.989

11. Research professionals are encouraged to become involved in biosafety matters.

3.788

1.093

4.153

0.864

12. At my institution, the promotion of best biosafety practices involves all levels of the organization.

3.639

1.137

3.471

1.089

13. Consultation in developing best biosafety practices involves researchers and biosafety professionals.

3.858

1.094

4.134

0.899

14. In the laboratory (institution), we discuss research professional’s safety, biological hazards and incident prevention.

4.249

0.923

4.229

0.815

15. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety awareness.

4.490

0.776

4.204

0.799

16. In the laboratory (institution), we remind each other of the regulations and guidelines regarding research professional’s
safety.
17. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety compliance.

4.216

0.917

4.057

0.935

Biosafety Climate Score
1. The safety of research professionals is a priority for my institution.

Mean

Mean
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4.349

0.861

4.096

0.838

Factor 1: Management Priority

12.523

2.541

12.012

2.468

Factor 2: Supervisor Commitment

13.188

2.448

13.242

2.271

Factor 3: Communication

11.897

2.871

11.598

2.626

Factor 4: Participation

15.029

3.918

15.464

3.216

Factor 5: Group Norms

17.304

3.140

16.585

3.009

Table 16: Comparison of Biosafety Climate of Research and Biosafety Professionals in the USA Biosafety Climate Study (n=847)

USA-RP
n=690
Biosafety Practices of Research and Biosafety Professionals in the USA

N

Mean

CDC
NIH
OSHA BBP
Institutional Policies
Other
University biosafety practices
Select all that apply to your institution.
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

641
640
639
652
83

4.526
4.589
4.595
4.724
3.072

Regulations and guidelines are strictly followed
Everyone is encouraged to know regulations and guidelines
Practical Training is given to first time researchers in lab before they begin work
Peer to Peer feedback on biosafety issues and safe practices is encouraged
Biosafety issues and safe practices are easily communicated
Senior management is involved in addressing biosafety issues and improve safe practices
Concepts that drive university's biosafety program
Which of the following concepts drives the biosafety program at your institution?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

687
685
683
686
687
684

Regulations (Federal & State such as OSHA, NIH, CDC, DOT and others)
Institutional Policies
Safety Culture
Behavior Based Safety
Mode of training given
What mode of training is given at your institution?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)

Std.
Dev.

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

0.873
0.858
0.906
0.632
1.659

155
151
155
156
33

4.761
4.728
4.794
4.756
4.455

0.511
0.702
0.566
0.594
1.201

4.054
4.353
4.173
3.914
4.015
3.835

0.895
0.855
1.030
1.037
1.007
1.096

157
156
156
157
154
157

3.911
4.263
3.782
3.834
3.909
3.573

0.827
0.719
0.932
0.926
0.924
1.105

675
675
669
668

4.557
4.455
4.039
3.647

0.650
0.734
0.958
1.156

156
157
155
155

4.596
4.331
3.768
3.316

0.577
0.737
1.037
1.049

685
656
667

4.304
3.098
3.898

0.835
1.163
1.039

157
153
152

4.210
3.366
3.730

0.707
0.901
0.884

Regulations and guidelines
Which of the following regulations and guidelines does the biosafety program follow at
your institution? (Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
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Online
Classroom
Hands on by Researchers

USA-BP
n=157

Hands on By Biosafety
Hands on by both researchers and Biosafety professionals
Other (animal care, biological hazards, chemical hazards)
Training taken with 1 year

658
2.678
1.145
154
3.078
0.967
645
2.826
1.220
146
2.911
1.076
74
1.973
1.249
19
2.368
1.257
Research Professionals: BBP (346), NIH (226), BS (471)
Biosafety Professionals: 131 said train bbp every year. 9
every 3 years, 12 others

Training taken with 3 year

Research Professionals: BBP (362), NIH (313), BS (499)
Biosafety Professionals:38 train NIH every year, 56 every
3 years, 5 every 3 years and 47 every other

Training taken with 5 year

Research Professionals: BBP (341), NIH (324), BS (471)
Biosafety Professionals: 68 train BS every year, 40 every
3 years, 3 every 3 years and 41 others
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Biosafety resource awareness
Which of the following biosafety resources are you aware of? (Select all that apply)
(1-Not at all Aware,2- Slightly Aware,3-Moderately Aware,4-Very Aware,5-Extremely
Aware)
ABSA
WHO
CDC
NIH
PSDS
OSHA
Guidelines for Biosafety Laboratory Competency
IBC
Other (packaging & shipping--IACUC committee)
Resources utilized for risk assessment
Which of the following do you utilize to assess the risk of your research and lab activities in
your lab? (Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
Risk group of agents
Consultation with a biosafety officer
CDC
NIH
PSDS
Peer research
OSHA
IBC

612
626
658
654
611
658
642
659
35

1.92
2.42
3.57
3.80
1.43
3.71
2.99
3.86
2.94

1.155
1.253
1.188
1.155
0.953
1.260
1.395
1.178
1.662

150
150
154
151
146
150
146
152
14

4.63
4.41
4.71
4.64
4.18
4.75
3.49
4.51
4.71

0.670
0.868
0.533
0.615
1.127
0.451
1.266
0.719
0.469

632
637
615
619
588
571
606
621

3.786
3.251
3.039
3.207
1.320
2.923
3.178
3.805

1.279
1.196
1.321
1.414
0.860
1.543
1.577
1.306

149
142
149
150
144
136
145
146

4.624
4.246
4.557
4.387
3.424
4.007
4.352
4.493

0.692
0.893
0.711
0.903
1.255
1.085
0.804
0.824

Other (IACUC Committee and Citi training)
Lab inspection conducted by biosafety program administration
The biosafety administration at your institution conducts __________type of laboratory
inspections/assessments.
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)

34

3.000

1.688

10

4.300

0.823

Announced
Unannounced
Both
Other
Biohazard exposure prevention awareness
Are you aware of how to prevent exposure to a biological hazard if an incident involving
these hazards occurs in your lab? (3-Yes,2-Not Sure,1-No)

587
549
422
48
686

3.726
2.525
2.962
1.958
2.92

1.142
1.045
1.187
1.368
0.306

142
136
98
10
154

4.246
2.596
3.255
2.400
2.61

0.908
1.043
1.246
1.265
0.575

Principal investigator
Department chair
Biosafety officer
EHS
Government (NIH, CDC, FDA, DOD, OSHA, State)
Colleagues in the lab
I do not know
Other
Known biosafety incidents resulting in lab acquired infections
Are you aware of any biosafety incidents resulting in Lab Acquired Infections in your lab
during 2016 to 2020? (1-Yes,0-No)

690
690
690
690
690
690
690
690
685

0.783
0.291
0.693
0.580
0.052
0.343
0.048
0.033
0.010

0.413
0.455
0.462
0.494
0.223
0.475
0.214
0.180
0.101

157
157
157
157
157
157
157
157
155

0.885
0.312
0.822
0.771
0.382
0.146
0.013
0.274
0.123

0.320
0.465
0.384
0.422
0.487
0.355
0.113
0.447
0.329

Known biosafety incidents resulting in exposure to biohazards
Are you aware of any biosafety incidents resulting in exposure to biological hazards in your
lab during 2016 to 2020? (1-Yes,0- No)

686

0.055

0.229

155

0.516

0.501

Incident reporting
If incidents involving biohazards occurs in your lab, whom are you required to report to per
incident reporting guidelines at your institution? (Select all that apply) (1-if yes, 0-if no)
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Table 17: Biosafety Practices of Research Professionals and Biosafety Professionals in the USA Biosafety Climate Study (n=847)

USA-RP
n=690
Biosafety Perceptions of Research and Biosafety Professionals in the USA
Perception on university biosafety practices
How do you rate biosafety practices at your university?
(3-Good as is,2-Can be improved, -Undergoing improvements)
Perception on risk level of work conducted in the lab
What do you consider the risk level of work conducted in your lab?
(5-Very Low,4-Low,3-Moderate,2-High,1-Very High,0-I Don't Know)
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Perception on measures taken in the lab against hazards
Do you believe your lab takes strong measures to protect you from the hazards of the work conducted
in your lab?
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Perception on university's Biosafety program in mitigating risks
Do you consider the biosafety program at your university to be effective in mitigating risks in your
lab?
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Perception on practices that improve adherence to safety practices & mitigate risk in lab
Which of the following do you believe would improve adherence to safety practices and mitigating
risks in your lab?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Regulations and guidelines are strictly followed
Everyone is encouraged to know regulations and guidelines
Practical Training is given to first time researchers in lab before they begin work
Peer to Peer feedback on biosafety issues and safe practices is encouraged
Biosafety issues and safe practices are easily communicated
Senior management is involved in addressing biosafety issues and improve safe practices
Perception on lab inspections
Select the type of laboratory inspections/assessments you consider to be effective.
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Announced
Unannounced
Both

N

Mean

USA-BP
n=157
Std.
Dev.

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

686

2.64

0.543

156

1.90

0.592

686

3.94

0.809

156

2.97

0.75305

686

4.28

0.882

156

3.97

0.822

686

4.00

0.951

157

4.02

0.738

637
646
646
648
640
641

4.04
4.25
4.38
4.12
4.20
3.90

0.825
0.747
0.822
0.876
0.816
0.988

139
142
145
146
147
143

3.99
4.24
4.37
4.28
4.39
4.27

0.691
0.673
0.734
0.803
0.647
0.771

534
528
540

4.15
3.92
4.09

0.799
0.968
0.814

122
119
126

4.07
4.08
4.34

0.773
0.926
0.695

Other
Perception on training format
Select the following training format that you believe could improve biosafety at your institution.
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
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27

2.63

1.305

11

4.45

0.688

Online
Classroom
Hands on by Researchers
Hands on By Biosafety
Hands on by both researchers and Biosafety professionals
Other (animal care, biological hazards, chemical hazards)
Perception on lab design
Which lab design do you believe is safer: (Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

600
584
589
608
588
53

3.73
3.58
4.01
3.98
3.99
3.11

1.024
1.016
0.934
0.960
0.956
1.187

138
139
141
142
145
21

3.87
3.91
4.30
4.19
4.37
3.86

0.809
0.751
0.643
0.694
0.633
1.236

Open
Closed
Both
Perception on lab design type preferred
Which lab design do you prefer to work at: (Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

503
545
319

3.06
3.90
3.45

1.045
0.901
0.803

110
131
84

2.41
4.30
3.29

0.961
0.720
1.001

Open
508
3.57
1.157
Closed
480
3.73
1.100
Both
301
3.52
0.831
Table 18: Biosafety Perceptions of Research Professionals and Biosafety Professionals in the USA Biosafety Climate Study (n=847)

109
124
81

2.49
4.35
3.26

1.085
0.722
1.034

USA-RP
n=690
Perceptions on Research Safety of Research and Biosafety Professionals
in the USA during COVID-19 Pandemic
In relation to COVID-19 and your activity in research labs, do you feel:
(Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Feel safe working in labs (Research labs are safe)
University prioritizes COVID-19 precautions in labs
Supervisor prioritizes COVID-19 precautions in labs
Good communication on changes in lab safety
In lab, peers (researchers’) are complying with lab safety and covid-19
precautions
COVID-19 precautions are imposing additional challenges to lab safety

N

Mean

USA-BP
n=157

Std. Dev.

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

674
675
674
672
670

4.22
4.30
4.48
4.22
4.28

0.853
0.939
0.788
0.970
0.866

154
153
151
152
154

4.18
4.43
4.47
4.26
4.17

0.658
0.686
0.671
0.801
0.748

671

3.84

1.144

154

4.01

0.871

Table 19: Biological Laboratory Safety of Research and Biosafety Professionals During COVID-19 Pandemic in the USA Biosafety Climate Study
(n=847)
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Coefficients

Estimate

Std. Dev.

z Value

Intercept
1. The safety of research professionals is a priority for my institution.

-1.51225

0.64093

-2.359

0.018302 *

-0.17079
0.29018

0.20613
0.17255

-0.829
1.682

0.407334
0.092623.

-0.71255

0.18683

-3.814

0.000137 ***

0.123

0.24006

0.512

0.608395

0.0539
0.26263

0.26989
0.24704

0.2
1.063

0.841701
0.287723

0.07038
-0.40404

0.17116
0.16688

0.411
-2.421

0.680942
0.015471 *

0.49362
-0.54617

0.16409
0.16249

3.008
-3.361

0.002628 **
0.000776 ***

1.14721
-0.40682

0.1865
0.14817

6.151
-2.746

7.68e-10 ***
0.006041 **

0.50184

0.14361

3.495

0.000475 ***

0.30694

0.196

1.566

0.117333

-0.80888

0.25614

-3.158

0.001589 **

0.26818

0.2161

1.241

0.214599

-0.50689
0.006577

0.24848
0.006945

-2.04
-0.947

0.041351 *
0.3436

2. University administration considers research professionals' safety to be as important as productivity.
3. University administration shows support for prevention of biological hazards and incidents through
involvement and commitment.
4. In the laboratory (institution), my supervisor acts quickly to correct problems/issues that affect research
professional’s safety.
5. My supervisor clearly considers the safety of research professionals to be of great importance.
6. My supervisor acts decisively when a concern of a research professional’s safety practices is raised.
7. There is good communication at my institution about biosafety issues which affect me.
8. Information about proper biosafety practices is always brought to my attention in my institution.
9. My contributions to resolving biosafety concerns in the institution are listened to.
10. Research professionals participate in developing best biosafety practices in my institution.
11. Research professionals are encouraged to become involved in biosafety matters.
12. At my institution, the promotion of best biosafety practices involves all levels of the organization.
13. Consultation in developing best biosafety practices involves researchers and biosafety professionals.
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14. In the laboratory (institution), we discuss research professional’s safety, biological hazards and
incident prevention.
15. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety awareness.
16. In the laboratory (institution), we remind each other of the regulations and guidelines regarding
research professional’s safety.
17. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety compliance.
Biosafety Climate Score

p-Value

Table 20: Logistic Regression Comparing Research and Biosafety Professionals in the USA Biosafety Climate Study (n=847)
Note: The results of fitting a logistic regression model on Biosafety Climate Survey dataset. Estimate is the logs odds ratio and Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001
‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, .

Results from Linear Regression of Research Professionals BSCL
scores and variables (n=690)

Results from Linear Regression of Biosafety Professionals BSCL
scores and variables (n=157)

Variable
Age

Variable
Age

Biosafety issues and safe
practices are easily
communicated

Estimate
0.115324
2.081987

P-Value
0.006766
4.02E-05

5.828477

3.29E-30

Perception on university's
Biosafety program in mitigating
risks

Supervisor prioritizes COVID-19
precautions in labs

Senior management is involved
in addressing biosafety issues
and improve safe practices

Estimate
0.033458
3.10716

P-Value
0.714025
7.59E-04

8.657818

1.61E-07

3.82946913

0.023011298

Perception on university's
Biosafety program in
mitigating risks
3.027694045

3.72E-05

Research labs are safe during
COVID-19 pandemic
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Table 21: Linear Regression of Biosafety Climate (BSCL) Scores of Research and Biosafety Professionals in the USA (n=847)

Results from Ordinal Regression of Research Professionals BSCL items scores and variables
(n=690)
Variable

Item Name
Item 1: The safety of research
professionals is a priority for
my institution.

Estimate
0.0210329

P-value
0.0017237

Peer to Peer feedback on
biosafety issues and safe
practices is encouraged

Item 1: The safety of research
professionals is a priority for
my institution.

0.7987449

0

Perception on university's
Biosafety program in
mitigating risks

Item 7: There is good
communication at my
institution about biosafety
issues which affect me.

1.3429292

0

Item 5: My supervisor clearly
considers the safety of
research professionals to be
of great importance.

1.0875542

0

Age

Supervisor prioritizes
COVID-19 precautions in labs

Results from Ordinal Regression of Biosafety Professionals BSCL items scores and variables
(n=157)
Variable
IBC Membership

Research labs are safe

Item Name
Item9: My contributions to
resolving biosafety concerns
in the institution are listened
to.

Estimate
-0.6019327

P-value
0.0267659

Item 1: The safety of research
professionals is a priority for
my institution.

1.0723065

0.0008514

Table 22: Ordinal Regression of Individual BSCL Scale Items of Research and Biosafety
Professionals in the USA (n=847)
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Figure 6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Biosafety Climate Scale for Researchers at
USA(n=690), Unstandardized Estimates of 5 Factors
Note: CFA results of unstandardized estimated of 5 factors are presented. 17 items are
represented as bsclrp_1 to bsclrp_17 for the 17 items of Research Professionals Biosafety Climate
(BSCL-17) scale. The five factors are presented as management priority (F1), communication
(F2), participation (F3), group norms (F4), and supervisor commitment (F5). The variance, that is
the amount of change on dependent variable is 0.68, 0.67, 0.65, 0.74 and 0.63 for the five factors.
The covariance that is the amount of change in single predictor variable ranged from 0.36 to 0.58.
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Figure 7: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Biosafety Climate Scale for Researchers at
USA(n=690), Standardized Estimates of 5 Factors
Note: CFA results of standardized estimated of 5 factors are presented. 17 items are represented
as bsclrp_1 to bsclrp_17 for the 17 items of Research Professionals Biosafety Climate (BSCL-17)
scale. The five factors are presented as management priority (F1), communication (F2),
participation (F3), group norms (F4), and supervisor commitment (F5). The factor loading
estimates (higher the better) ranged from 0.79 to 0.92 and were acceptable. The correlations
between the factors ranged from 0.52 to 0.88.
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Figure 8: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Biosafety Climate Scale for Biosafety Professionals at
USA(n=157), Unstandardized Estimates of 5 Factors
Note: CFA results of unstandardized estimated of 5 factors are presented. 17 items are
represented as bsclbp_1 to bsclbp_17 for the 17 items of Biosafety Professionals Biosafety
Climate (BSCL-17) scale. The five factors are presented as management priority (F1),
communication (F2), participation (F3), group norms (F4), and supervisor commitment (F5). The
variance, that is the amount of change on dependent variable is 0.67, 0.54, 0.62, 0.47 and 0.53 for
the five factors. The covariance that is the amount of change in single predictor variable ranged
from 0.35 to 0.55.
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Figure 9: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Biosafety Climate Scale for Biosafety Professionals at
USA(n=157), Standardized Estimates of 5 Factors
Note: CFA results of standardized estimated of 5 factors are presented17 items are represented as
bsclbp_1 to bsclbp_17 for the 17 items of Biosafety Professionals Biosafety Climate (BSCL-17)
scale. The five factors are presented as management priority (F1), communication (F2),
participation (F3), group norms (F4), and supervisor commitment (F5). The factor loading
estimates (higher the better) ranged from 0.75 to 0.93 and were acceptable. The correlations
between the factors ranged from 0.64 to 0.90.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPACT OF BIOSAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ON
BIOSAFETY CLIMATE AT UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

Introduction
In the previous chapters, research on biosafety climate at academic universities in the United
States of America as well as at University of Louisville (UofL) in the recent years was presented.
This chapter presents my research on the impact of biosafety program management on biosafety
climate over the period of 2011 to 2021 at UofL.
Literature identified aspects of management styles that play an integral role in building a safety
culture that fosters trust, openness to communication on safety issues and sharing of safety
information.120 Key organizational elements such as management commitment, workforce
involvement, participation, training, management, polices and communication are known to play
a role in supporting safety climate in workplace.48 A culture that has a command-and-control
management style results in a rule and discipline approach that results in managers issuing orders
instead of eliciting safety related information from workers.120 Characteristics of a positive safety
culture encompasses approaches that are non-disciplinary, proactive in collecting data on at-risk
behaviors, safety analysis using objective data, and cooperative by engaging stakeholders within
both management and labor.120-122

Though there are studies examining management styles and its impact on safety culture and
climate, there are none to my knowledge that specifically evaluate the effect of biosafety program
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management practices on biosafety climate. To address this gap, we examined biosafety program
management in place and its influence on biosafety climate.
The hypothesis being tested in this study was whether changes in biosafety program management
style is associated with biosafety climate perceptions. The null hypothesis being tested is that
changes in biosafety program management style does not impact with biosafety climate. To test
this hypothesis, the biosafety programs in place at UofL during two different periods of time and
their impact on biosafety climate and safety perceptions of researchers at UofL’s biological and
biomedical research laboratories were examined.

This study differentiated the biosafety program management models in place at UofL based on
two periods: one prior to December 31, 2014, and the second after January 01, 2016. The
biosafety program in place prior to 2014 has been referred to as Biosafe-1 and the biosafety
program in place since 2016 as Biosafe-2 in this study. The year 2015 was considered as a
transition year in this study, during which many changes were made to the biosafety program
management at UofL such as: addition of full-time employees that included a biosafety officer,
training specialist and lab safety specialist, update of Biosafety manual, changes to Institutional
Biosafety Committee (IBC) review process, changes to training, changes in lab assessments, and
other changes in management practices. UofL went through a documented change around 2014
that resulted in a change in its biosafety program management. This change in biosafety program
management at UofL presented a unique opportunity that has been utilized in this study to
compare the different management styles and its impact on biosafety climate.

Rationale & purpose of the study
The study’s purpose was to identify the biosafety program management model in place before
December 31, 2014, and after January 01, 2016, at UofL and evaluate biosafety climate and
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safety perceptions during these two periods. By examining the practices in place and their impact
on safety and biosafety climate perceptions, we can determine the aspects of a biosafety program
that aid in improving safety climate.

The University of Louisville Institutional Review Board reviewed the study design and protocols.
The study was classified as Non-Human Subjects Research (NHSR) and was granted permission
to proceed (IRB 18.1222, Appendix G). All institution policies and guidelines on participant
privacy were followed.

Methods
The study being observational in nature utilized a retrospective cohort design.123-124 Quantitative
approach focuses on breadth and generalizability of a given concept whereas qualitative approach
allows to understand a given issue from the perspective of the study participants.125-126 Qualitative
approaches are suited for addressing research questions like “how, and “why” to understand the
context whereas questions like, “what”, “when” and “how long” are better addressed by
quantitative approaches.127 For this reason, we employed both quantitative and qualitative
approaches through interviews, review of past and current documents and questionnaires from
UofL’s Department of Environmental Health and Safety (DEHS) office which manages the
UofL’s Biological Safety Program.

Participant Sampling, Subject Recruitment and Enrollment
The study participants consisted of research professionals (RPs) engaged in biological research
utilizing risk group (RG) 1, 2 and 3 agents at UofL laboratories. The goal was to recruit at least
12 subjects in the study. Julious, recommended a sample size of 12 per group as a rule of thumb
for pilot study based on feasibility, regulatory considerations, and precision about mean and
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variance.128 The inclusion criteria for the participants were: a) involved in biological research for
at least six months prior to December 31, 2014 and at least six months since January 01, 2016, b)
must be working with biological agents belonging to risk group (RG) 1, 2 or 3 agents at biosafety
level (BSL) 1, 2 or 3 laboratories, and c) should be 18 years or older. The RPs consisted of
principal investigators, research staff and lab managers. The exclusion criteria consisted of any
researchers not involved in biological research activities at UofL.

Participants were recruited by sending a subject recruitment email to everyone in the email list of
UofL researchers that was provided by the biosafety personnel at DEHS. This email list consisted
of past and current researchers at UofL involved in chemical, animal, clinical and biological
research activities. The email was first sent on March 09, 2021, followed by two reminders. The
email requested research personnel and any members from Institutional Biosafety Committee
(IBC) who engaged in biological research activities at UofL to respond if interested in the study.
The subject recruitment email had details on inclusion criteria, study purpose, confidentiality
statement, brief details of the study and contact information of Torsten Hopp and Sivarchana
Mareedu. Please see attached recruitment letter in Appendix H.
Potential study participants who responded through email or phone were provided with further
details of the study, Appendix I. Details on interview and questionnaire was shared with the
participants. Any questions on the study were answered through phone or email. Those who met
the inclusion criteria of the study and agreed to participate in both interview and complete the
survey were enrolled in the study. No compensation was provided to the study participants.

Data Collection
Quantitative and qualitative data was collected through interviews, surveys and review of
biosafety program records and documents from both the periods of study.
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Interviews
A semi structured interview guide was utilized to conduct interviews of study participants over
Microsoft Teams or phone. The interview guide consisted of the following components. Please
see attached interview guide in Appendix J.
•

Confidentiality Statement: Sivarchana Mareedu read the confidentiality statement prior to
the commencement of the interview. It stated that all identifying information will be
removed and that the interview will be recorded if permitted.

•

Study Background: A brief background on biosafety climate and the two time periods
being investigated through the study was explained.

•

Study Details: Details on phone/virtual interview and survey questionnaire was shared.
Inclusion criteria was reiterated to ensure the participants met the criteria.

•

List of Topics: The topics covered in the interview was listed, which included biosafety
administration, safety practices, safety concerns, safety perceptions, and perceptions on
COVID-19 pandemic precautions to ensure safety in laboratories.

•

Survey Details: A link to the survey was shared with the participants at the end of the
interview. They were requested to complete the survey within a week.

Sivarchana Mareedu recruited the participants, scheduled, and conducted all the interviews. All
the questions in the interview were open ended. Participants were encouraged to discuss any
relevant topic not listed in the guide. Mareedu took notes during the interview.

Review of Past and Current Biosafety Programs
Biosafety program records and documents at UofL such as training materials, training records,
IBC protocols, IBC minutes, lab assessment and other related documents during the period of
2011 to 2021 were reviewed.
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Survey Administration
A biosafety climate questionnaire was shared with study participants at the end of their interviews
through REDCap. The survey was divided into four parts: a) demographic questions, b) questions
based on period prior to December 31, 2014 (Biosafe-1), c) questions based on period since
January 01,2016 to present (Biosafe-2), and d) current perceptions on lab safety. The
questionnaire consisted of biosafety climate (BSCL) scale that was developed and validated in
Chapter-2, questions on biosafety practices, biosafety perceptions, and perceptions on biological
laboratory lab safety during COVID-19 pandemic at UofL. Questions on background such as age,
gender, educational level, trainings, type of work conducted, and work environment were also
asked. All the items in the BSCL scale were positive and measured on a five-point Likert scale,
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). All questions were optional to respond
except for BSCL scales, questions on name and contact email or phone number. Survey has been
shared in Appendix K.

Data Management and Analysis
The virtual interviews were recorded once the confidentiality statement was read to the
participants and their permission to record was received. Only Sivarchana Mareedu had access to
these recordings that were stored in a password-protected computer. Mareedu collected and
summarized the interview recordings. Once the required data was collected, the recordings were
erased. The survey data collected was exported from REDCap into Microsoft Excel for data
cleaning and management. Data analysis was performed on only surveys that were completed. All
participants were assigned a numerical identifier which was assigned to their completed surveys
before sharing with Riten Mitra, who guided with data analysis.
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Statistical Analysis
All analysis were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2021). For continuous variables, independent
samples t-tests (for normal distribution), Wilcoxon methods (for non-normal distribution) and
Fishers Exact Test for categorical variables was utilized to compare RPs responses during the two
periods in the study. Differences in research professionals’ perceptions during Biosafe-1 and
Biosafe-2 was examined using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

Results
All identifying information was redacted from surveys and interview summaries before
presenting the results.

Sample Size and Participant Characteristics
The subject recruitment email was sent to 4800 researchers at UofL whose emails were listed in
the Listserv shared by the biosafety administration at DEHS. 45 responses were received, out of
which 18 were excluded as they did not work in biological research laboratories, 6 were excluded
as they did not work in biological research laboratories prior to 2014, 21 met the inclusion criteria
and showed interest to participate in the study. These 21 participants were sent further details on
the study out of which 15 researchers agreed to participate and 6 participants did not want to
proceed citing time constraints. Interviews were scheduled with the 15 participants during the
March 17 to April 13, 2021. At the end of each interview, participants were encouraged to
complete the survey within a week. 15 researchers completed the survey, which met our
minimum sample size requirement of 12.

The interviews lasted from 41 minutes to 1 hour 55 minutes, with an average of 72 minutes per
interview. Participant characteristics are expressed as n (%) for categorical variables and mean
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(SD) for continuous variables. The characteristics of the participants during the Biosafe-1 and
Biosafe-2 period are shown in Table 23. The sample population during Biosafe-1 was majorly
male (n=8, 53.3%), aged (45.54 years), had post doctorate (n=8, 53.3%), in the role of principal
investigators (n=8, 53.3%) conducted research (n=15, 100%), worked at BSL-2 setting
(n=86.7%), worked with RG-1 (n=14, 93.3%), in closed labs (n=7, 46.7%), at Health Science
Campus (HSC) (n=9, 60%), with government funding (n=12, 86.7%), had an average team size of
5.8 and 11.33 years of experience in current role. The sample population during Biosafe-2 was
majorly male (n=8, 53.3%), aged (51.54 years), had post doctorate (n=9, 60%), in the role of
principal investigators (n=9, 60%) conducted research (n=15, 100%), worked at BSL-2 setting
(n=12, 80%), worked with RG-1 and RG-2(n=11, 73.3%), in both closed and open labs (n=5,
33.3%), at Health Science Campus (HSC) (n=11, 66.7%), with government funding (n=14,
93.3%), had an average team size of 7.07 and 12.47 years of experience in current role.

Interview Summary
The topics discussed during the interview are summarized below. The same questions were asked
to each of the study participants by Mareedu to keep the interview process consistent. The
participants were asked to respond to each of the questions regarding Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2.

a. Biosafety Administration
Questions were posed on biosafety program to examine the changes in program
administration, accessibility of resources, changes in trainings, lab assessments, IBC review
process, and perceptions on university administration’s priority on biosafety over the years.

Biosafety administration was described as adversarial, less flexible, overreacting, overly
fearful, combative, and confrontational prior to 2014. Since 2016, it was described as
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collaborative, a partnership between researchers and administration, conducive to research
and approachable.
•

" Prior to 2014, it did seem a little more adversarial compared to the current administration.
And I think the one shift that I have seen is more of, we are here to monitor you to more of
we are here to help you."

•

"Did not start off collaborative, we were to develop our own protocols and then they would
tell us whether they were wrong. And then we would have to redo them. Only they wouldn't
give us much feedback as to what should be changed. After 2016 we would get a set of
responses back in which there would be queries about some of our protocols and then
invitations to talk about them. And you know, to discuss them back and forth and so it
became more collaborative."

•

"Regulatory driven to almost like we're just really dotting our I's and crossing the T's because
we have to have IBC in place. Culture of fear before but now gotten better. Since 2016,
things have changed but feel more hands off."

•

"Since 2016 dramatic change in communication and realization of actual risk involved".

•

"2010-2014-hurdles much higher than other institutions I worked at. Though regulations were
same, practices not appropriate for risk, unnecessary administrative burden on PI ex:
biosafety protocol renewal every year."

•

"My sense currently is it's more of a collaborative effort and what's best to ensure that things
are done in a safe or correct way. Whereas in the past it was more about you know just,
follow the rules. Here's the rules. You know, wasn't much thinking outside of that lane. Here's
what we're supposed to do, we're doing it."

Trainings prior to 2014 were mostly given through in class sessions and PowerPoint
presentations whereas since 2016 it has shifted towards online sessions except for initial
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training. The content of the training material has been described to be similar during both
periods though updates in the platforms being used, content displayed and quizzes since 2016
has been expressed. Participants noted increase in training reminders since 2016 which they
considered to be a positive change. However, one participant did say that they find the
trainings since 2016 to be more time consuming though not learning anything new.
•

"Classroom training was always kind of a pain because it was only offered once a month or
so, but I think it's gone virtual, and I really liked the changes in the training modules. They
look amazing, just how they are now presented with the section. Yeah, and I don't mind the
quizzes of course. I like the reminders as well."

•

"Not sure, same online training but feel can reach out if I have any questions."

•

“Quizzes and trainings are longer now.”

•

"More online trainings-same information but different format like sway I think, and I did not
like it as it got difficult but not learning anything new, just time consuming."

Participants expressed a mixed opinion on changes to accessibility of biosafety resources
between the two periods. They noted that it has improved over the years as more resources
are available in the DEHS website but that it could be further improved.
•

"Not many repositories in UofL website, I just google. More information during 2015, but not
much useful information since. Generally good but can be improved."

•

“Find it easily accessible at DEHS website.”

•

“I just google or ask peers.”

•

“Could be improved, but I think everything is available with little effort.”

•

“Not sure, I think we had access before too. Now it is more personal access.”

•

“Never went to UofL website, we just use standard protocols.”
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A change in lab assessments was mentioned by the participants during Biosafe-1 and Biosafe2. Participants described a positive change regarding how lab assessments were conducted
since 2016 compared to previous years. They stated an increase in lab assessments, use of
self-assessment checklists and announced inspections during Biosafe-2. However, few
participants noted that they were never inspected either during Biosafe-1 or 2. Few
participants stated that they were not aware of lab assessments, but it could be because
someone else in their lab took care of it.
•

“Self-assessments now, biosafety team comes and walks together with principal investigators
(PIs) or lab personnel. Prior, inspections focused on finding what's wrong and felt truly like
an inspection, now it is more like find what is wrong/right and look at the process. Now it is
more like let’s work together.”

•

“Self-assessment now, I feel they are more biased, no lab will go after themselves and are
conducted every 1 to 3 years and it is up to lab to request one. I never got a reminder saying
you have to do one, so there is little oversight.”

•

“Before 2014, I don't remember lab inspections, only few if any. Now self-assessments and
then Biosafety personnel comes in, knowing what to do or expect is easy.”

•

“Announced is collaborative whereas unannounced is presumptive or there could be no one in
lab.”

•

“Lab assessment prior to 2014 not very routine, not sure if in place but since 2016 there are
self-assessments.”

•

“Before 2014, don't remember. IACUC and IRB remember annual but IBC only after 2016
has been more visible. Had assessment once since 2016.”

•

“Lab inspections before were announced did not seem scientific but now extreme opposite is
happening with no lab assessments.”
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The participants consisted of four current IBC members, one was a past IBC member and ten
were never members of IBC. All the participants noted key changes in IBC submission
processes between Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2. They stated that prior to 2014, IBC protocols
were submitted through snail mail or electronic paper copies whereas since 2016 it has
moved towards use of iRIS system. The time taken to process an IBC protocol improved
from 3 to 4 months during Biosafe-1 period to 1 to 2 months during Biosafe-2. However,
participants noted difficulties with the current online process sometimes being challenging
due to iRIS system not being user friendly.
•

“You had to put together a protocol and address the various aspects of risk and so forth. But I
would say that there was not as much help for the investigator in terms of what the committee
was looking for. And so, I think that has improved since 2014, I think. "

•

"It was not clear to investigators what exactly the committee was looking for, what people
tended to do was to cut and paste material from you know, like NIH grants into the protocol
they were using. But since 2016, lot clearer, no need to give proposal just tell kind of
techniques and risks associated.”

•

"Prior to 2014, it took forever. Yes, that is one thing that I remember very clearly. These
things were a nightmare to do for us because we wait for 4-5 months before we even get an
approval. I remember that certain times when there was a little bit of gap where I didn't have
an approved IBC protocol for my lab. That is scary. It was a nerve-wracking experience
because it's a mess and we shouldn't be continuing research, but we cannot stop work and it's
a gray area. When we ask them, they say okay it's in review. iRIS is now taking much less
time, maybe 1-2 months now."

•

"I remember it being a frustrating process, yeah and then it was snail mail." Took up to 3
months before, now 30-45 days, much better turn around rate.

•

“Prior to 2014, submit every year…but now only if there are modifications."
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•

Prior to 2014, “It was a huge administrative burden, and you know the problem with
unnecessary administrative burden is that it leads to people not doing everything right."

•

“Not much changed regarding the review process over the years, online review did add more
complications. PDF was easier. Technology is hard to understand but easier to update or
renew.”

•

“Before if there were any problems during IBC review, it was kept hush-hush whereas now it
is shared within IBC community.”

•

During Biosafe-1, “IBC focused more on details not as much on risk involved”.

•

“Less push back than before during IBC submission process by PIs. Some PIs don't agree but
it's not escalating like before.”

On perceptions of management priority to safety, participants had mixed response. Few stated
that the university’s priority has not changed between the two periods. A couple of
participants noted an increase in management’s priority to biosafety over the years. However,
they noted that it could be further improved. Participants expressed that the priority on
biosafety was always higher within labs compared to departments or at university
administration level.
•

"I think the priority at the department level definitely increased over the years."

•

It has always been up to the PI and nothing changed at department level but definitely gotten
better at university level.”

•

“They prioritize now because of NIH…it’s an evolution. So unfair to previous committees to
compare as they did with what they could with the resources they had.”

•

“I don't know if there is awareness at the department level at this point. My department chair
is not involved. They are only involved if there is an issue, and it depends on the person's
background.”
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•

“Too much trust in researchers, lack of priority, feels like not a high priority, it is more up to
researchers.”

•

“DEHS/biosafety high priority and truly concerned about safety, UofL motivation is more
priority on liability or bad publicity or penalty than safety.”

b. Safety Practices
Questions were posed on safety practices to examine communication, participation, and
group norms between the two periods of Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2.

Participants expressed that communication has evolved over the years between researchers
and biosafety team. Most of the participants said that they found the biosafety administration
during both periods accessible and did not had any issue communicating through email or
phone. Participants did mention an increase in communication during the Biosafe-2 period in
the form of safety newsletters, email reminders on trainings and safety fair that was
conducted as part of DEHS outreach. However, few participants noted that they do not read
the newsletters and were not aware of newsletters or safety fairs.
•

"There used to be one poster everywhere about IBC. That's all I remember before. Now I feel
like, there is a little more. Specially electronically. Things have been much more streamlined,
Communication is better, it became much more accessible."

•

“Prior to 2014 don't remember. Since 2016 better communication about updates, biosafety
issues around nation, good communication about changes that impact.”

•

Since 2016, “See lot more emails on spills, labels, about safety and they are all informative.”

Most of the participants responded stating that their participation has been limited to within
their labs. Very few participants mentioned to be part of IBC or training other research labs
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within their department on biosafety matters over the years. Lack of opportunities to
participate in biosafety matters at UofL was raised by a couple of participants whereas others
stated that they were not interested in being involved.
•

On opportunities to be involved in biological safety matters at UofL, “Not aware of any
opportunities but willing to be part of.”

Group norms and behavior did not change much between Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2. The
general opinion was that some labs have better culture whereas others don’t, and it is mostly
PI or lab dependent. The influence of a department on a lab’s safety culture is minimal unless
it is a department that is high profile or research heavy. Participants did mention that young
researchers seem to be aware of biosafety matters and are more willing to follow the
guidelines.
•

“People are more aware of safety now, as DEHS is more involved when things are not done
right. It’s been a gradual change. Also depends on type of experiments being done. Learning
and adapting based on experiments and agents being worked on.”

c. Safety Concerns
Participants stated that they do not have any major safety concerns during Biosafe-1, Biosafe2 or COVID-19 pandemic. Few participants noted that their safety concerns which were
mostly minor were fewer during Biosafe-2 compared to Biosafe-1.
•

"When I first came, I had been worried that I had been doing it all wrong for years because of
how strict they were being with us. You know, every little thing we were doing was putting
my students at risk, even though I had been working on the same pathogens for 10 years,
right? The culture was that if you don't do this in the biosafety cabinet, you know you're
putting everybody at risk and they're all going to die. And as a PI, I was ultimately
responsible for it. I was worried that my students were going to get sick or get exposed. And
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after transition since 2016, now I'm like okay, what I learned was fine. It was just being
overly cautious before 2014."
•

Prior to 2014, “I felt there was no good response from biosafety, issues were brushed under
the rug instead of using as an opportunity to fix.”

•

“New concerns with new stuff, but I think we build up on what we know.”

•

“All the labs I worked at UofL; people are pretty serious about doing things safely.”

d. Safety Perceptions
Participants noted that they had a neutral to positive opinion about biosafety practices during
both Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2. A shift in positive direction has been noted over the years
which was attributed to evolution of the biosafety program over the years and building up on
practices and safety awareness. Participants observed openness in biosafety discussions,
consideration of actual risk during Biosafe-1. However, deficiencies continue to exist when a
new PI sets up their lab or closes one at UofL.
•

“University gave resources when bad things happen before. But now, it is more proactive.”

•

“I have a positive opinion about the evolving biosafety.”

•

“The approach that is taken currently is a good one and it balances the safety concerns, which
of course have to be there with the reality of you know what it means to be a research
investigator and the demands on you know time.”

•

" I think before 2014, I think it was a nightmare with regulation and you did not want to talk
to people because you didn't want to open up a can of worms or have them come down on
you. But now they have been taking the extreme opposite side of things. I would like to see a
little bit more of a safety culture and climate, not more regulations but just more presence and
more availability.”
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e. COVID-19 Pandemic and Biosafety
Participants said that UofL’s biosafety program adapted very well during COVID-19
pandemic. Masking, six feet of social distancing, wiping high touch areas, signing up
electronically for shared space or equipment usage, staggered shifts to reduce number of
research personnel in a lab, flexibility on work from home, and training on specific
precautions during COVID-19 were implemented. One participant highlighted having
COVID-19 ambassadors who did walkthroughs to remind safety precautions as a great
measure while another participant stated they found it menacing. One participant noted that
they felt the precautions put in place were too restrictive as most labs already followed
similar safety precautions.
•

“Did a great job, early on a little shaky. But never felt unsafe, there was regular
communication”.

•

“Felt a little menacing with covid ambassadors with non-biological background telling us
what to do.”

•

“If there is culture of biosafety, not a big difference to add on pandemic guidelines.
Precautions all there. The mindset is already there.”

•

"Science does suffer, we cannot do science using six feet distance, right? Because I need to
train my graduate student or train new people who come to the lab and that's not possible
following 6-foot distancing."

•

"Safety wise it's been great; science wise it's been awful."

f.

Suggestions to improve Biosafety Program Management
Participants were requested to share suggestions on improving biosafety program
management at UofL.

•

“Nurture good habits in the beginning and maintain them through training and inspections.”

108

•

“Have surprise visits even though there will be push back, if announced or self-assessment
researchers will just select to make it look good.”

•

“Prefer announced lab assessment so that we are available as we are busy with wet lab.”

•

"Good change with online training modules, but I think you can only do so much with online
training. And if you really want to improve safety, that comes down to direct interactions
between the safety officer and the practitioners."

•

"Good if outreach can involve visits to specific departments with BSL- 1 or 2 or whatever
number there are and meet with them on a regular basis. They don't have to meet, they can
collect survey of issues just like you're doing now but if it is something done online, that
would be great."

Review of past and current documents
A summary of biosafety program records and documents during Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2 periods
that were evaluated are shown in Table 24. This review showed that training was primarily
through classroom sessions during Biosafe-1 and through BioRAFT during Biosafe-2. Lab
assessment and consultations were provided during both periods though self-assessment
checklists were provided to laboratory personnel since 2016. Communication and outreach
activities improved since 2016 compared to previous years. IBC protocol required annual
submissions during Biosafe-1 whereases during Biosafe-2, IBC protocols required review only if
there was a change in protocol after being approved for either 1, 3 or 5 years.

Survey Analysis
A measurement of biosafety climate perceptions of researchers at UofL biological laboratories
was taken on BSCL scale as shown in Table 25, where 17 indicated low biosafety climate score
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and 85 indicated high biosafety climate. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that biosafety
program management during Biosafe-2 elicited a statistically significant change in biosafety
climate perceptions of researchers at UofL biological laboratories, (p < 0.003). The mean of
aggregate biosafety climate score of researchers during Biosafe-2 (mean = 69.87) increased
compared to Biosafe-1 (mean = 61.67). Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that biosafety
climate is not associated with biosafety program management and assume that biosafety program
management in place since 2016 at UofL caused a significant increase in biosafety climate.
Participants perceived all items on BSCL scale more positively during Biosafe-2 compared to
Biosafe-1. However, a significant increase in perceptions was observed only in four items of 7, 8,
10 and 17. The difference in perceptions of “communication on biosafety issues at the university
level” was higher during Biosafe-2 (mean = 4.20) than in Biosafe-1 (mean = 3.13), which was
significant (p < 0.011). An increase in perceptions on “proper biosafety practices at university
level” during Biosafe-2 (mean = 4.13) than in Biosafe-1 (mean = 3.13) was found to be
significant (p < 0.018). A significant increase in perceptions on “participation of research
professions in developing best biosafety practices” was observed during Biosafe-2 (mean = 4.07)
compared to Biosafe-1 (mean = 2.87). The perceptions on “caring about each other’s safety
compliance at laboratory level” also increased during Biosafe-2 (mean=4.60) compared to
Biosafe-1(mean = 4.13), significant (p < 0.026). An increase in all five dimensions of
management priority, supervisor commitment, communication, participation, and group norms
were noted during Biosafe-2 compared to Biosafe-1. However, only the dimension of
communication and participation were significant. The perception on communication during
Biosafe-2 (mean = 12.13) increased from that of Biosafe-1 (mean = 9.47) was found to be
significant (p < 0.012). An increase in perceptions of participation during Biosafe-2 (mean =
15.33) compared to Biosafe-1 (mean = 12.40) was significant (p < 0.05).
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Perceptions on biosafety practices was examined during the two periods using Wilcoxon signedrank test are shown in Table 26. The results indicated differences in perceptions on university
biosafety practices during the two time periods. An increase in perceptions of biosafety practices
that are based on behavior-based safety concepts.120,129-130 that is “Practical Training is given to
first time researchers in lab before they begin work” and “Peer to Peer feedback on biosafety
issues and safe practices is encouraged” was noticed during Biosafe-2 (mean = 4.00 & 4.33)
compared to Biosafe-1 (mean = 3.60 & 3.13) which was significant (p < 0.04 & 0.013). A
practice based on safety culture concepts,120 “Biosafety issues and safe practices are easily
communicated”, also showed a significant (p < 0.004) increase during Bisoafe-2 (mean = 4.33)
compared to Biosafe-1 (mean = 3.00). These findings correlated with the question on concepts
that drive university’s biosafety program. Participant’s perceptions that concepts of institutional
policies, safety culture and behavior-based safety drive the university’s biosafety program
increased during Biosafe-2 (mean = 4.40, 4.13 and 4.00) compared to Biosafe-1 (mean = 3.73,
3.67 and 2.87) which was found to be significant (p < 0.019, 0.042 and 0.006).

Biosafety perceptions prior to 2014 and since 2016 was examined are shown in Table 27.
Perceptions on biosafety practices at the university showed a significant (p < 0.042) improvement
with the rating to be slightly above “can be improved” reaching towards “good as is” (mean =
2.47) during Biosafe-2 compared to “can be improved” (mean = 2) during Biosafe-2. An increase
in perception of biosafety program in mitigating risk during Bisoafe-2 (mean 4.33) compared to
Biosafe-1 (mean = 3.400) was significant (p < 0.009). Responses on perceptions on practices to
improve adherence to safety practices, lab inspections, training format, lab design preferred and
considered safe was also collected from the participants. Participants showed a preference for
hands on training (mean = 4.27) compared to online or classroom training (mean = 3.93).
Participants preferred announced inspections (mean = 3.93) over unannounced (mean = 3.77)
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inspections. The purpose of collecting this information was to utilize it in developing future
intervention studies aimed at improving biosafety climate.

Participants perceived biological lab safety during COVID-19 pandemic positively as presented
in Table 28. Participants agreed that they felt safe working in labs (mean = 4.40), peers complied
with COVID-19 precautions (mean = 4.53) and that COVID-19 precautions were prioritized by
the university (mean = 4.07) and supervisor (mean = 4.07). Communication on changes in lab
safety, was considered slightly above neither agree nor disagree to agree (mean = 3.67) similar to
perceptions on challenges imposed by COVID-19 precautions (mean = 3.60).

Discussion
Based on the perceptions of participants gathered through interviews, important aspects of
biosafety program during Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2 were identified at UofL, illustrated in Figure
11. The biosafety program in place prior to December 31, 2014 was described as adversarial and
overreacting in approach, driven by regulations and perceived risk assessment of biological
hazards, management priority to biosafety ranged from neutral to positive, training was primarily
through classroom session utilizing PowerPoint presentations, lab inspections were not many and
mostly announced, and IBC protocol review was mostly conducted through mail or electronic
pdf/word documents with a turnaround time of 3-4 months. The biosafety program in since
January 01, 2016 was described as collaborative and conducive to research in approach, driven by
regulations, behavior-based safety, safety culture and actual risk assessment of biological hazards,
management priority to biosafety was positive, training was given through online as well as
classroom sessions, lab inspections were conducted through self-assessments and announced
visits of biosafety administrative personnel, and IBC protocol review conducted through online
platform of iRIS with a turnaround time of 1 to 2 months. However, it is important to consider
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that biosafety program management prior to 2014 was the first of its kind at UofL that had to face
challenges such as: developing a biosafety program specific to the needs of UofL, creating
biosafety awareness and building a relationship between research professionals and
administrative personnel. Whereas biosafety program since 2016 had the advantage of enhancing
an existing biosafety program, buy in from researchers due to exposure to Biosafe-1 and
additional online capabilities to run the program.

Quantitative findings through the survey corroborated qualitative data from interviews and
provided consistent explanations on biosafety program management during the two periods. A
significant increase in biosafety climate was observed during Biosafe-2, highlighting the
importance of communication and participation dimensions on overall biosafety climate. A
perceived increase in utilization of safety culture, behavior-based safety, and institutional policies
and not just regulations to drive university’s biosafety program during Biosafe-2 was observed.
This is consistent with other studies that highlighted the importance of behavior-based safety and
safety culture concepts to improve safety climate and safety outcomes.120,131 An improvement in
perceptions of biosafety practices and biosafety program in mitigating risks during Bisoafe-2 was
noticed compared to Biosafe-1. Participants mostly had positive perceptions on COVID-19
precautions taken to ensure lab safety during COVID-19 pandemic.

A careful review of documents from these two periods revealed differences in biosafety program
management during the two periods. Additional online resources were utilized during Biosafe-2
which boosted ease of access to biosafety resources and reduced administrative burden on
researchers during IBC protocol submission. An increase in communication and outreach
activities, updated forms, revised IBC bylaws, and use of self-assessments were observed since
2016.
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Common themes that emerged from discussion with researchers on ways to improve biosafety
program management are presented below:

1. Training: Hands on training or workshops on biological waste disposal, discarding of
serological pipettes, hood use, and biosafety cabinets by floor managers or someone
managing safety within department and/or biosafety administrative personnel. Specific
training for custodial staff on waste pickup and actual risk.
2. Resources: A central resource on standard protocols, risk level, post exposure measures,
prophylactic measures, opening and closing of labs.
3. IBC protocol submission: Continue improving iRIS platform to make it user friendly. Provide
guides to navigate the website.
4. Risk assessment: Improve environmental risk assessment during research protocol review.
Risk assessment should involve low risk groups and not just high-risk groups.
5. Lab inspection: Increase the frequency of lab inspections or walkthroughs to increase
visibility of biosafety administration as well as their rapport with research personnel. Mimic
lab inspections to NIH or EPA inspections so that researchers are prepared and meet the
standards.
6. Outreach: Increase communication of safety matters through newsletters or emails with
biosafety topics. Campaign about biosafety services offered so that researchers know who
and how to contact for biosafety matters. Collect input on issues or suggestions to improve
biosafety practices from researchers through surveys.

There are strengths and limitations of this study as is expected of any research. Using BSCL scale
that was developed and validated as presented in Chapter-2 of this dissertation has been a
strength. This study utilized different methods such as interviews and online survey to collect
data for this study. Several studies have shown a difference in responses based on the survey
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mode with positive responses by participants over telephone than mail.132-135 However, the fact
that researchers scored higher biosafety climate perceptions during Biosafe-2 comparable to the
opinions expressed on change in biosafety climate perceptions during interviews is evidence that
there was no bias due to survey method. Participants of the study were only from one university
warranting caution when generalizing the study findings to other universities or settings. Another
limitation of the study is recall bias as the participants were asked to express their perceptions
from few years ago. To minimize recall bias, this study utilized review of records and documents
to obtain objective data about biosafety program managements in place during the two periods.
To address selection bias, this study invited all the researchers at UofL to participate in the study.
Only, Sivarchana Mareedu interviewed and collected data from the participants which was
deidentified before analyzing so that no one from the current biosafety program administration at
UofL would influence the research design or data interpretation. Measures like carefully defining
inclusion criteria, adequate sample size for a pilot test, data collected in similar way from all the
participants that reduce bias,137 were implemented.

To date, we are not aware of any study that examined the association of safety climate with
biosafety program administration and practices at a public biological research university in the
US. Studies suggested an increase in communication between management and employees to
improve perceived occupational safety climate.48,138 This study also showed that increased
communication through newsletters, emails, safety fair and inspections during Biosafe-2 was
associated with improved perceptions of biosafety climate, comparable to other studies.22 Also,
one of the suggestions by the study participants was to increase visibility of biosafety services to
improve biosafety climate perceptions at UofL.
This study presented suggestions by researchers on improving biosafety climate which could be
utilized to develop intervention studies aimed at improving safety climate and safety outcomes.
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Additional studies that are prospective in nature could be utilized to investigate the association of
biosafety climate perceptions with changes in biosafety program management.

Conclusion
The study was conducted to utilize the unique opportunity presented at UofL due to an abrupt and
documented change in biosafety program procedures. This change in biosafety program
management enabled us to review the impact of different biosafety program administrative
models in place on biosafety climate of researchers at biological laboratories. This study was not
a comparison of biosafety administrative personnel or their work during the two periods of study.
The goal of the study was to identify the key aspects of biosafety program and evaluate biosafety
climate prior to 2014 and since 2016. Utilizing quantitative and qualitive data collected through
interviews, records review and survey, this study was able to show significant differences in
biosafety program management during the two periods. Researchers perceived biosafety climate
to be higher since 2016 compared to previous years. This increase in biosafety climate can be
attributed to a biosafety program that is collaborative in approach and driven by actual risk, safety
culture and behavior-based concepts.
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Variable
Female
Male
Role
Principal Investigator
Professor
Lab Manager
Research Assistant
Student
Other-Research Role
Post-Doctoral Researcher
Educational Background
Bachelors
Masters
PhD
Post Doctorate
Type of Work
Research
Teaching
BSL Level
BSL-1
BSL-2
BSL-2+
BSL-3
RG Level
RG-1
RG-2
RG-3
Lab Design
Open Lab
Closed Lab
Both
Lab Location
Belknap Campus
HSC Campus
Both
Research Funding
Government
University
Private
Other
Continuous Variable= mean (SD)
Age (years, continuous)
Experience in current role(years)
Team Size

BioSafe-1
(n=15)

BioSafe-2
(n=15)

N (%)

N (%)

p-value1

7(46.7)
8(53.3)

7(46.7)
8(53.3)

8(53.3)
4(26.7)
5(33.3)
1(6.7)
2(13.3)
1(6.7)
2(13.3)

9(60)
6(40)
4(26.7)
1(6.7)
0(0)
3(20)
2(13.3)

1(6.7)
3(20)
3(20)
8(53.3)

1(6.7)
2(13.3)
3(20)
9(60)

15(100)
5(33)

15(100)
6(40)

9(60)
13(86.7)
3(20)
1(6.7)

8(53.3)
12(80)
4(26.7)
1(6.7)

14(93.3)
10(66.7)
2(13.3)

11(73.3)
11(73.3)
3(20)

4(26.7)
7(46.7)
4(26.7)

5(33.3)
5(33.3)
5(33.3)

3(20)
9(60)
3(20)

4(26.7)
11(73.3)
0(0)

13(86.7)
10(66.7)
5(33.3)
1(6.7)

14(93.3)
10(66.7)
6(40)
1(6.7)

BioSafe-1
(n=15)

BioSafe-2
(n=15)

p-value1

45.54(11.89)
11.33(8.07)
5.8(2.57)

51.54(11.89)
12.47(9.58)
7.07(4.38)

0.000
0.575
0.550

0.848

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.811

0.284

1.000

Table 23: Characteristics of Study Participants in the UofL Biosafety Program Evaluation
Study (n=30)
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Institutional
Biosafety
Committee

Platforms Utilized

IBC Protocol
Reviews

Lab assessment

BioSafe-1

BioSafe-2

IBC operating charter revised in 2013
provided general details on IBC
responsibilities and membership.
Committee members did not have
BSL-3 experience

Bylaws of IBC approved in 2016
provided thorough details on purpose,
membership, duties, terms of office
and other details. Biosafety manual
was created in 2017. Committee
members with BSL-3 experience
iRIS, an online platform for IBC
protocols and BioRAFT PI platform
for training and inspection was
utilized.
IBC protocols were reviewed if there
was a change in protocol. IBC
protocols were approved for 1, 3 or 5
years based on risk assessment.
IBC meeting minutes reviewed from
2021 were concise and appropriate.

Emails, phone and electronic
documents were utilized.
IBC protocols were reviewed annually.
IBC meeting minutes reviewed from
2014 were long and included a lot of
details on proposed experiments.

Records indicate that biosafety
personnel conducted consultations and
lab audits utilizing lab inspection
checklists based on BSL during 2009
to 2014.
Biosafety Basics and Bloodborne
Pathogens training was given through
PowerPoint presentation in 2014
through classroom sessions. The slides
were busy with lots of words but were
appropriate.
Emails, phone, posters, lab
consultations.

Self-assessments checklists were
utilized that assessed general lab
safety, chemical safety and biological
safety together. Consultations with
biosafety department provided.

Basic Biosafety and Bloodborne
Pathogens training was given through
online BioRAFT platform. The
Training
information was presented through
visual aids and was interactive in
nature.
Newsletter, email reminders, phone,
Communication &
posters, safety fair and lab
Outreach Activities
consultations.
Unable to assess previous versions.
The website is updated with Biological
Safety tab listing SOPS for
biohazardous spills, biohazardous
DEHS Website
agents, biosafety manual, trainings,
forms, documents, contact information,
IBC meeting dates, waste disposal and
other appropriate resources.
Table 24: Review of Biosafety Program Documents and Records in the UofL Biosafety Program
Evaluation Study
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BioSafe-1
n=15
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Biosafety Climate Scale: Items and Factors
Std.
Mean
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Dev.
Biosafety Climate Score
61.67 10.22
1. The safety of research professionals is a priority for my institution.
3.80 0.775
2. University administration considers research professionals' safety to be as important as productivity.
3.13
1.19
3. University administration shows support for prevention of biological hazards and incidents through
involvement and commitment.
3.47
0.99
4. In the laboratory (institution), my supervisor acts quickly to correct problems/issues that affect research
professional’s safety.
4.20
1.01
5. My supervisor clearly considers the safety of research professionals to be of great importance.
4.07
1.03
6. My supervisor acts decisively when a concern of a research professional’s safety practices is raised.
4.33
0.98
7. There is good communication at my institution about biosafety issues which affect me.
3.13
0.99
8. Information about proper biosafety practices is always brought to my attention in my institution.
3.13
1.06
9. My contributions to resolving biosafety concerns in the institution are listened to.
3.20
1.08
10. Research professionals participate in developing best biosafety practices in my institution.
2.87
1.13
11. Research professionals are encouraged to become involved in biosafety matters.
3.33
1.11
12. At my institution, the promotion of best biosafety practices involves all levels of the organization.
3.07
1.28
13. Consultation in developing best biosafety practices involves researchers and biosafety professionals.
3.13
1.41
14. In the laboratory (institution), we discuss research professional’s safety, biological hazards and incident
prevention.
4.00
1.07
15. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety awareness.
4.40
0.63
16. In the laboratory (institution), we remind each other of the regulations and guidelines regarding research
professional’s safety.
4.27
0.59
17. In the laboratory (institution), we care about each other’s safety compliance.
4.13
0.74
Factor 1: University Administration Priority
10.40
2.44
Factor 2: Supervisor Commitment
12.60
2.87
Factor 3: Communication
9.47
2.80
Factor 4: Participation
12.40
4.01
Factor 5: Group Norms
16.80
2.76
Table 25: Comparison of Biosafety Climate Prior to 2014 versus Post 2016 in the UofL Biosafety Program Evaluation Study (n=30)

BioSafe-2
n=15

p-value1

69.87
4.20
3.33

Std.
Dev.
10.48
0.676
1.11

3.80

0.86

0.073

4.33
4.33
4.27
4.20
4.13
3.80
4.07
3.87
3.47
3.93

0.82
0.90
0.96
0.68
1.06
0.94
0.88
1.13
0.99
1.10

0.586
0.174
0.850
0.011
0.018
0.101
0.003
0.106
0.071
0.061

4.47
4.60

0.83
0.51

0.188
0.233

4.47
4.60
11.33
12.93
12.13
15.33
18.13

0.52
0.51
2.29
2.63
2.29
3.79
2.10

0.149
0.026
0.061
0.586
0.012
0.005
0.078

Mean

p-value1
0.003
0.066
0.588

BioSafe-1
n=15
Biosafety Practices at UofL

N (%)

Mean

Regulations and guidelines
Which of the following regulations and guidelines does the biosafety program follow at
your institution? (Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
CDC
NIH
OSHA BBP
Institutional Policies
Other
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University biosafety practices
Select all that apply to your institution.
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Regulations and guidelines are strictly followed
Everyone is encouraged to know regulations and guidelines
Practical Training is given to first time researchers in lab before they begin work
Peer to Peer feedback on biosafety issues and safe practices is encouraged
Biosafety issues and safe practices are easily communicated
Senior management is involved in addressing biosafety issues and improve safe practices
Concepts that drive university's biosafety program
Which of the following concepts drives the biosafety program at your institution?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly
Agree)
Regulations (Federal & State such as OSHA, NIH, CDC, DOT and others)
Institutional Policies
Safety Culture
Behavior Based Safety
Mode of training given
What mode of training is given at your institution?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)

15
15
15
15

4.13
4.13
4.73
4.40

BioSafe-2
n=15
Std.
Dev.

0.915
1.302
0.458
0.632

National animal care policies

N (%)

Mean

Std.
Dev.

15
3.93
1.033
15
4.27
1.100
15
4.73
0.458
15
4.53
0.640
Environmental and Animal
care

pvalue1

0.463
0.892
1.000
0.572

15
15
15
15
15
15

3.60
3.93
3.60
3.13
3.00
2.67

0.910
0.961
1.056
0.915
1.134
1.175

15
15
15
15
15
15

4.07
4.47
4.13
4.00
4.33
3.40

0.884
0.516
1.246
1.000
0.617
1.326

0.165
0.066
0.040
0.013
0.004
0.061

15
15
15
15

4.53
3.73
3.67
2.87

0.516
0.799
0.617
1.125

15
15
15
15

4.53
4.40
4.13
4.00

0.516
0.507
0.990
1.069

1.000
0.019
0.042
0.006

Online
Classroom
Hands on by Researchers
Hands on By Biosafety
Hands on by both researchers and Biosafety professionals
Other (animal care, biological hazards, chemical hazards)
Training taken with 1 year
Training taken with 3 year
Training taken with 5 year
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Biosafety resource awareness
Which of the following biosafety resources are you aware of? (Select all that apply)
(1-Not at all Aware,2- Slightly Aware,3-Moderately Aware,4-Very Aware,5-Extremely
Aware)
ABSA
WHO
CDC
NIH
PSDS
OSHA
Guidelines for Biosafety Laboratory Competency
IBC
Other (packaging & shipping--IACUC committee)
Resources utilized for risk assessment
Which of the following do you utilize to assess the risk of your research and lab activities
in your lab? (Select all that apply)
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
Risk group of agents
Consultation with a biosafety officer
CDC
NIH
PSDS
Peer research
OSHA
IBC
Other (IACUC Committee and Citi training)

15
3.33
1.234
15
4.60
0.507
0.005
15
3.47
1.246
15
2.93
1.100
0.160
15
3.73
1.163
15
3.87
1.246
0.595
15
2.80
1.146
15
2.67
1.234
0.666
15
2.60
0.986
15
2.73
1.335
0.675
2
2.50
2.121
1
3.00
1.000
BioSafe1: BBP (13), NIH (6), BS (11) Biosafe2: BBP (12),
NIH (4), BS (10)
BioSafe1: BBP (13), NIH (10), BS (12) Biosafe2: BBP (14), NIH (9),
BS (13)
BioSafe1: BBP (13), NIH (11), BS (14) Biosafe2: BBP (13), NIH (11),
BS (14)

15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
2

2.13
2.07
3.27
3.93
2.00
3.93
2.93
4.20
2.00

0.990
1.163
1.335
1.280
1.254
1.438
1.486
0.941
1.414

15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
2

2.20
2.20
3.40
4.13
2.20
4.40
3.33
4.40
5.00

0.941
1.014
1.298
0.990
1.207
1.056
1.345
0.910
0.000

0.766
0.484
0.424
0.572
0.345
0.168
0.305
0.374

15
15
15
15
15
14
15
15
3

3.60
2.93
2.80
3.73
2.00
3.07
4.00
4.20
2.67

1.549
1.223
1.265
1.438
1.309
1.492
1.363
1.146
1.528

15
15
15
15
15
14
15
15
2

4.00
3.47
3.00
4.00
2.00
3.57
4.40
4.60
5.00

1.134
0.915
1.254
1.309
1.254
1.342
1.056
0.632
0.000

0.269
0.066
0.299
0.608
1.000
0.188
0.174
0.203
0.500

Lab inspection conducted by biosafety program administration
The biosafety administration at your institution conducts __________type of laboratory
inspections/assessments.
(1-Never,2-Rarely,3-Sometimes,4-Often,5-Always)
Announced
Unannounced
Both
Biohazard exposure prevention awareness
Are you aware of how to prevent exposure to a biological hazard if an incident involving
these hazards occurs in your lab? (3-Yes,2-Not Sure,1-No)
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14
14
8

3.00
1.50
2.00

1.301
0.650
1.069

14
14
8

3.14
1.43
1.75

1.512
0.756
1.165

0.679
0.766
0.346

15

3.00

0.000

15

3.00

0.000

NA

15
15
15
15
15
15

0.73
0.20
0.60
0.60
0.13
0.40

0.458
0.414
0.507
0.507
0.352
0.507

15
15
15
15
15
15

0.87
0.40
0.80
0.73
0.13
0.47

0.352
0.507
0.414
0.458
0.352
0.516

0.346
0.149
0.149
0.346
NA
0.773

15
0.00
0.000
Known biosafety incidents resulting in exposure to biohazards
Are you aware of any biosafety incidents resulting in exposure to biological hazards in
your lab during 2016 to 2020? (1-Yes,0- No)
15
0.13
0.352
Prior to 2014, 2 incidents: RNA reagents splashed in graduate student's eye and
needlestick
After 2016, dilute sodium azide was dumped in a sink
Table 26: Biosafety Practices Prior to 2014 versus Post 2016 in the UofL Biosafety Program Evaluation Study (n=30)

15

0.00

0.000

NA

15

0.07

0.258

0.773

Incident reporting
If incidents involving biohazards occurs in your lab, whom are you required to report to
per incident reporting guidelines at your institution? (Select all that apply) (1-if yes, 0-if
no)
Principal investigator
Department chair
Biosafety officer
EHS
Government (NIH, CDC, FDA, DOD, OSHA, State)
Colleagues in the lab
Known biosafety incidents resulting in lab acquired infections
Are you aware of any biosafety incidents resulting in Lab Acquired Infections in your lab
during 2016 to 2020? (1-Yes,0-No)

BioSafe-1
n=15

BioSafe-2
n=15

N
(%)

Mean

Std.
Dev.

N
(%)

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Perception on university biosafety practices
How do you rate biosafety practices at your university?
(3-Good as is,2-Can be improved,1-Undergoing improvements)

15

2.00

0.535

15

2.47

0.743

0.042

Perception on risk level of work conducted in the lab
What do you consider the risk level of work conducted in your lab?
(5-Very Low,4-Low,3-Moderate,2-High,1-Very High,0-I Don't Know)

15

3.53

0.640

15

3.47

0.743

0.777

Perception on measures taken in the lab against hazards
Do you believe your lab takes strong measures to protect you from the hazards of the work
conducted in your lab?
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Perception on university's Biosafety program in mitigating risks
Do you consider the biosafety program at your university to be effective in mitigating risks
in your lab?
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Perception on practices that improve adherence to safety practices & mitigate risk in lab
Which of the following do you believe would improve adherence to safety practices and
mitigating risks in your lab?
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Regulations and guidelines are strictly followed
Everyone is encouraged to know regulations and guidelines
Practical Training is given to first time researchers in lab before they begin work
Peer to Peer feedback on biosafety issues and safe practices is encouraged
Biosafety issues and safe practices are easily communicated
Senior management is involved in addressing biosafety issues and improve safe practices
Perception on lab inspections
Select the type of laboratory inspections/assessments you consider to be effective.
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

15

4.27

0.961

15

4.73

0.458

0.065

15

3.40

0.828

15

4.33

0.724

0.009

15
15
15
15
15
15

4.20
4.47
4.67
4.33
4.60
4.27

0.862
0.640
0.617
0.488
0.507
0.799

14
13
9

3.93
3.77
3.78

1.141
1.166
0.667

Biosafety Perceptions of Researchers at UofL
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Announced
Unannounced
Both

p-value1

Perception on training format
Select the following training format that you believe could improve biosafety at your
institution.
(Select all that apply)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
Online
Classroom
Hands on by Researchers
Hands on By Biosafety
Hands on by both researchers and Biosafety professionals
Perception on lab design considered safe
Which lab design do you believe is safer: (Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)
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15
14
15
14
15

3.93
3.93
4.20
4.29
4.27

1.163
1.072
1.146
1.139
1.100

Open
Closed
Both
Perception on lab design type preferred
Which lab design do you prefer to work at: (Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4-Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

14
13
8

2.86
4.08
3.00

1.167
0.760
0.926

Open
Closed
Both
Table 27: Biosafety Perceptions Prior to 2014 versus Post 2016 in the UofL Biosafety Program Evaluation Study (n=30)

14
12
8

3.43
3.83
3.25

1.399
1.193
1.035

BioSafe-2
n=15
Perceptions on Biological Laboratory Safety during COVID-19
Pandemic
In relation to COVID-19 and your activity in research labs, do you feel:
(Select appropriate response)
(1-Strongly Disagree,2-Disagree,3-Neither Agree nor Disagree,4Agree,5-Strongly Agree)

N (%)

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Feel safe working in labs

15

4.40

0.828

University prioritizes COVID-19 precautions in labs
Supervisor prioritizes COVID-19 precautions in labs

15
15

4.07
4.07

1.033
1.100

Good communication on changes in lab safety
In lab, peers are complying with lab safety and covid-19 precautions

15
15

3.67
4.53

1.113
0.640

COVID-19 precautions are imposing additional challenges to lab safety

15

3.60

1.183

Table 28: Biological Laboratory Safety Perceptions During COVID-19 Pandemic in the UofL Biosafety
Program Evaluation Study (n=30)
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Figure 11: Biosafety Program Aspects Identified During Biosafe-1 and Biosafe-2 in the UofL Biosafety Program Evaluation Study

Management
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-Neutral to
positive

Management
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Driven by
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Training
-Classroom

Training
-Online
-Classroom
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Biosafe-1
IBC protocol
review
-Electronic
pdf/word files
-3 to 4 months

Biosafe-2
Approach
-Adversarial
-Overreacting

Lab inspections
-Not many
-Unannounced if
any

Driven by
-Regulations
-Behavior-based
safety
-Safety culture
-Actual risk

IBC protocol
review
-Online
platforms (iRIS)
-1 to 2 months

Approach
-Collaborative
-Conducive to
research
Lab inspections
-Self
assessments
- Announced

CHAPTER 6: BIOSAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN THE ERA OF COVID19 AND BEYOND

Introduction
The previous chapters explored the status of biosafety climate at public universities in the
United States of America to understand the current needs and challenges in ensuring
safety in biological and biomedical research laboratories. Chapter 5 underscored the
perspectives of research professionals in identifying opportunities to enhance a biosafety
program. This chapter explored the perspectives of biosafety professionals in identifying
opportunities in biosafety program management.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a new human coronavirus that
caused coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was discovered in December 2019.74-76 Not long after, it
was officially declared as a global pandemic.77-78 Approximately 597,3943 deaths and 33,292,045
cases have been attributed to COVID-19 in the US alone as of June 14, 2021.139 Worldwide, the
pandemic has resulted in 3,829,318 deaths and more than 117 million cases of COVID-19 as of
June 14, 2021.140 Given the serious threat posed by the pandemic and risk of exposure to COVID19 pandemic at occupational settings, a multitude of measures have been put in place.
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) in USA provided guidance on
implementing a workplace COVID-19 prevention program to mitigate and prevent the spread of
COVID-19.79 Centers for Disease Control (CDC), World Health Organization, (WHO), state and
federal governments also provided guidance to mitigate risk of exposure to COVID-19 not only
in public settings but also occupational settings.79-83 Many changes to biosafety program
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management and laboratory safety measures were made in biological and biomedical research
and teaching laboratories to address the risks posed during the pandemic at public universities in
the US.82-140-142 Changes to general lab safety practices such as social distancing, remote work
when feasible, sanitizing of common/shared spaces, emergency communication, procedures of
cleaning, reminders on disinfection, personal hygiene, and appropriate personal protective
equipment (PPE) were made.142-144 In this chapter, we present a discussion on changes that were
made to biosafety program management to meet the needs of research community during a
pandemic and its implications on biosafety moving forward.

Insights from Biosafety Experts
To gain an understanding on biosafety program management, this study interviewed four
biosafety subject matter experts (SMEs): Sumit Ghosh, PhD, Allen Helm, Phd, Brandy Nelson,
MS and Patricia Delarosa, PhD, who were involved in biological laboratory safety at four well
known public universities in the US. The biosafety professionals in this study were asked similar
questions such as: explain challenges to biosafety program during the pandemic, describe changes
made to meet researcher’s safety, and opportunities identified for biosafety program management
during the pandemic. In May 2021, they were also requested to share their opinions and
suggestions to enhance biosafety program management at public universities in the US. The
responses shared by these SMEs are based on their experience and views on biosafety in general
and does not represent their place of work. Following is a summary from the interviews
conducted with the SMEs during May 2021.

128

Challenges to Biosafety Program Management During the Pandemic
Federal, state, and institutional policies and guidelines were put in place that included lockdown
measures to stop all non-essential work during the initial months of the pandemic, to prevent the
spread of novel coronavirus.145 This included most of the academic research laboratories unless
their work contributed to help curb the pandemic noted Dr. Helm. He and other SMEs recognized
that one of the challenges during the pandemic was creating a plan to return to work after a brief
shutdown of laboratories so that research professionals could safely resume laboratory research
activities. Finding an online platform to conduct biosafety administrative activities, meetings and
trainings was recognized as another challenge by one the SMEs. Few of the SMEs noted that,
conducting in person lab inspections and lab visits was difficult during the pandemic leading to
decrease in frequency of lab inspections. Given the diversity in academic institutions, Ms. Nelson
elaborated that, “how we make people aware of biosafety program elements, get that promulgated
throughout the institution and get people on board and get buy-in”, has always been a big
challenge in establishing a good safety culture in biological laboratories.

Changes Made to Biosafety Program Management During the Pandemic
Biosafety professionals were assigned with the task of risk mitigation for the COVID-19, as
research professionals pushed to study novel virus to understand its pathogenicity and develop
countermeasures.146 An increase in number of research professionals interested in working with
the novel coronavirus was noted.144,147 However, this soon highlighted the limitations of
laboratory resources and training,148 not only in developing countries but also in the US as
recognized by the SMEs. They stated that not many institutions have biosafety laboratory level
(BSL) 2+ or BSL-3 capabilities required for work with the novel coronavirus. Hence, it became a
challenge to change existing capabilities of laboratories to accommodate the needs of research
professionals in a short time. Also, training was developed quickly and specifically to train
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research professionals who were not previously trained to work in BSL-3 settings. Meetings,
orientations, and trainings were conducted online to accommodate the measures put in place due
to the pandemic. As trainings were given online, existing training material was updated to make it
more appealing and engaging to increase participation. Biosafety teams were assigned to conduct
walkthroughs once or twice during a day to ensure COVID-19 precautions were being followed
within research laboratories. Attending virtual workshops were incentivized through e-cards as
means of recognition and encouragement, noted Dr. Ghosh.
The frequency of in person lab inspections decreased during the pandemic due to labs being in
lockdown for few weeks and due to social distancing measures in place thereafter. To
accommodate, the measures put in place to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, changes were made
to lab inspections. One SME noted that their institution before pandemic conducted traditional in
person lab visits but since pandemic moved to a hybrid version. The hybrid inspection consisted
of two parts. The first part was a virtual inspection wherein one lab personnel and one member of
the biosafety team met via zoom and reviewed training records, IBC protocol, research questions
and so on. The second part of the inspection was a brief in person visit to the lab for a
walkthrough to conduct visual inspection of the workspace. Another expert noted that they
implemented self-assessments in place of in person laboratory inspections which seemed to work.

Opportunities for Biosafety Program Management During the Pandemic
The SMEs made an interesting observation that the use of virtual platforms for trainings and
meetings during the pandemic resulted in increased attendance and participation. “We found that
offering trainings and meetings through virtual platform increased attendance in our meetings, so
that definitely worked in our favor”, stated Dr. Ghosh. Both Dr. Ghosh and Ms. Nelson
emphasized that they observed positive response to virtual trainings and webinars. She added that
the pandemic led to transition of work from traditional in person format to virtual, which proved
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to be advantageous. The flexibility to schedule virtual meetings with principal investigators per
their flexibility led to increased communication between research professionals and biosafety
team, she noted.
During the pandemic, Ms. Nelson notes that some of her peer in the biosafety community
expressed an increase in awareness to biosafety programs not only by research professionals but
also the institution. The pandemic enabled people to understand and utilize the biosafety
resources already available at their institutions, echoed other SMEs. Dr. Delarosa emphasized the
importance of biosafety community in addressing COVID-19 pandemic. She explained that few
of the many roles that biosafety community was called upon to undertake during the pandemic
included: acting as public health advisers, subject matter experts in responding to scientific
discussions, reaching out to public to address their risk concerns and bring an awareness to risk
mitigation measures.

Biosafety during the COVID-19 era and beyond
The SMEs interviewed in this study shared their opinions on ensuring effective biosafety
programs in academic laboratories. SMEs recognized collaboration with research professionals to
understand their needs and being flexible as important in smooth biosafety program management.
Even though the guidelines on lab safety during the initial months of the pandemic was not very
clear, Dr. Helm informed that biosafety programs were able to successfully coordinate and
enforce additional lab safety measures required during the pandemic. This he attributes to having
a well-established communication system in place between research and biosafety professionals
as well as full buy-in from university administration to implement a biosafety program. Dr.
Ghosh recommends trainings that are innovative to keep people engaged and motivated to attend
training sessions. Preparation is the key stated Dr. Ghosh advising biosafety programs to be
prepared in the future for unexpected challenges posed by pandemic as he explains, “it has
happened once it might happen again”.
131

To develop a good biosafety program during the COVID-19 era and beyond, it is essential to
incorporate research and biosafety professionals’ recommendations when creating or improving
biosafety programs.
Based on the insights provided by the SME’s and observations from Chapter 5. The following
aspects can be summarized as important to a biosafety program from the perspective of biosafety
professionals:
•

Information sharing through monthly and quarterly newsletters or posters to share
information on safety related topics, injuries, near misses, safety reviews, overall
findings, safety regulations and guidelines.

•

Trainings that are engaging and appealing when delivered through online platforms.

•

Collaboration between research and biosafety professionals to work as a team to address
safety concerns and mitigate risks.

•

Communication between research and biosafety professional to share any safety related
concerns as and when they arise.

•

Buy-in/support from both management and research professionals to run a biosafety
program

Chapter 3 and 5 provided details on the elements of a biosafety program that research
professionals considered to be of importance. The following aspects were considered important to
a biosafety program from the perspective of research professionals:
•

Hands on training from both experienced research and biosafety professionals.

•

Resources on standard protocols, guidelines, risk assessment, exposure prevention, post
exposure measures, prophylactic measures, opening and closing labs.
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•

Ease of Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) protocol submission and review process
that balances risk and appropriate control measures.

•

Risk assessment based on actual risk.

•

Lab inspections or visits to increase interactions between research and biosafety
professionals.

The findings from previous chapters also highlighted the need to decrease gaps between research
and biosafety professionals such as biosafety resources awareness, resources utilized for risk
assessment, awareness on lab acquired incidents, awareness on potential exposures and risk
assessment process so that research and biosafety professionals can work together as a team in
establishing biological laboratory safety. Be it during COVID-19 or beyond, it is important for
biosafety administration to be aware of their institutional needs and capabilities. They should be
aware of:
•

Number of labs (active, new, and closed)

•

Type of laboratory (shared/closed/ biosafety laboratory level)

•

Type of research conducted (risk groups utilized)

•

Number of research professionals

•

Facilities available

•

Type of training platform (online/in-person) utilized versus preferred by research
professionals

•

Training needs (update based on findings from lab inspections and survey of researcher’s
feedback)

•

Training platform (adaptable both online and in person)

•

Resource awareness (people, facilities)

•

Prioritize lab inspections (tiering labs based on hazards, type of research)
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•

Lab inspections - self-assessment, in person or virtual to meet the needs of the research
community.

Discussion
The study identified the challenges and opportunities due to changes made to biosafety program
management to accommodate the occupational safety measures put in place due to COVID-19
pandemic at biological laboratories at public universities in the US. This study identified
important aspects of a biosafety program that must be considered not only during a pandemic but
beyond to move biosafety in the right direction.
Dr. Delarosa reminded of the incidents that happened during 2014 that singled out federal labs for
having problems with safety and biosecurity. She explained that this fundamentally shook the
biosafety community, as “there was a realization that you can have all the guidance and all the
regulation in place, and you still aren’t safe. You still cannot guarantee the safety of your
workers”. She explained that this led to the publication of recommendations by the Federal
Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) in 2015 on changes to biosafety programs to fill in
those gaps identified by the various incidences. The FESAP provides guiding principles for
biosafety governance that promotes federal requirements compliance and foster culture of
responsibility within research institutions,149-150 Dr. Delarosa pointed out that this was a good way
towards establishing a culture of safety in laboratories. She stated that recommendations based on
nuclear regulatory safety measures151 are now being recommended to establish a culture of
responsibility to ensure safety in biological laboratories.
Dr. Ghosh states that organizations should utilize biosafety professionals’ expertise in not only
laboratory settings, but also other areas given their expertise and unique perspective in controlling
hazards posed by infectious agents. This view was also expressed by Ms. Nelson who said that
the pandemic brought increased awareness to biosafety programs at institutions. The principles of
biosafety program management haven’t changed before and during the pandemic stated Dr.
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Helm. He explained, be it before, during or after a pandemic the three important aspects of an
effective biosafety program remain the same: establishing collegiality with research professionals
(improves communication), buy-in from institution and being as non-punitive as possible. “We
are your colleagues, not cops”, said Dr. Helm stressing the importance of research and biosafety
professionals working together as a team to establish efficient biosafety culture. In the same line
of thought, Dr. Delarosa agrees that biosafety moving forward should look at understanding the
systemic failures that result in biosafety accidents and incidents rather than pointing out fingers at
who did that.
An important observation that Dr. Delarosa makes was the need for biosafety to transcend the
confinements of a laboratory and consider its application in public health in advising on risks.
Moving forward, in the era of COVID-19 pandemic and beyond it is essential to not only
optimize biosafety programs in place for biological laboratories but also interface biosafety and
public health practices for the health and wellbeing of everyone.
The key strength of this study is that it summarized perspectives of biosafety professionals in
determining the changes made to biosafety program during the pandemic at the US academic
laboratories. However, one limitation of this study is that, only SMEs at public universities in the
US were interviewed. Further studies need to analyze in depth the challenges and opportunities in
managing biosafety. However, the findings from this study are important in preliminary
exploration on the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on biosafety program from the perspective of
biosafety professionals.

Conclusion
The findings from this chapter and previous chapters, concludes that an effective biosafety
program management should incorporate elements that addresses the needs of research
professionals in facilitating safe research activities while also meeting the biosafety community’s
goals of risk mitigation and safety compliance. Biosafety program management should be
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developed by taking into consideration the viewpoints of research professionals as the end
consumers to increase their buy-in and compliance. The expertise of biosafety professionals
should be considered not only in administering a biosafety program but also during risk
assessment process. Research and biosafety community need to work together as a team,
complementing each other’s expertise in developing an effective biosafety program that protects
from potential exposures to infectious agents and hazards.
The COVID-19 pandemic not only accentuated the needs for continued research on existing and
emerging infectious diseases but also the need for a biosafety program to keep up with the
evolving needs of microbiological and biomedical research. The insights gained from this study
could help in shaping biosafety program during the COVID-19 era and beyond.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
This chapter encapsulates the overall findings, strengths, limitations, significance, and future
recommendations of this dissertation.

Overall Findings
Chapter 1 presented an overview of specific aims and studies conducted as part of this
dissertation. Chapter 2 presented a background on safety climate as a leading indicator of
safety and its application in capturing a snapshot of safety culture at biological
laboratories. A step-by-step process on scale development was provided to inform
interested scholars on process involved in Biosafety Climate (BSCL) scale development.
Based on survey data collected from research professionals at UofL (n=91) and biosafety
professionals in the US (n=88), a biosafety climate scale with 17 items was developed
and validated for research and biosafety professionals using exploratory factor analysis
and reliability measures.
Chapter 3 showed that the BSCL scale was effective in measuring biosafety climate over
time at University of Louisville (UofL) based on test-retest analysis. This study compared
the survey data collected from research professionals at UofL (n=91) during 2019 and
survey data collected from research professionals at UofL (n=120) during 2020. This
study concluded that biosafety climate perceptions remained the same prior to and during
COVID-19 pandemic. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated a five-factor
underlying structure for BSCL scale for research professionals.
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Chapter 4 presented the results of a national survey of research and biosafety
professionals at public universities in the US that worked in biological and biomedical
laboratories. Survey was distributed to 584 public universities in the US, resulting in
responses from research professionals (n=690) and biosafety professionals (n=157). The
survey data was utilized to conduct CFA, which confirmed five underlying structure of
the BSCL scale of research professionals. These five factors are: management priority,
supervisor commitment, communication, participation, and group norm. This study found
that the overall biosafety climate scores of research and biosafety professionals are
comparable. However, some significant differences between individual item scores of the
BSCL scale between research and biosafety professionals was found. This study
identified the gaps in perceptions of research and biosafety professionals which suggests
that the information being applied to assess risk might be different for research and
biosafety professionals.
Chapter 5 found significant association between biosafety climate perceptions and
biosafety program management. For this study, data was collected from research
professionals (n=15) at UofL through a survey and interviews on perceptions during two
different biosafety program managements in place at UofL over the period 2011 to 2021.
A review of program records was also conducted as part of this study. Perspectives from
research professionals on the important aspects of a biosafety program management
during and beyond COVID-19 pandemic was shared in this study. A biosafety program
that is collaborative in approach, driven by actual risk, safety culture and behavior-based
concepts elicited better perceptions of biosafety climate from researchers.
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Chapter 6 summarized the perspectives of biosafety professionals on biosafety program
management in biological laboratories. Four subject matter experts were asked to share
their opinions on biosafety during the pandemic. A summary of the perspectives of
research professionals on biosafety program management was drawn from the previous
studies. The important aspects of biosafety program management from the perspective of
both biosafety and research professionals were presented in the era of COVID-19 and
beyond.
Strengths
Primary data was collected for all the studies presented in this dissertation that would be
of immense interest to biosafety and research community. The BSCL scale that was
developed and validated can be used as a key performance indicator of biosafety
programs and aid in developing targeted interventions to improve safety. The impact of
COVID-19 pandemic and biosafety program management on biosafety climate
perceptions was evaluated. The BSCL scale was utilized to assess the impact of two
different management programs on biosafety climate at UofL, revealing valuable insights
that could aid the current biosafety management to further advance biosafety. This study
quantified the biosafety climate perceptions of researchers and biosafety professionals at
the national level, providing a snapshot of safety status of biological research
laboratories.
Limitations
This dissertation only collected data from public biological laboratories in the USA and,
thus, the results should be interpreted carefully when generalizing the findings to private,
diagnostic, or clinical biological laboratories. The BSCL scale for research professionals
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was confirmed to have a five underlying factor structure. However, the BSCL scale for
biosafety professionals was unable to confirm the underlying factor structure.
Significance
Overall, this dissertation study contributes to the field of occupational safety and fills in
gaps in the literature on safety climate specific to academic biological and biomedical
research laboratories in the US. BSCL scale has the potential to serve as a benchmark for
evaluating biosafety climate at academic laboratories. It can serve as a tool for biosafety
program management and process improvement. This dissertation utilized the BSCL
scale successfully to quantify biosafety climate perceptions of research and biosafety
professionals at biological laboratories. By evaluating the biosafety practices,
perceptions, and impact of COVID-19 pandemic on biosafety climate perceptions at
national biological laboratories, this study was able to find the gaps in differences
between research and biosafety professionals. Significant differences in risk perceptions’,
biosafety resources awareness and utilization was observed between research and
biosafety professionals. Perspectives from both research and biosafety professionals was
collected as part of this dissertation, which should be considered in developing or
improving biosafety programs for biological laboratories.
Future Recommendations
The association of biosafety climate and drivers of biosafety programs should be further
explored. The disparities in risk assessment, utilization of biosafety guidelines, and
resources between research and biosafety professionals should be evaluated. Studies
should emphasize on a thorough understanding on the gaps between research and
biosafety professionals in biosafety program management. Biosafety programs
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management should consider the recommendations and biosafety climate perceptions of
research and biosafety professionals presented in this dissertation.
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APPENDIX C
Biosafety Climate (BSCL) Scale Development and Validation Process

•Scientific literature review.
•Identification of existing safety climate scales.
•Examine themes within safety climate scales.
Literature review •Identify themes important to Biosafety Climate (BSCL).

Items
Development

•Development of BSCL items.
•Input from subject matter experts (biosafety and research
professionals).
•15 items identified for BSCL scale.

•Survey administration to research (n=9) and biosafety (n=7)
professionals.
•Analyze data from study 1 (feedback from experts, reliability test,
content validity).
•Revise 15 items & addition of 2 items, based on feedback, reliability
Study 1:
Development of and quanitative data analysis.
•Reliability analysis of the proposed 17 items.
BSCL Scale
•Finalize 17 items of BSCL scale.

Study2:
Validation of
BSCL Scale

•Survey administration to research (n=91) and biosafety (n=88)
professionals.
•Analyze data from study 2 (exploratory factor analysis, reliability
test, content validity).
•Examine items and factors in BSCL scale.
•Determine themes identifies in the BSCL scale.
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APPENDIX D
Subject Recruitment Email
Subject title: Contribute to PhD Study | Perception of Biosafety in UofL Biological Laboratories
Greetings,

I am a Ph.D. candidate at University of Louisville. As part of my dissertation thesis, I am
investigating biosafety climate and perceptions of both biosafety and research professionals at US
academic laboratories under the guidance of Dr. Torsten Hopp, Biosafety Officer at UofL.

You are requested to participate in the study if you are a student, researcher
and/or biosafety professional at an academic university performing microbiological and
biomedical research activities utilizing risk group 1, 2 or 3 agents at BSL-1 and/or 2 laboratories.
Please contribute to our study by participating and sharing the Biosafety Climate Survey at
UofL by clicking here URL LINK from REDCap. This is a public link that can be shared with
others whereas the link at the bottom of this email is specific to you.
Your input will enable us to gain insights on the status of biosafety climate and understand the
factors that lead to safer biological laboratories.

Your participation is essential for the success of our study and any confidential information will
be strictly safeguarded. It will take you about 20 minutes to complete the survey.
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Our study on Biosafety Climate in the USA (IRB #: 18.1220) has been approved by the
University of Louisville's Institutional Review Board on 07/22/2019.
For further details, please respond to this email or call Sivarchana Mareedu at (502) 718-9795

Sincerely,
Sivarchana Mareedu, MS
Doctoral Candidate, School of Public Health, and Information Sciences
UofL COVID-19 Contact Tracing Advisor/Analyst
Campus Health Services and Department of Environmental Health and Safety
University of Louisville
AND
Torsten A. Hopp, PhD, RBP
University Biosafety Officer / Responsible Official
Adjunct Assistant Professor, School of Public Health and Information Sciences
Department of Environmental Health and Safety
University of Louisville
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APPENDIX E
Biosafety Climate Survey: USA
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APPENDIX F
Subject Recruitment Email
Subject title: PhD Study| Perception of Safety in US Biological Laboratories
Greetings,
We are writing this message requesting your participation in our study. If you already completed
this survey, kindly ignore this message. However, we humbly request you to share this survey
with your peers and acquaintances.
We appreciate your time and attention.
You are requested to participate in the study if you are at an academic university in the USA
performing microbiological and biomedical research activities utilizing risk group 1, 2 or 3 agents
at BSL-1 and/or 2 laboratories in one of the following roles:
•

Student

•

Researcher

•

Biosafety professional

Please contribute to our study by participating and sharing our survey on safety practices in
biological laboratory settings by clicking here URL LINK from REDCap. You can either click on this
public link URL LINK from REDCap that can be shared with others or click on the link at the
bottom of this email that is specific to you to complete the survey
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Your input will enable us to gain insights on the status of biosafety climate, compare perceptions
of researchers and biosafety professionals and understand the factors that lead to safer
biological laboratories.
Your participation is essential for the success of our study and any confidential information will
be strictly safeguarded. It will take you about 10 to 15 minutes to complete the survey.
Our study on Biosafety Climate in the USA (IRB #: 18.1220) has been approved by the University
of Louisville's Institutional Review Board on 07/22/2019.

For further details, please respond to this email or call Sivarchana Mareedu at (502) 718-9795
NOTE: You will receive 3 emails requesting your participation in this study. Please, ignore these
requests if you do not want to participate or respond ‘Remove’ to stop receiving these email
requests. Thank you!
Sincerely,
Sivarchana Mareedu, MS
Doctoral Candidate, School of Public Health, and Information Sciences
Department of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences
University of Louisville
AND
Torsten A. Hopp, PhD, RBP
University Biosafety Officer / Responsible Official
Adjunct Assistant Professor, School of Public Health, and Information Sciences
Department of Environmental Health and Safety
University of Louisville
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APPENDIX G
Institutional Review Board -Outcome Letter 2
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APPENDIX H
Subject Recruitment Email
Are you involved in biological research at University of Louisville?
We are enrolling volunteers for a research study to compare biosafety climate at University of
Louisville’s biological research laboratories prior to December 31, 2014 and after January 01,
2015.
Qualified participants must be:
1. 18 years or older.
2. Involved in research/work at UofL biological research laboratories that utilize risk group
1, 2 or 3 agents at biosafety level 1, 2 or 3 laboratories.
3. Have worked for at least 6 months or more prior to January 01, 2015 at UofL biological
research laboratories.
The study involves participation in an online survey and phone/virtual interview. Your identity
will be kept strictly confidential. There is no compensation for participation in the study. But
your valuable experience and input will be greatly appreciated.

If you are interested, please contact us for more details:
Sivarchana Mareedu, MS
Doctoral Candidate, School of Public Health, and Information Sciences
Department of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences
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University of Louisville
OR
Torsten A. Hopp, PhD, RBP
University Biosafety Officer / Responsible Official
Adjunct Assistant Professor, School of Public Health, and Information Sciences
Department of Environmental Health and Safety
University of Louisville
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APPENDIX I
Study Details Email
Subject title: Study Details | Biosafety Climate at UofL: Now & Then
Greetings,
Thank you for expressing your interest in our study.
You are requested to participate in the study if you have been involved in biological research or
biological safety related work at University of Louisville for at least 6 months or longer prior to
December 31, 2014.

The study involves the following activities:
1. Questionnaires: A Biosafety climate survey that will take approximately 20 minutes to
complete.
2. Phone/Virtual interview: This interview will take about 45 minutes or longer and will
involve a structured interview with open and close ended questions.

To participate in the survey please click here URL LINK from REDCap . This is a public link that
can be shared with others whereas the link at the bottom of this email is specific to you.

Your input will enable us to gain insights on the status of biosafety climate prior to 12/31/2014
(Then) and after 01/01/2015 (Now) at UofL and understand the factors that lead to safer
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biological laboratories at academic research institutions.

Your participation is essential for the success of our study and any confidential information will
be strictly safeguarded. For questions, please respond to this email or call Sivarchana Mareedu.

If you already received this email earlier, kindly ignore this message. We appreciate your time
and attention.

Sincerely,
Sivarchana Mareedu, MS
Doctoral Candidate, School of Public Health, and Information Sciences
Department of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences
University of Louisville
AND
Torsten A. Hopp, PhD, RBP
University Biosafety Officer / Responsible Official
Adjunct Assistant Professor, School of Public Health, and Information Sciences
Department of Environmental Health and Safety
University of Louisville
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APPENDIX J
Interview Guide
Confidentiality Statement
•

Any identifying information will be removed from the data collected.

•

Only the principal investigators will have access to the information.
o

Sivarchana Mareedu

o

Dr. Torsten Hopp

•

With your permission, the interview will be recorded for data collection.

•

The recording will be deleted once the study is completed.

Study Details
The study involves the following activities:
•

Phone/virtual interview: This interview will take approximately 60 to 90 minutes.
Semi structured interview approach to ensure same general areas of information are
collected from each interview. Includes open and close ended questions.

•

Questionnaire: A Biosafety climate survey that will take approximately 40 to 60 minutes
to complete. A link to the survey will be shared at the end of the interview.

In today’s interview, we will be discussing about the topics listed here. It consists of 5 topics on
biosafety and your thoughts on biosafety. I will email the survey link at the end of the study. This
is a semi structured interview, so please feel free to discuss on any topic not mentioned here.

Biosafety Administration
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A. Biosafety program in place
1. Discuss any changes in the biosafety program over the years?
2. How have trainings related to biological safety changed over the years?
3. Describe accessibility for resources on biosafety guidelines at UofL?
4. Discuss how lab assessment are conducted.
B. Institutional Biosafety Committee
1. Were you ever a member of IBC?
2. Did you ever apply for a research protocol approval through IBC?
3. Tell me about the research protocol submission process?
4. Discuss if you find the process efficient?
C. Management priority to safety
1. How would you describe the management priority on biosafety practices?
2. Discuss any changes in management priority regarding biosafety over the years
at university level and at department level.
Safety Practices
A. Communication
1. Do you feel there is open & easy communication with biosafety officer/staff?
Please explain.
2. Describe how you communicate with biosafety office for any biosafety related
matters or concerns?
3. Discuss if you find the biosafety office approachable?
4. What type of communication about biosafety related matters did you receive?
5. Explain how communication about biosafety related matters has changed over
the years?
B. Participation and involvement
1. Describe your involvement in biological safety matters at UofL over the years?
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2. Are there opportunities to be involved? Explain.
C. Group norms and behavior
1. Explain changes in group norms and behavior in relation to biosafety over the
years?
2. Discuss the awareness and participation levels of your peers/research personnel
in the laboratory about biosafety matters?
3. Describe how often do you discuss biosafety matters with peers/research
personnel and administration (UofL & Department)
Safety Concerns
Please discuss:
A. Any safety concerns?
B. Rate safety concerns?
C. If different over years?
Note: Respond in relation to 3 time periods:12/31/2014 or prior, 01/01/2016 to 02/29/2020 and
Since 03/01/2021 (during COVID-19)

Safety Perceptions
A. Discuss if you have a positive or negative opinion on biosafety practices at UofL?
B. Describe your observation on changes in lab safety over the years?
Note: Respond in relation to 3 time periods:12/31/2014 or prior, 01/01/2016 to 02/29/2020 and
Since 03/01/2021 (during COVID-19)

COVID-19 and Biosafety
A. What additional challenges to lab safety did you notice?
B. Discuss how UofL biosafety program adapted to ensure lab safety during
COVID-19?
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Final Thoughts
A. Any suggestions to ensure efficient lab safety practices, moving forward?
B. Discuss Biosafety over the years.
C. Your opinion on biosafety practices at UofL

Biosafety Climate Survey
I will email the link to you by the end of the day.
The online survey will take 40 to 60 minutes approximately. You can pause and resume the
survey as needed. Just save your code or reach out to me. Survey consists of 6 parts:
1. Consent information
2. Inclusion criteria
3. Demographics
4. Questionnaire 12/31/2014 or prior
5. Questionnaire 01/01/2016 or later if applicable
6. Current safety perceptions

Questions or Comments.
Thank you for your participation.
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APPENDIX K
Biosafety Climate Survey at UofL: Program Evaluation

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

CURRICULUM VITAE
Sivarchana Mareedu Boada
485 East Gary Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Email: msivarchana@gmail.com
EDUCATION
Doctor of Philosophy in Public Health Sciences -Environmental Health, August 2021
University of Louisville, Kentucky, USA


Dissertation: Development and validation of biosafety climate scale and survey-based
analyses of safety perceptions in biological research and teaching laboratories at public
universities in the USA

Master of Science in Environmental, Safety and Health Management, December 2012
University of Findlay, Ohio, USA


Thesis: Trend analysis of occupational injuries in manufacturing sector from 1926 to 2011
and benefits of implementing a lock-out/tag-out program in compliance with federal OSHA
in a manufacturing company

Post Graduate Diploma in Bioinformatics, June 2010
Osmania University, India


Thesis: Molecular Modeling and Docking Studies of RXR Antagonists based on
Diepinylbenzoic Acid Structure

Bachelor of Science in Chemistry, Biotechnology and Biochemistry, June 2009
St. Mary’s College, Osmania University, India


Project: Isolation, Immobilization, and assay of enzyme amylase from different sources.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
COVID-19 Contact Tracing Lead/Analyst, August 2020 to December 2020
University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
•

Established contact tracing program, data management and analysis.
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•

Trained and supervised 12 student workers and 2 full time employees.

•

Supervised a 12-member team.

•

Responsible for weekly reports on trends that was shared with University’s management
and Louisville Health Department for Public Health and Wellness.

COVID-19 Communicable Disease Investigator, June 2020 to July 2020
Kindred Health / Lacuna Health, Louisville, Kentucky
Client: Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness
•

Assist in diseases investigation, contact tracing, completing assessment forms,
communicate with patients or next of kin, identify epi link and clusters, issue
isolation/quarantine orders, provide resources, document non-compliance, escalate to local
health department as needed.

Case Investigator Volunteer, April 2020 to June 202
Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness, Louisville, Kentucky
•

Assist Covid-19 Response group with contacting cases, completing assessment forms,
daily disposition for hospitalized patients, review Electronic Health Record (EHR),
communicate with patients or next of kin, identify epi link, inform administrative
assistant about isolation/quarantine orders, document non-compliance, communicate with
Lead Epi, Epi Director and Director of Nursing, and close cases.

Patient Registration Representative, July 2019 to July 2020
Norton Healthcare, Louisville, Kentucky
•

Register patients of all ages by filling out all the required documentation, patient
verification, insurance verification and provide resources to patients and their families or
friends during their visit to the emergency room.

Sales Associate, November 2018 to July 2019
Coach Outlet Shoppes of the Bluegrass, Simpsonville, Kentucky
•

Work at the cash register and assist multiple customers simultaneously as needed.

•

Discuss product features with clients.

•

Replenish inventory on sales floor as needed.

•

Processes shipments as needed.

•

Use company’s tools and resources to be up to date with product knowledge.

Graduate Research/Teaching Assistant, August 2015 to August 2020
University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
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Summary: I worked with University of Louisville's, School of Public Health, and Information
Sciences, EHOS department. I assisted the faculty’s research on lead exposure in children exposed
to cigarette smoke, nano particle exposure on mice and DEHS's biosafety related activities. I also
assisted with teaching undergraduate and graduate courses.
Lab Rotation I, August 2015 to December 2015.
Assist the faculty in department’s research and teaching assistant for graduate classes: Introduction
to Environmental & Occupational Health, and Occupational Health and Safety.
•

Assist in grading of tests and assignments.

•

Attend lectures and participate in class discussions.

•

Prepare grading rubrics to be used in the current and future courses.

Lab Rotation II, January 2016 to May 2016.
Assist the faculty in department’s research: Lead exposure in children exposed to cigarette smoke.
•

Data entry and analysis in SPSS and R studio.

•

Conduct protein estimation and Western blot experiments.

•

Write summary reports on assigned readings.

•

Write and edit manuscript on exposure to lead in children.

•

Assist and guide undergraduate students in research.

•

Assist in experiments and lab maintenance under the guidance of a senior doctoral
candidate student.

•

Attend weekly lab meetings.

•

Attend seminars by various departments in the university.

•

Take required trainings to work in the lab: HIPPA, OSHA, Blood borne pathogen safety,
Lab safety.

Lab Rotation III, June 2016 to December 2016.
Assist the faculty in department’s research: Effects of nano particle exposure on mice.
•

Assist during mouse harvesting experiments.

•

Prepare materials needed prior to experiments.

•

Maintain the laboratory.

•

Guide Graduate visiting student from China.

•

Read current literature on nano particle pollution and exposure to humans.

•

Embed mouse tissues and organs in paraffin cassette and label them for storage.

•

Conduct basic molecular biology and protein purifications tasks.

•

Data analysis and documentation.
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Lab Rotation IV, January 2017 to December 2020.
Assist DEHS’s Biosafety staff in biosafety related activities and research.
•

Assist in Institutional Biosafety Committee meetings.

•

Assist in preparation of meeting agenda and meeting minutes.

•

Attend seminars, meetings, and trainings.

•

Update and periodically review the research protocols in iRIS system to follow the
regulations.

•

Read current literature on safety topics.

Graduate Teaching Assistant, August 2017 to August 2020.
•

Assisted in undergraduate courses:
o
o
o

PHUN-550 Public Health and Our Environment
PHUN 550 Public Health Nutrition
PHUN-440 Biology for Population Health

•

Develop teaching material, quizzes, and test material.

•

Facilitated class discussions and lectures.

•

Assisted students with questions and concerns.

•

Proctored examinations and graded exams.

Environmental, Health and Occupational Safety Intern, January 2012 to June 2012
Okamoto Sandusky Manufacturing LLC, Sandusky, Ohio
•

Developed 250 Lock-Out/Tag-Out procedures for all the controlled equipment to provide
a safe environment for the employees and comply with OSHA.

•

Incorporate a safety culture by making the employees aware of healthy and safe practices
by actively observing fellow employee’s work practices and making recommendations to
enhance safety.

•

Communicated with different employees like team leaders, operators, maintenance, and
other employees at management level to gather required information to establish LockOut/Tag-Out program at the facility.

•

Assisted the EHS manager in safety training, incident investigation, development of new
and review of current training programs to ensure safe working conditions at the facility.

•

Created HIMS labels, assisted in the preparation of OSHA 300 logs and incidents that
occurred at the facility.

Student Assistant, August 2011 to December 2011
University of Findlay, Findlay, Ohio
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•

Developed and strategically implemented the project for the Self Study Report to submit
to The National Environmental Health Science & Protection Accreditation Council
(EHAC) for review and accreditation.

•

Assisted in the accreditation renew process of the undergraduate Environmental Safety and
Occupational Health Management (ESOH) program.

•

Collected information on all the courses offered for the past six years by interacting with
faculty and staff in various departments.

•

Organized gathered information into databases for analysis.

•

Analyzed the past enrollment trends and predicted the future enrollment trends in the
undergraduate ESOH program.

VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE
Library Volunteer, June 2015 to July 2015
Centerville Public Library, Centerville, Indiana
•

Developed an emergency preparedness plan for the library.

•

Assisted library staff with organizing events and programs for the community.

•

Organized the books in the shelves.

Hospital Volunteer, January 2013 to March 2014
Reid Hospital and Health Care Services, Richmond, Indiana
•

Assist in documentation of monthly environmental and safety surveys collected from
various departments.

•

Track the missing or misplaced surveys and keep the information up to date.

•

Organize the documents for the Hospital’s Incident Command System, Emergency
Management Plan, and Safety Committee reports.

•

Retrieve patient information and provide appropriate information in person or over the
phone to patients and family/visitors, accessing current and confidential information of the
patients in the hospital.

SKILLS
•

Language: English, Telugu, Hindi, French (beginner level)

•

Lab: Western blot analysis, PCR, Formalin-Fixed Paraffin-Embedded Experiments,
Inventory maintenance, Cell culture mouse cell lines, Harvest cells and culture medium.

•

Computer: Microsoft Office, MS Project office, SPSS, SAS, R, Brady graphical writing
software, Programming, Web designing, Html, sybyl, video/photo editing tools, MS
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Visio, Software Testing tools: QTP, Selenium, Social Media Management: Blogging and
networking.
•

Soft: Excellent verbal, written, analytical, interpersonal, organizational and
communication skills, detail oriented, goal oriented, resourceful, flexible, accountable,
innovative, enthusiastic, self-motivated, quick learner, efficient in time management,
efficient team leader, team player, and possess strong work ethics.

CERTIFICATIONS
•

Dental Public Health Certification (2019, non-credit)

•

30 Hours OSHA General Compliance (#23-900251577)

•

ISTQB-AT: International Software Testing Quality Board-Foundation level Agile Tester

HONORS


Phi Kappa Phi

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP


2018-2019: Graduate Student Council Representative for EHOS at university of Louisville



2017-Present: Midwest Area Biosafety Network (MABiON)



2016-Present: The Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity (ABSA)



2020-Present: The American Public Health Association (APHA)

PUBLICATIONS / MANUSCRIPTS IN PREPARATION
1. Sivarchana Mareedu-Boada, Torsten Alwin Hopp, and Riten Mitra. Development and
validation of biosafety climate scale for biological and biomedical science laboratories in
the

United

States.

Applied

Biosafety.

Ahead

of

print.

http://doi.org/10.1089/apb.2021.0006
2. Sivarchana Mareedu-Boada, Riten Mitra and Torsten Alwin Hopp. Biosafety Climate in
biological and biomedical laboratories at public universities in the USA. In preparation
3. Sivarchana Mareedu-Boada, Riten Mitra and Torsten Alwin Hopp. Impact of COVID-19
on biosafety climate at university of Louisville. In preparation.
4. Sivarchana Mareedu-Boada, Riten Mitra, David Tollerud and Torsten Alwin Hopp. Impact
of biosafety program management on biosafety climate at university of Louisville. In
preparation.
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5. Sivarchana Mareedu-Boada, Riten Mitra and Torsten Alwin Hopp. Biosafety program
management in the era of COVID-19 and beyond. In preparation
PRESENTATIONS & CONFERENCES
1. Ensuring Biosafety in Academic Research Institutions: Biosafety Survey and Program
Development
Midwest Area Biosafety Network, August 2018
2. Development and Implementation of a safety Intervention at Academic Biological
Laboratories
Midwest Area Biosafety Network, August 2019
3. Development and Validation of Biosafety Climate Scale for US Biomedical and
Microbiological Research Universities
Midwest Area Biosafety Network, August 2020
4. Evaluation of Biosafety Climate (BSCL) in Biological and Biomedical Laboratories at
Public Universities in the USA
Midwest Area Biosafety Network, August 2021 (Scheduled to be presented)
5. Evaluation of biosafety program administration and SARS-CoV2 on Biosafety Climate at
a Midwestern Public University in the USA
Annual Biosafety and Biosecurity Conference, October 2021 (Scheduled to be presented)
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